ENGLISH

Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1 (Social Philosophy and Policy) (v. 25)

Book information

Year
2008
ISBN
0521719631, 9780521719636
DOI
10.1017/S0265052508080011
LCC
BJ1031 .O25 2008
Open Library ID
OL16364358M
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
2 MB (1909364 bytes)
Pages
416\409
Time added
2011-06-04 13:46:07

Description

Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures-Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant-or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists-such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation. Still others consider what the phenomenology of our moral experiences can reveal about moral objectivity.

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