Consciousness

Description

Brings together some of the most important research publications on the philosophical problem of consciousness. It includes a detailed introduction that surveys the leading issues in the current debate. Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Acknowledgements Series Preface Introduction PART I PHENOMENAL FEEL, FUNCTIONALISM AND REPRESENTATION 1 ‘The Inverted Spectrum’, Journal of Phlosophy, 2 ‘Goodbye to Transposed Qualia’ 3 ‘The Subjective Qualities of Experence 4 ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience’ 5 ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character’ PART II QUALIA AND PHYSICALISM: THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT 6 ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’ 7 ‘A Challenge to Physicalsm’ 8 ‘Could Love Be Like a Heatwave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience’ 9 ‘Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia' 10 ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States’ 11 ‘Phenomenal Knowledge’ PART III QUALIA AND PHYSICALISM: ABSENT QUALIA AND ZOMBIES 12 ‘Absent Qualia are Impossible - A Reply to Block’ 13 ‘Are Absent Qualia Impossible?’ 14 ‘From Physical Explicabilty to Full-Blooded Materialism’ 15 ‘Form, Function, and Feel’ PART IV WHAT MUST BE ADDED TO GET CONSCIOUSNESS OF? 16 ‘Conscious Experience’ 17 ‘Consciousness and Concepts I’ 18 ‘Consciousness and Concepts II’ PART V MAKING PHYSICAL SENSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 19 ‘Physicalism, Consciousness and the AntipatheticFallacy’ 20 ‘Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness’ 21 ‘The Message is: There is no Medum' 22 ‘Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?’ PART VI PESSIMISM 23 ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’ Name Index