Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis

Description

Constitutions serve to delineate state powers and enshrine basic rights. Such matters are hardly uncontroversial, but perhaps even more controversial are the questions of who (should) uphold(s) the Constitution and how constitutional review is organised. These two questions are the subject of this book by Maartje de Visser, which offers a comprehensive, comparative analysis of how 11 representative European countries answer these questions, as well as a critical appraisal of the EU legal order in light of these national experiences. Where possible, the book endeavours to identify Europes’s common and diverse constitutional traditions of constitutional review. The raison d’être, jurisdiction and composition of constitutional courts are explored and so too are core features of the constitutional adjudicatory process. Yet, this book also deliberately draws attention to the role of non-judicial actors in upholding the Constitution, as well as the complex interplay amongst constitutional courts and other actors at the national and European level. The Member States featured are: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom. This book is intended for practitioners, academics and students with an interest in (European) constitutional law. Introduction Introductory Definitions: Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review Background: The Need for a Perspective Combining National and European Constitutional Law Objectives Method Terminology Structure Chapter 1: The Role of Non-Judicial Actors inUpholding the Constitution I. Introduction II. Councils of State and Chancellors of Justice III. Parliament and its Committees IV. Heads of State V. The People VI. Concluding Remarks Chapter 2: The Rise of Constitutional Adjudication I. Introduction II. The Notion of 'Constitutional Jurisdiction' III. Exploring the Reasons Behind the Rise of Constitutional Adjudication IV. Buckling the Trend? A Closer Look at the Approaches of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom V. Concluding Remarks and Some Brief Reflections on the Two European Courts Chapter 3: Purposes of Constitutional Adjudicationand Access to Constitutional Courts I. Introduction II. The Institutional Design of Constitutional Adjudication III. Four Purposes that may be Served by Constitutional Adjudication IV. Final Comparative Remarks and Reflections on the Court of Justice Chapter 4: The Constitutional Bench I. Introduction II. Selection and Appointment Procedures III. Number of Judges and Eligibility Criteria IV. Tenure of Judicial Appointments and Termination Thereof V. Final Comparative Remarks and Reflections on the Court of Justice Chapter 5: Identifying the Sources of Standardsfor Constitutional Review I. Introduction II. Belgium: Cour Constitutionnelle III. Czech Republic: �stavn� Soud IV. Germany: Bundesverfassungsgericht V. France: Conseil Constitutionnel VI. Hungary: Alkotm�nyb�r�s�g VII. Italy: Corte costituzionale VIII. Trybunal Konstytucyjny IX. Spain: Tribunal Constitucional X. The Netherlands: Raad Van State XI. United Kingdom: House of Lords Constitutional Committee XII. Perustuslakivaliokunta XIII. European Union: Court of Justice XIV. Comparative Remarks Chapter 6: Testing and Remedying Unconstitutionality I. Introduction II. Deference Rhetoric III. Theory of the Living Law IV. Constitution-Conform Interpretation V. Types of Judgment and their Effects VI. Concluding Remarks Chapter 7: Interplay between ConstitutionalCourts and Other Actors I. Introduction II. Interactions between Constitutional Courts and (Constitutional) Legislatures III. Interactions between Constitutional Courts and the Ordinary Courts IV. Interactions among European Constitutional Courts V. Interactions between Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice VI. Interactions between National Highest and Constitutional Courts and the European Court of Human Rights VII. Concluding Remarks