Accidents and Disasters: Lessons from Air Crashes and Pandemics

Description

This book deals with the contemporary subject of perception of risk and its influence on accidents and disasters. The contents examine the conventional viewpoints on human errors, incubation of errors, complexity and organisational deviance as a cause for accidents. Work of Mary Douglas with regard to risk, Charles Perrow's work on the normal accident theory and Diane Vaughan's theory on normalisation of deviance are examined from a fresh perspective in this book. It also discusses prominent accidents in aviation, space, nuclear energy, automotive and healthcare, using the pandemic and Boeing 737 Max as a backdrop to study accidents and disasters. It further explores the background and similarities to these events and addresses the core issues such as the state of regulation, the worldview of the sociologists, and proposes that mental models of complex systems, avarice and risk for gain as other possibilities for accidents. Using the concept of nudge in behavioural economics and the Elinor Ostrom’s viewpoint on regulating for common good, it suggests a way forward through the High Reliability Organisation Theory (HRO) leading to enhanced risk perception. The book will be of interest to those who would like to understand the need to incorporate risk perception into regulation, engineers and scientists, professionals and policy makers working in the areas of disaster and risk management, technology areas like aviation, nuclear plants, space and healthcare, students of the sociology of risk and of course the general reader. Preface Contents About the Author 1 Introduction References 2 Incidents, Accidents, and Unmitigated Disasters 2.1 Tenerife, Concorde, Comet, and the Boeing 737 Max 2.2 The Space Shuttle Disasters 2.3 Fukushima and Chernobyl 2.4 COVID-19, OxyContin, and Thalidomide 2.5 Other Accidents and Disasters References 3 Learning from Failures—Evolution of Risk and Safety Regulation 3.1 Bird Strikes and Air Crashes 3.2 Elon Musk and Space Travel 3.3 Nuclear Energy and IAEA 3.4 Stagecoaches, Cars, and Seatbelts 3.5 Oil Rigs, Ferries, and Maritime Regulation 3.6 Masks, Vaccines, and WHO 3.7 Catering for a Black Swan: Foresight in Regulation 3.8 The Real Regulatory Role? References 4 Keep It Simple but not Stupid—Complex Technology and Complex Organisations 4.1 Complexity 4.2 Complex Technology 4.3 Engineers and Complexity 4.4 Complex Organisations 4.5 Black Swans 4.6 High-Reliability Organisation (HRO) Theory References 5 Are Failures Stepping Stones to More Failures? The Sociology of Danger and Risk 5.1 Mary Douglas and the Perception of Danger and Risk 5.2 Engineering and Risk 5.3 Perrow and the Normal Accident Theory 5.4 Turner and Man-Made Disasters 5.5 Downer and the Epistemic Accident 5.6 Vaughan and the Normalisation of Deviance 5.7 The Organisational Structure and Risk 5.8 Safety Culture References 6 To Err is Human—What Exactly is Human Error? 6.1 The Lexicon 6.2 The Law 6.3 What Psychologists Say 6.4 Engineering and Human Error 6.5 The Honest Mistake in Healthcare 6.6 Regulation and Errors References 7 What I Do not Know Will Hurt Me—Mental Models and Risk Perception 7.1 A Mental Model 7.2 Evolution of Mental Models 7.3 Mental Models of Technology and Automation 7.4 Faulty Mental Models and Accidents 7.5 Training and Refinement of Mental Models 7.6 Risk Perception References 8 Is Greed Truly that Good? Avarice and Gain Versus Risk and Blame 8.1 Risky Behaviour and Gain 8.2 Human Behaviour and Probability 8.3 Nudge and Risk 8.4 Nudge and Deviance 8.5 Blame 8.6 Wilful Ignorance: The Deadly Combination References 9 And Then There is Dr. Kato: How Does It Look and Where Do We Go from Here? 9.1 Human Behaviour 9.2 Inevitability 9.3 Scientists and Engineers: The Ostrich with Its Head in the Sand 9.4 Tragedy of Commons, Ostrom, and Risk Regulation 9.5 What Should Be the Nudge in Risk Regulation? 9.6 Why is HRO so Important? 9.7 Integration of These Concepts into Risk Regulation References