From Psychology to Neuroscience: A New Reductive Account

Description

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 The mind-body problem in philosophy of mind 1.2 The metaphysical issue of mental causation 1.3 The epistemological reducibility of psychology 1.4 Outline Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION 2.1 Objects, events and properties: preliminary remarks 2.2 Premises of the problem of mental causation 2.3 Inconsistency of the premises 2.4 Typology of possible positions in philosophy of mind 2.5 Summary and transition Chapter 3 ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM 3.1 Classical type-identity 3.2 Multiple realization in an ontological context 3.3 Supervenience 3.4 The causal completeness: psychology and physics 3.5 Non-reductive physicalism 3.6 The causal argument for the token-identity thesis 3.7 The token-identity thesis as ontological reductionism 3.8 Summary and transition Chapter 4 PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE 4.1 General background 4.2 Folks psychology as a functional theory of the mind 4.3 Neuroscience 4.4 Summary and transition Chapter 5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM 5.1 Why epistemological reductionism? 5.2 Classical reductionism and the requirements of reduction 5.3 Multiple realization in an epistemological context 5.4 Overcoming multiple realization 5.5 The general dilemma of multiple realization 5.6 Summary and transition Chapter 6 REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES 6.1 What should be expected from any account of epistemological reductionism? 6.2 Starting point: an implication of multiple realization 6.3 Reduction by means of functionally defined subtypes 6.4 Summary and transition Chapter 7 REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE:CASES STUDIES 7.1 How it works: guidelines to reducibility in principle 7.2 Finding critical conditions of manifestations 7.3 Down to neurobiology 7.4 Summary and transition Chapter 8 FINAL REMARKS 8.1 Complete reductionism 8.2 Conservative reductionism 8.3 Back to the mind-body problem BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX