The Theory and Practice of Recognition

Description

This volume presents new essays on the theory and practice of recognition. In order to retain its overall plausibility as a critical social theory, contemporary recognition theory needs to be able to successfully combine theory with real-life perspectives, in both contemporary and historical contexts. Contemporary recognition theory has developed into an established and active multidisciplinary research programme. The chapters in this volume have two main purposes. First, they engage in theoretical development of the contemporary theories of recognition. They explore the conceptual histories and the environments of recognition, as well as the connection between recognition and authenticity, emancipation, and social ontology. Second, they connect the theoretical insights of contemporary recognition with analyses of contemporary and historical social practices. These contributions explore themes such as populism and polarization, models of harmful invisibilization and social ignorance, the problem of evil and suffering, and social justice phenomena such as the #MeToo movement. The Theory and Practice of Recognition will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in social and political philosophy, social ontology, political theory, and sociology. Cover Endorsement Page Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Preface Acknowledgements List of Contributors The Theory and Practice of Recognition: An Introduction Theories of Recognition Practices of Recognition In This Volume Notes References Part I: Recognition, Personal Life, and Constitution of the Self Chapter 1: Authenticity and the Problem of Social Recognition 1.1 Authenticity: Individuality and Immersion 1.2 Being Oneself: Making or Finding? 1.3 Recognition and Authenticity 1.4 Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes References Chapter 2: Recognition and the Human Life-Form: Towards an Anthropological Turn in Critical Theory 2.1 The Variability or Invariability of Recognition and Its Importance 2.2 The Constitution of the Human Life-Form and the Role of Intersubjective Recognition in It 2.3 The Mode of Recognition and the Goodness of Life with the Human Form 2.4 Full-Fledged Personhood and Recognition 2.5 Personifying Recognition and the Personhood of the Recognizer 2.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 3: Mutual Recognition and Well-Being: What Is It for Relational Selves to Thrive? 3.1 The Thesis: Relations of Mutual Recognition Constitute the Thriving of Relational Selves 3.2 Theories of Good Life 3.2.1 Hedonism and the Experiential Quality of Life 3.2.2 Desire-Satisfaction Theories and Valuing 3.2.3 Objective List Theories 3.2.4 Hybrid Theories of Good Life 3.3 The Importance of Relationships 3.3.1 Do Relationships Reduce to Activities? 3.3.2 The Highest Good as Relational Selves: Relationships 3.3.3 Does This Generalize from Love to Esteem, Respect, and Trust? 3.3.4 What about Vertical Relationships? 3.3.5 Summing Up 3.4 Prudential Goodness 3.4.1 Prudentially Good Lives versus Good Lives in Other Ways 3.4.2 Recognitional Goods 3.4.3 How Does the Proposed View Fare as a Theory of Well-Being? 3.5 Are We Essentially Relational Selves? 3.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 4: Recognition: Intersubjectivity and Self-Respect 4.1 Recognition: Anthropological and Normative Perspectives 4.2 Intersubjectivity and Self-respect 4.3 A Life of Disrespect: The Novel Anton Reiser by Karl P. Moritz 4.4 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 5: Varieties of Social Invisibilization and Non-person Treatment 5.1 Goffman on Non-Person Treatment 5.2 Social Invisibility: The Most Horrible Situation or an Opportunity? 5.3 Social Invisibilization and Overt Disrespect 5.4 The Distorted and the Prejudiced Look 5.5 Social Invisibilization as a Form of Bullying 5.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 6: The Gift Model of Recognition 6.1 ‘Gift’: A Brief Look at Some Key Developments and Questions 6.1.1 The Legacy of Marcel Mauss 6.1.2 Philosophy of the (Pure) Gift: Derrida and Marion 6.1.3 Plurality and Diversity of the Current Research on the Gift 6.1.4 Key Questions 6.2 The Gift of Recognition: Marcel Hénaff and Paul Ricœur 6.2.1 Marcel Hénaff's Gift: Neither Economic Nor Altruistic 6.2.2 Two Problems 6.2.3 Paul Ricœur’s Gift: Mutuality and “Agape” 6.2.4 Hénaff, Ricœur, and the Gift in Modern Times 6.2.5 Gift-Giving and Recognition: A Preliminary Summary 6.3 Recognition as Gift: Three Perspectives 6.3.1 Theology of the Gift: God’s Primordial Gift of Recognition 6.3.2 Gifts and Rights 6.3.3 Gifts, Recognition, and Otherness Notes References Part II: Political Practice and the Theory of Recognition Chapter 7: Populism, Polarization, and Misrecognition 7.1 Resurgent Populism 7.1.1 Documenting Populism 7.1.2 Defining Contemporary Populism 7.2 Rising Partisan Polarization 7.3 Moral Psychology and Social Dynamics 7.3.1 Evaluative Emotions and Social Identity 7.3.2 Universal Political Psychology 7.3.3 Social Changes in the Recognition Order 7.4 Substantive Claims for Recognition 7.4.1 Psychological Dopes or Agents of Evaluation? 7.4.2 Populism’s Manifest Content 7.4.3 Misrecognition and Populism 7.5 Conclusions Notes References Chapter 8: The Environment of Recognition 8.1 The Theory of Recognition 8.2 Urban Environments 8.3 Assurance and Humiliation 8.4 The Colston Hall 8.5 What Is to Be Done? 8.6 Concluding Remarks Notes References Chapter 9: Creating Irrelations: The #MeToo Phenomenon in the Light of Recognition Theory 9.1 #MeToo – Exposing the Casting Couch 9.2 It Ain’t Necessarily So 9.3 Conceptual Prerequisites 9.4 Central Features of Recognition Theory 9.5 The Mutually Agreeable Romantic Relationship 9.6 The Illicit Sexual Relationship 9.7 The Grey Zone 9.8 Gendered Systems of Power, Opportunity, and Responsibility 9.9 A Gendered System of Acknowledgement 9.10 #MeToo and Recognition Theory Notes References Chapter 10: How to Criticize?: On Honneth’s Method 10.1 Normative Reconstruction in Contrast to Construction and Genealogy 10.2 Construction 10.3 Reconstruction 10.4 Genealogy 10.5 Discussion 10.6 Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes References Chapter 11: Emancipation and Interpretation of Norms in Contemporary Recognition Theory 11.1 Autonomy and Heteronomy: A Tension in the Foundations? 11.2 The Potential Reach of an Immanent Argumentation Strategy? 11.3 Normative Criteria and Recognitional Goals? 11.4 A Supposed Contrast with Ideal Political Philosophies? 11.5 Conclusions: Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Critical Theory? Notes References Chapter 12: Institutionally Mediated Recognition: A Vicious Circle? 12.1 Institutions and Recognition – Outlining the Problem 12.2 Recognizable Institutions 12.3 Recognitive Attitudes towards Institutions 12.4 Challenging Vertical Recognition 12.5 In Conclusion: How Vicious Is the Circle? Notes References Part III: Historical and Religious Practices of Recognition Chapter 13: Recognition and Fides : Old and New Paths of Conceptual History 13.1 The Long History of Performative Recognition 13.2 Externalist and Internalist Faith Communities 13.3 Premodern Religious Recognition 13.4 Modern Religious Recognition 13.5 Concluding Remarks References Chapter 14: “I Am Not Like Other People!” Desire for Esteem within the Community of Equals 14.1 Bernard of Clairvaux: At the Crossroads between Pride and Humility 14.2 John of la Rochelle: The Arduous Social Emotions 14.3 Thomas Aquinas: Pride and Glory 14.4 Natural Hope and Future Orientation 14.5 Conclusions Notes References Chapter 15: Citizens and the Criteria for Recognition in the Roman Empire 15.1 Romulus and the Ethos of Asylum 15.2 Roman Citizenship and the Criteria for Recognition 15.2.1 The Strong Conception of Citizenship: Cultural Criteria 15.2.2 The Less Strong Conception of Citizenship: Expressions of Loyalty as Criteria 15.3 The Criteria for Recognition in Late Roman Society (200–400) 15.4 The Criteria in the Christian Empire: Correct Religion 15.5 The Impact of Immigration in Late Antiquity 15.6 Citizen Stilicho 15.7 Concluding Remarks Notes References Ancient sources Modern sources Chapter 16: Beyond the Theory-Practice Dichotomy: Pragmatism, Antitheodicy, and the Recognition of Suffering 16.1 The Availability of Antitheodicy 16.2 Theory and Practice 16.3 Moral Criticism 16.4 Recognition and Toleration 16.5 Primo Levi’s Antitheodicism: A Case Study on Moral Recognition 16.6 Concluding Reflections Acknowledgements Notes References Index