ENGLISH

The Non-Reality of Free Will

Book information

Publisher
Oxford University Press, USA
Year
1991
ISBN
0195064976, 9780195064971
LCC
BJ1461 .D67 1991
Open Library ID
OL1873743M
Language
english
Format
DJVU
Filesize
2 MB (1868153 bytes)
Pages
259\259
DPI
300
Time added
2011-06-04 13:46:07

Description

The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion.

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