Inter-firm Networks: Coordination Through Board and Department Interlocks

Description

This book examines the inter-firm networks created by interlock coordination through shared directors (inter-board) and managers (inter-department) at various levels: whole aggregate, core vs. peripheral companies, and distribution by country and sector. Presenting an empirical case study on all the limited liability or stock companies of the aerospace industry in the European Union and its interlock partners worldwide, the authors shed new light on these forms of coordination. Moreover, they reveal the relevance of shared managers’ coordination and hybrid manager-director interlocks. The book applies advanced statistical and social network analysis alike by combining firms’ attributes (e.g. standard economic-financial parameters) and topological indices for firms (e.g. centrality and cluster measures). By conducting the analysis at both the aggregate network level and the cluster or corporate group level, the authors show how extensive and intensive the interlock forms of coordination are, especially when dealing with shared managers. By testing seven hypotheses concerning the research stream on board interlocks and (more broadly) inter-firm networks, the study offers new insights into the role of the financial sector, on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ performance, on the role of geographical, technological and organizational proximity, and on the relations between interlock coordination and firms’ size. As such, this book will appeal to scholars of organization studies, business and management studies, industrial and evolutionary economics, and economic sociology, as well as officers and policymakers at anti-trust regulation institutions. Contents Abbreviations General Economic-Financial Network Network Indexes (Where Applicable Weighted Versions Substitute the First “B” with “W”) Sectors’ Symbols 1 Introduction 2 A Knowledge-Based View of Inter-Firm Interlock Coordination 2.1 A Knowledge-Based View of Inter-Firm Networks 2.2 Inter-Firm Knowledge Networks 2.3 Board Interlocks from the Knowledge-Based View 2.4 Social Network Analysis 2.5 Department Interlocks 2.6 Hybrid Manager-Director Coordination 2.7 The Effects of Board Interlocks on Firm Performance 2.8 The Antitrust Literature and the View from Standard Economics 2.9 Summary References 3 Overview on the EU28 Aerospace Industry Network and Its Neighbors 3.1 A Brief Overview of the Industry 3.2 A Statistical Description 3.3 Basic Structural Aspects 3.4 An Integrated View of the Main Analytical Aggregates—EASIN, EASINT, Neighbors and EASIN + NEIGH 3.5 Summary References 4 Network Analysis of the ALL (Merged) Network 4.1 Network Outline 4.2 Correlation Analysis 4.3 Components and Cliques 4.4 Inter-sectoral Network 4.5 Inter-country Network 4.6 Cluster Analysis 4.7 Bridging Companies as Key-Players 4.8 The Different Composition of the Main Component 4.9 Heavy-Tail Scale-Free Distribution Analysis 4.10 Summary References 5 Inter-Departmental Coordination Through Shared Managers 5.1 Network Outline and Statistical Analysis 5.2 Correlation Analysis 5.3 Network Analysis 5.4 Inter-Sectoral Network 5.5 Inter-Country Network 5.6 Cluster Analysis 5.7 Cliques Analysis 5.8 Bridging Companies as Key-Players 5.9 Heavy-Tail Scale-Free Analysis 5.10 Assortativity 5.11 Summary References 6 Inter-Board Coordination Through Shared Directors 6.1 Network Outline and Statistical Analysis 6.2 Correlation Analysis 6.3 Network Analysis 6.4 Inter-Sectoral Network 6.5 Inter-Country Network 6.6 Cluster Analysis 6.7 Cliques Analysis 6.8 Bridging Companies as Key-Players 6.9 Heavy-Tail Scale-Free Analysis 6.10 Assortativity 6.11 Summary 7 Asymmetric Knowledge Coordination Through the Manager-Director Hybrid Role 7.1 Network Outline and Statistical Analysis 7.2 Correlation Analysis 7.3 Network Analysis 7.4 Inter-sectoral Network 7.5 Inter-country Network 7.6 Cluster Analysis 7.7 Bridging Companies as Key-Players 7.8 Heavy-Tail Scale-Free Analysis 7.9 Assortativity 7.10 Summary References 8 Comparing the Three Coordination Forms and Hypotheses Testing 8.1 Bridging Companies and their Coordination Propensity 8.2 Assortativity 8.3 Topological Similarity between Companies within Networks 8.4 Topological Similarity between Networks 8.5 Does Interlock Coordination Enhance a Better Economic Performance? 8.6 Could the Connectivity-Performance Relation Be Nonlinear? 8.7 Proximity and Interlock Coordination 8.8 Bank Centrality: Do Banks Play a Pivotal Role in Interlock Networks? 8.9 Do Continental EU Countries Have Stronger Connection with the Financial Sector? 8.10 Is There an Association Between a Company’s Size and Interlock Coordination Propensity? 8.11 Is Companies’ Interlocking Propensity Country/Size-Specific? 8.12 Summary References 9 Conclusions References Methodological Appendix A.1 Data A.2 Links A.3 Distribution of People A.4 Multi-layer Networks A.5 Network Indexes and Their Formulas A.6 Analysis A.7 Software Bibliography Index