A Case for Necessitarianism

Description

This book is the first detailed and focused defense of necessitarianism. The author’s original account of necessitarianism encourages a re-examination of commonly held metaphysical positions as well as important issues in other, related areas of philosophy. Necessitarianism is the view that absolutely nothing about the world could have been otherwise in any way, whatsoever. Most philosophers believe that necessitarianism is just plain false and presume that some things could have been otherwise than what they are. In this book, the author argues that necessitarianism is true and the view that some things in the world are contingent―what the author terms contingentarianism―is false. The author assesses various theories of contingency, including the possible worlds theory, combinatorialism, and dispositionalism and argues that no theory can successfully explain why an entity is such as it is rather than not. She then lays out a case for necessitarianism and provides responses to various objections. The book concludes with an explanation of the ways in which necessitarianism is relevant to issues in ethics, philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. A Case for Necessitarianism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of science. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents A Case for Necessitarianism Preface Introduction Introduction Contingency and Necessity Necessitarianism Some Moments in the History of Necessitarianism and Contingentarianism Some Ancient and Early Medieval Philosophers Some Medieval and Modern Philosophers Some Late Modern and Contemporary Philosophers The Present and the Future of Modal Metaphysics Outline of the Book An Exhortation Notes 1. The (Seriously Lacking) Justification for Contingency Introduction 1.1 Experience 1.2 Probabilities and Indeterminacies 1.3 Intuition 1.4 Majority Opinion 1.5 Contingency-Talk 1.6 Conclusion Notes 2. Theories of Contingency Assessed Introduction 2.1 Theories of Contingency 2.2 Shalkowski's Two Conditions for an Adequate Theory of Modality 2.3 Armstrong's Combinatorialism and Brute Contingent Entities 2.4 Indeterminate Entities as Brute Contingencies 2.5 No Contingency Can Be Fundamental or Brute 2.6 Contingencies All the Way Down? 2.7 Radical Contingentarianism 2.8 Dispositionalism 2.9 Potencies and Unrealized Possibilities 2.10 The Dispositionalist's Claim That Universals Concern the Ways Things Could Be 2.11 Indeterminate Property Manifestations: Propensities 2.12 The Dispositionalist's Claim That There Is No Determining Cause 2.13 Probability Need Not Entail Indeterminacy 2.14 Indeterminism May Be Inconsistent with Dispositionalism 2.15 Different Initial Conditions, Different Fundamental Properties, Different Laws 2.16 The Meaningfulness of Disposition-Statements and the Truth of Counterfactuals 2.17 Dispositionalists Need Not Endorse Contingentarianism 2.18 Entities That Are Partly Contingent and Partly Necessary 2.19 The Possible Worlds Theory 2.20 Lewis's Reductive Account of Modalities 2.21 Superessentialism and Necessitarianism 2.22 Contingency Cannot Be Rooted in Necessity 2.23 Some Findings Notes 3. Support for Necessitarianism Introduction 3.1 The Main Argument 3.2 A Thing Is All the Ways That It Is 3.3 Unactualized Possibility Is Contradictory 3.4 The Uncontainable Contagion of Contingency 3.5 Ockham's Razor and the Principle of Simplicity 3.6 Let's Get Real Notes 4. Objections and Replies Introduction 4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals 4.2 Degrees, Types, and Varieties of Necessity 4.3 No Modalities? 4.4 The Commitment to Monism: O Happy Metaphysician! 4.5 Whence Does Necessity Come? 4.6 Change, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility 4.7 Why Do So Many Philosophers Reject Necessitarianism? Notes Bibliography Index