Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940

Description

This is the first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 to the catastrophic defeat of 1940. Using extensive new research, John Gooch explores the nature and development of the three armed forces, their relationships with Mussolini and the impact of his policies and command, the development of operational and strategic thought, and the deployment and use of force in Libya, Abyssinia and Spain. He emphasizes Mussolini's long-term expansionist goals and explains how he responded to the structural pressures of the international system and the contingent pressures of events. This compelling account shows that while Mussolini bore ultimate responsibility for Italy's fateful entry into the Second World War, his generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on irrationality and incompetence. Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 The beginning of the Fascist era, 1922-1925 Mussolini, military power and the goals of foreign policy Army, state and party politics Naval policies, plans and ambitions Aeroplanes, air power and Fascism 2 Domestic checks and international balances, 1925-1929 The pattern of foreign policy Budgets, forces levels and military organisation War planning 3 Military constraints and diplomatic restraint, 1929-1932 Mussolini’s foreign policy Deliberating the needs of war Naval policy, Fascist politics and the London Naval Conference of 1930 The war plans and preparations of the Regia Marina Balbo and the ‘disciplined air force’ Gazzera and the preparation of the army 4 Moving towards aggression, 1932-1934 Political fluctuations and the rise of Nazi Germany Army plans and organisation Nava! armaments and intentions Air force insufficiencies Preparing the Abyssinian War 5 The trial of force: Abyssinia, 1935 Diplomatic preparations for war Baistrocchi and army reform Naval policy» planning and the Mediterranean crisis Planning the land war 6 Wars, arms and the Axis, 1936-1937 Foreign policy in troublesome times Conquest, conflict and the defence agenda Naval necessities Decisive but undecided: the Regia Aeronautica 7 The year of true ‘realism’, 1938 Foreign policy before and after Munich Naval strategies and suppositions Pariani’s preparations and plans Valle’s tribulations The armed forces and the Munich crisis The Aftermath of Munich 8 ‘Speak of peace and prepare for war’, 1939-1940 International politics and Fascist goals Italo-German military collaboration Economic accounts and security surveys Military preparations Naval preparations for war Readying the Regia Aeronautica From ally to non-belligerent, August-September 1939 New men, new programmes Last orders Conclusion Notes Appendix 1 : Ministers and Heads of the Armed Forces Appendix 2: Italian military expenditure 1934-41 (in millions of lire) Bibliography