The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics

Description

This volume aims to contextualize the development and reception of Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism by placing him in dialogue with his most important interlocutors – his mentors, peers, and students. Husserl’s “turn” to idealism and the ensuing reaction to Ideas I resulted in a schism between the early members of the phenomenological movement. The division between the realist and the transcendental phenomenologists is often portrayed as a sharp one, with the realists naively and dogmatically rejecting all of Husserl’s written work after the Logical Investigations. However, this understanding of the trajectory of the phenomenological movement ignores the extensive and intricate contours of the idealism-realism debate. In addition to helping us better interpret Husserl’s attempts to defend his transcendental-phenomenological idealism, reconsidering the idealism-realism debate elucidates the relationship and differences between phenomenology and the broader landscape of early 20th century German philosophy, particularly the Munich phenomenologists and the Neo-Kantians. The contributions to this volume reconsider many of the early interpretations and critiques of Husserl, inviting readers to assess the merits of the arguments put forward by his critics while also shedding new light on their so-called “misunderstandings” of his idealism. This text should be of interest to researchers working in the history of phenomenology and Husserlian studies. Contents Contributors The Idealism-Realism Debate and the Great Phenomenological Schism 1 The Context 2 The Debate 3 The Contributions References Part I: Realism, Platonism, and Ideal Objects in the Logical Investigations Hermann Lotze and the Genesis of Husserl’s Early Philosophy (1886–1901) 1 Introduction 2 Husserl’s Main Sources: Brentano and Stumpf 3 Lotze and Husserl’s Anti-psychologistic Turn 4 Remarks on Husserl’s Manuscript K I 59 (Mikrokosmos) 5 Lotze and the Criticism of Logical Psychologism in the Prolegomena 6 Conclusion References A Realist Misunderstanding of Husserl’s Account of Ideal Objects in the Logical Investigations. Discussing the Arguments of Antonio Millán-Puelles 1 Introduction 2 First Critique: The Proof of Ideality Is Invalid 2.1 How the Proof Works 2.2 The Two Strata of the Proof of Ideality 2.3 Millán-Puelles’ Critique of Husserl’s Proof of Ideality in the Logical Investigations 3 Second Critique: The Husserlian Theory of Ideality in the Logical Investigations Is Not Realist 4 Conclusion References Part II: The Marburg Reception of Ideas I. Neo-Kantian and Critical Realist Critiques The “Offence of any and all Ready-Made Givenness”. Natorp’s Critique of Husserl’s Ideas I 1 Introduction 2 Natorp’s Account of an Ambiguity in Husserl’s Notion of the “Given” in Pure Intuition 3 Historical Grounds of Natorp’s Conviction that Mediation Is a Necessary Condition for the Givenness of Knowledge 4 Natorp’s Account of the Offence of Ready-Made Givenness 5 Natorp’s Account of the Difference Between Plato and Aristotle, and Husserl’s Error 6 Natorp’s Account of the Overlap of his Position and Husserl’s Regarding the Opposition Between Immanent Consciousness and Posited Objectivity 7 Natorp’s Critical Distinction Between Thinking’s Demand for Immediacy and the Capacity of Reflection to Give it 8 First Prong of Natorp’s Critique of Phenomenological Reflection’s Incapacity to Provide Unmediated Access to Absolute Consciousness: Stilling the Stream 9 Second Prong of Natorp’s Critique of Phenomenological Reflection’s Incapacity to Provide Unmediated Access to Absolute Consciousness: It Dissolves concreta into abstracta 10 Heidegger’s Fateful Misappropriation of Natorp’s Critique 11 A Husserlian Response to Natorp’s Critique 11.1 Part One: What Natorp Gets Right 11.2 Part Two: The Cryptic Relation Between Induction and Reflection in the Critique 12 Husserl’s Account of Reflection as the Method of Knowing Consciousness at all 13 The Husserlian Phenomenon’s Determination in the Double-Sided Foundational “Logic” Proper to the Relationship Between Unreflected and Reflective Lived-Experiences 14 The Gap in Husserl’s Account of the Modification of Reflection in its Change Over to Phenomenological Reflection References Critical Ontology and Critical Realism. The Responses of Nicolai Hartmann and Vasily Sesemann to Husserl’s Idealism 1 Introduction 2 The Dialectical Tension Between Givenness and the Theoretically Constructed Problem in Hartmann’s Philosophy 3 The Problem of Givenness and Philosophical Anthropology 4 The Critique of Neo-Kantianism and Hartmann’s “Closed Consciousness” in Sesemann’s Philosophy 5 Phenomenological Idealism and the Phenomenological Method 6 Phenomenology – Idealism or Realism? 7 Conclusion References Part III: The Munich Circle Reception of Husserl’s Idealism. Back to the Things Themselves The Problem of Reality. Scheler’s Critique of Husserl in Idealismus – Realismus 1 Introduction 2 The Realism Debate in Early 20th Century German Philosophy and Scheler’s Critique of Husserl 3 Reality as Resistance. Scheler’s Analysis of Dilthey 4 Scheler’s Critique of Husserl in the Context of the Idealism-Realism Debate 5 Conclusion References The Question of Reality. A Postscript to Schuhmann and Smith on Daubert’s Response to Husserl’s Ideas I 1 Introduction 2 Against Idealism 3 The Problem of Daubert’s Manuscripts 4 Towards a Philosophical Whole 5 The Problem of the Question 6 The Question of Being (Seinsfrage) 7 Conclusion References Bogged Down in Ontologism and Realism. Reinach’s Phenomenological Realist Response to Husserl 1 Introduction 2 Phenomenological Realism 3 Ontology of the A Priori, States of Affairs, and Essences 4 Jurisprudence 5 Conclusion References Evidence-Based Phenomenology and Certainty-Based Phenomenology. Moritz Geiger’s Reaction to Idealism in Ideas I 1 Why Moritz Geiger? 2 Idealism and Realism 3 Attitudes 4 Idealism 5 Conclusion References The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal. Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism 1 Introduction 2 The Architectonic of Idealism and Its Damage to the Consolidation of Metaphysics 3 Conrad-Martius’ Alternative to Idealism: Securing the Possibility for Metaphysics 4 Epilogue References Part IV: The Göttingen and Freiburg Followers. Appropriations and Amendments of Idealism Gustav Shpet’s Implicit Phenomenological Idealism: A Response to Husserl’s Ideas I 1 Transcendental Phenomenology: A Realism or an Idealism? 2 Enter Shpet 3 Phenomenological Idealism in Appearance and Sense 4 From Eidos to Comprehension 5 In the Aftermath – Remarks and Affirmations 6 Shpet’s Ostensibly Mundane Studies 7 A Non-egological Phenomenological Idealism 8 Conclusion References Edith Stein on a Different Motive that Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism 1 Positio Quaestionis: What Question, Exactly? 2 Excursus on Stein on Transcendental Idealism 3 Stein and the Motive that Led Husserl to “Transcendental Idealism” 3.1 The Footnote 3.2 Stufenreich: Remarks on the Structure of Essence 3.3 Remarks on Husserl’s Tatsache und Wesen and Stein’s Argument 4 Conclusion References Senses of Being and Implications of Idealism: Heidegger’s Appropriation of Husserl’s Decisive Discoveries 1 Introduction 2 Heidegger’s Basic Criticisms, His Ambivalence, and the Question of Incrimination 3 Heidegger’s Appropriation of the Decisive Discoveries of Husserl’s Phenomenology 3.1 Intentionality, Phenomenological Reduction, and Being-in-the-World 3.2 Categorial Intuitions, Reflection, and the Disclosiveness of Being-Here 4 Concluding Remark: The Unconstituted World References Not Idealist Enough. Satomi Takahashi and Tomoo Otaka on Husserl’s Idealism 1 Introduction 2 Husserl’s Failed Attempt at Subjective Idealism – Satomi Takahashi 2.1 Egological and Intersubjective Reductions 2.2 Intersubjective Reduction 2.3 How Husserl’s Idealism Fails 2.4 Assessing Takahashi’s Interpretation 3 Discovering the World of Meaning With Husserl – Tomoo Otaka 3.1 Otaka’s Limited Use of Husserl’s Idealism in the 1930s 3.2 A World of Meaning 3.3 (Potential) Objections and Replies 4 Conclusion References Author Index Subject Index