The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism

Description

Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl maintain that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty. They argue that the critical character of individual rights results from their being tethered to metaphysical realism. After reprising their explanation and defense of natural rights, Rasmussen and Den Uyl explain metaphysical realism and defend it against neo-pragmatist objections. They show it to be a formidable and preferable alternative to epistemic constructivism and crucial for a suitable understanding of ideal theory. Preface......Page 9 Contents......Page 13 Chapter 1: Whence Natural Rights?......Page 16 1 What’s Wrong with Natural Rights?......Page 19 2 Problems with the Non-aggression Principle?......Page 27 3 Why the Reluctance to Appeal to Natural Rights?......Page 32 Chapter 2: How to Understand and Justify Individual Rights: A Synopsis......Page 34 Liberty as a Moral Notion......Page 35 Understanding the Role of Rights......Page 43 Individualistic Perfectionism......Page 47 Why We Have Rights......Page 56 A Realist Basis for Rejection of Equinormativity......Page 59 The Virtue of Justice and Metanorms......Page 61 Three Senses of Justice......Page 69 Social Justice and Natural Endowments......Page 72 3 Conclusion......Page 77 1 Rights, Principles, and Practicality......Page 79 Understanding the Context for Side-Constraints......Page 82 The Range of Applicability of Individual Rights......Page 90 On Being Practical......Page 92 Ideals and Principles......Page 97 Conflicting Principles......Page 101 2 Natural Rights as Principles......Page 103 3 Conclusion......Page 109 Chapter 4: Objections to Natural Rights and Replies......Page 110 Natural Rights do not Precede Their Implementation......Page 111 Natural Rights are Over-Individualized......Page 113 Natural Rights are Basically a Matter of Power......Page 114 Natural Rights are Neither Primary Nor Sufficiently Obligatory......Page 117 The Alleged Naturalistic Fallacy......Page 120 Deeper Ontological and Epistemological Issues......Page 127 Natural Rights are Grounded in Controversial Metaphysics......Page 128 The Irrelevance of Natural Rights......Page 129 Natural Rights Fail to Guide......Page 133 The Absoluteness of Natural Rights......Page 134 The Impotency of Natural Rights......Page 136 The Failure of Inclusivity in Natural Rights......Page 138 The Problematic Concept of Human Nature......Page 140 1 MacIntyre, Rights, and Tradition......Page 143 2 Natural Rights and Metaphysical Realism......Page 154 1 Essentialism without Realism......Page 159 Metaphysical Realism and Conceptual Relativity......Page 164 Conceptual Relativity and Getting it Right......Page 169 Idealized Rational Acceptability and the Democratization of Inquiry......Page 174 3 Questioning Idealized Inquiry......Page 180 Whose Freedom? Which Way of Expressing Human Intelligence?......Page 181 Ayn Rand and Universalizability: Asking Questions You Were Always Afraid to Ask......Page 185 The Human Capabilities Approach: Legislating for Human Flourishing......Page 190 Questioning the Criteria of Idealized Inquiry......Page 193 4 Conclusion......Page 197 1 Constructivism, Metaphysical Realism, and Aquinas’s Distinction......Page 199 2 Replying to some Basic Objections to Epistemological Realism......Page 206 On Imposing a Conceptual Scheme on the World......Page 207 The Problem of Hooking on to the World......Page 211 A Neo-Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Concepts and Cognition......Page 217 The Myth of the Framework......Page 231 Defining the Nature of Something......Page 234 On Being Fallible and Limited......Page 238 3 Putnam, Metaphysical Realism, and Conceptual Relativism......Page 242 Chapter 8: The Importance of the Realist Turn......Page 250 1 Ideal and Non-ideal Theory......Page 251 2 Facing a New Direction and/or Recovering an Old One......Page 265 Index......Page 269