The Power of Opposition: How Legislative Organization Influences Democratic Consolidation

Description

Proposing a novel way to look at the consolidation of democratic regimes, this book presents important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of democratic consolidation, legislative organization, and public opinion. Theoretically, Simone Wegmann brings legislatures into focus as the main body representing both winners and losers of democratic elections. Empirically, Wegmann shows that the degree of policy-making power of opposition players varies considerably between countries. Using survey data from the CSES, the ESS, and the LAPOP and systematically analyzing more than 50 legislatures across the world and the specific rights they grant to opposition players during the policy-making process, Wegmann demonstrates that neglecting the curial role of the legislature in a democratic setting can only lead to an incomplete assessment of the importance of institutions for democratic consolidation. The Power of Opposition will be of great interest to scholars of comparative politics, especially those working on questions related to legislative organization, democratic consolidation, and/or public opinion. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments PART I: The Moderating Role of Parliamentary Procedures 1 Institutions, the Role of Opposition, and Democratic Consolidation 1.1 The Role of Citizens 1.2 The Role of Legislatures 1.3 Key Questions and Contribution 1.4 Outline of the Book 2 The Role of Parliamentary Procedures 2.1 The Importance of Legislatures – Moving beyond Governmental Organization 2.2 The Importance of Winners and Losers 2.3 The Influence of Parliamentary Procedures on Democratic Consolidation 2.4 Summary 3 Measuring Opposition Power 3.1 Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players 3.2 Method of Data Collection – Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players 3.3 Summary PART II: Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players and Its Consequences for Democratic Consolidation 4 Methods and Data 4.1 Empirical Strategy 4.2 Independent Variable: Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players, Winners and Losers 4.3 Dependent Variable: Consolidation – Political Support 4.4 Control Variables 4.5 Sample 4.6 Summary 5 Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players around the World 5.1 How Much Policy-Making Power Do Opposition Players Have? 5.2 What Kind of Policy-Making Power Do Opposition Players Have? 5.3 Conclusion 6 Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players and Democratic Consolidation 6.1 Democracy as the Best Form of Government 6.2 Satisfaction with Democracy 6.3 Satisfaction with Government Performance 6.4 Conclusion 7 Why Should We Care About Opposition Power? Conclusion and Implications 7.1 Main Findings 7.2 The Study of Institutions, Oppositions, and Democratic Consolidation – Limitations and Future Research 7.3 Last Thoughts Appendix Index