Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 25)
Book information
Description
Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures-Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant-or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists-such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation. Still others consider what the phenomenology of our moral experiences can reveal about moral objectivity.
Similar books
Natural Rights Individualism and Progressivism in American Political Philosophy
2012 · PDF
What Should Constitutions Do?
2011 · PDF
Liberalism: Old and New: Volume 24, Part 1 (Social Philosophy and Policy)
2007 · PDF
Scientific Innovation, Philosophy, and Public Policy: Volume 13, Part 2 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (Vol 13, Pt.2)
1996 · PDF
Morality and Politics: Volume 21, Part 1 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 21)
2004 · PDF
Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice: Volume 23, Part 2 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 23)
2006 · PDF
Liberalism and the Economic Order: Volume 10, Part 2 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 10)
1993 · PDF
Autonomy: Volume 20, Part 2 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 20)
2003 · PDF