Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War: Diplomacy, Battle, and Lessons

Description

The State of Israel faced one of its most difficult challenges during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually emerged as the clear victor in the war, it suffered serious reverses at the outset of hostilities, as well as substantial losses in men and equipment. This book revisits the Yom Kippur War by exploring a number of issues that have not previously received the attention they deserve or that would benefit from a fresh evaluation. Among the issues examined are: the American-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli relationships during the war; the roles of Israeli nuclear weapons and airpower; the IDF's practice of combined arms warfare; the reasons why the IDF turned the tide of the war more quickly on the Golan front than on the Sinai front; and the lessons derived from the war by the United States Army and the IDF. Front Cover Dedication Title Page Copyright Contents Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations List of Illustrations Introduction: The Historiography of the Yom Kippur War Part I: Diplomacy 1. The American–Israeli Relationship 2. The Israeli–Jordanian Relationship 3. Nuclear Arms, Deterrence, and Compellence Part II: Battle 4. Israeli Combined Arms Warfare 5. Israeli Resurgence on the Golan versus in the Sinai 6. Israeli Airpower in the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars Part III: Lessons 7. The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel 8. The American Assessment 9. The Israeli Response Conclusion: From Defeat to Victory in the Yom Kippur War Notes Bibliography Index About the Author Back Cover