The Appearance of Ignorance : Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2

Description

Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context. Cover The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2 Copyright Preface and Acknowledgments WhatÂś Old and WhatÂś New in this Book A ReaderÂś Guide to the Longer Chapters Ignorance Other Acknowledgements Contents Detailed Contents 1: Solving the Skeptical Problem 1.1. The Puzzle of Skeptical Hypotheses 1.2. Contextualist Solutions: The Basic Strategy 1.3. Some Old Contextualist Solutions: LewisÂś ``Rule of AccommodationÂÁ̂ ́ 1.4. Some Old Contextualist Solutions: The ``Relevant AlternativesÂÁ̂ ́Approach and the Rule of Relevance 1.5. The Subjunctive Conditionals Account (SCA) of the Plausibility of AIÂś First Premise1.6. SCA, Grandmothers, and Methods 1.7. SCA and Some Skeptical Hypotheses that DonÂt́ Work 1.8. SCA Confirmed 1.9. NozickÂś Own Solution and the Abominable Conjunction 1.10. Strength of Epistemic Position and AIÂś Second Premise 1.11. Strength and Sensitivity 1.12. The Rule of Sensitivity and the Beginnings of a New Contextualist Solution 1.13. The Rule of Sensitivity and SCA: A Comparison of Our New Solution with the Other Contextualist Solutions and with Nozickâ#x80 #x99 s Solution 1.14. Our New Contextualist Solution Clarified and Compared with the Straightforward Solutions1.15. Bold Skepticism and the Warranted Assertability Maneuver 1.16. Bold Skepticism and Systematic Falsehood 1.17. Begging the Question Against the Skeptic? 2: Moorean Methodology: Was the Skeptic Doomed to Inevitable Defeat? 2.1. Methodological vs. Substantive Mooreanism 2.2. A Quick Look at Moore in Action 2.3. Conservatism and Making a ``Moorean ChoiceÂÁ̂ ́ 2.4. MORE PLAUSIBLE and its Application to the ``Moorean SituationÂÁ̂́ 2.5. Damage-Control Conservatism: Making an ``Enlightened Moorean ChoiceÂÁ̂ ́and the Project of Defeating the Skeptic2.6. Was the Skeptic Doomed to Defeat? 2.7. A Division among Philosophers over the Intuitive Power of AIÂś First Premise 2.8. More Curiously Varying Responses to AIÂś First Premise: Attempts to Ask Non-Philosophers 2.9. Assessment: The Intuitive Power of AIÂś First Premise 2.10. Contextualist Mooreanism and the Intuitive Complexity Surrounding AIÂś First Premise 2.11. The Value of AI, Whether or Not the Skeptic Had a Chance 3: Two Substantively Moorean Responses and the Project of Refuting Skepticism3.1. Substantively Moorean Responses to AI, Straightforward and Contextualist, and Our Pointed Question: How Can We Know that Weâ#x80 #x99 re not Brains in Vats? 3.2. The Project of Refuting Skeptics-and Anti-Skeptics who Are Not Engaged in that Project 3.3. Putnam-Style Responses to AI from Semantic Externalism 3.4. Two Forms of Arguments from Semantic Externalism 3.5. Old Objections: Varieties of Semantic Externalism and Varieties of Skeptical Hypotheses 3.6. The Disadvantages of Heroism