Down But Not Out: A Reassessment of Critical Turning Points in Analytic Philosophy

Description

This book provides a detailed reassessment of the role and impact of analytic philosophy in the overall philosophical debate. It does so by focusing on several important turning points that have been particularly significant for analytic philosophy’s overall history, such as Bertrand Russell's critique of Meinong, and the vindication of Heidegger's famous 'Nothing'- sentence. In particular, the book scrutinizes whether the theses written about such points have been convincingly argued for, or whether they have gained attraction as a type of rhetorical device. Due to its broad nature, this book is of interest to scholars interested in all aspects of philosophy, at both graduate level and above. Preface Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: From Hegel to Kaplan 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Hegel´s Thesis 2.3 Bradley´s Holism 2.4 Russell´s Acquaintance 2.5 What Is Dead and What Is Alive of Hegel´s Thesis 2.6 (Happy?) Ending Chapter 3: What Is Alive and What Is Dead in Russell´s Critique of Meinong 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Meinong´s Ontological Thesis Is Compatible with Russell´s Theory of Descriptions 3.3 Russell´s Theory of Descriptions Favors Meinong´s Ontological Thesis 3.4 Meinongian Objects Do Not Violate the Law of Non-Contradiction 3.5 Meinongian Objects Do Not Violate the Principle of Excluded Middle Chapter 4: Heidegger´s Logico-Semantic Strikeback 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Logical Well-Formedness 4.3 An Impossible Denotation? 4.4 Meaningfulness 4.5 Conclusion Chapter 5: Descartes Errs (But So Do We All) 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Descartes´ Error 5.3 Cartesian Dualism´s Pars Construens Chapter 6: Is the Causality of Mental States Really Not Negotiable? 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Is Davidson So Anti-Wittgensteinian? 6.3 Are Davidson´s Two Main Arguments Against the Distinction Conclusive? 6.4 How the Cause-Reason Distinction May Again Be Appealing Chapter 7: Wittgenstein, Kripkenstein, and Meaning Experiences 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Official View: No Semantic Role for Experiences of Meaning 7.3 Expressions of Meaning Strike Back 7.4 Why Wittgenstein Did Not Endorse the Experientialist Solution Chapter 8: The Fall from Grace of Philosophy as Conceptual Analysis 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Why the Usual Reasons for the Decline of Conceptual Analysis Are Not So Cogent 8.3 What Are the Right Reasons for the Decline of Conceptual Analysis 8.4 Philosophy as a Backward-Looking Form of Science Chapter 9: Conclusion 9.1 Where Are We Now? Bibliography Name Index Subject Index