Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996: world inventories, capabilities, and policies

Description

This book provides an updated authoritative survey of the quantities of fissile material produced for nuclear weapons and in the civilian fuel cycle. The control of fissile materials and associated technologies are at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The authors demonstrate that despite technical, political and economic difficulties, a fully effective material control regime is feasible. The main steps towards realisation of such a regime are identified. Contents......Page 5 Preface......Page 15 Acknowledgements......Page 16 Glossary......Page 17 Acronyms and conventions......Page 28 Part I. Introduction......Page 33 I. Introduction......Page 35 II. Four security contexts......Page 36 III. The need for greater transparency......Page 38 IV. The limits to accuracy......Page 40 V. The scope of the book......Page 41 VI. Sources......Page 42 II. Highly enriched uranium......Page 44 III. Plutonium......Page 50 Part II. Military inventories in the nuclear weapon states......Page 59 I. Introduction......Page 61 II. The production process......Page 62 III. Methods of estimating military plutonium inventories......Page 65 IV. The United States......Page 69 V. The former Soviet Union......Page 82 VI. The United Kingdom......Page 91 VII. France......Page 98 VIII. China......Page 108 II. Overview of enrichment programmes......Page 111 III. The United States......Page 113 IV. The former Soviet Union......Page 126 V. The United Kingdom......Page 148 VI. France......Page 153 VII. China......Page 158 Part III. Principal civil inventories......Page 163 I. Introduction......Page 165 II. The fuel cycle in civil reactor systems......Page 167 III. Fuelling strategy and fuel burnup......Page 168 IV. A sketch of methods......Page 170 V. Discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from civil reactors......Page 173 VI. Conclusions......Page 179 I. Reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle......Page 180 II. The evolution of fuel-cycle strategies......Page 182 IV. Overview of power-reactor fuel reprocessing......Page 187 V. Commercial reprocessing programmes......Page 189 VI. Summary of power- and fast-reactor fuel reprocessing, 1960–2000......Page 215 VII. Projections of plutonium separation to 2010......Page 222 VIII. Conclusions......Page 224 I. Introduction......Page 225 II. Fast-reactor fuel cycles......Page 226 III. Plutonium use in fast reactors......Page 227 IV. Past and projected plutonium use in fast reactors......Page 229 V. Plutonium use in thermal reactors......Page 241 VI. National programmes for thermal plutonium recycling......Page 244 VII. Summary of plutonium use in thermal reactors: past and projected......Page 255 VIII. Commercial and R&D plutonium use compared with quantities separated......Page 261 IX. Conclusions......Page 269 I. Introduction......Page 270 II. Civil suppliers of highly enriched uranium......Page 271 III. Civil reactors using HEU fuels, 1995......Page 273 IV. Converting to low-enriched uranium fuels......Page 274 V. Spent fuel take-back and reprocessing of HEU fuels......Page 277 VI. US exports of highly enriched uranium......Page 280 VII. Civil inventories of highly enriched uranium......Page 285 Part IV. Material inventories and production capabilities in the threshold states......Page 287 I. Israel......Page 289 II. India......Page 296 III. Pakistan......Page 303 II. An unsafeguarded reactor emerges......Page 314 III. Initial safeguards declaration......Page 315 IV. Reactor defuelling......Page 320 V. Plutonium production reactors......Page 327 VI. Plutonium separation......Page 335 VII. How much plutonium does North Korea have?......Page 338 IX. Has North Korea built nuclear weapons?......Page 339 I. Introduction......Page 341 II. The Iraqi nuclear weapon programme......Page 343 III. Summary of Iraqi fissile material production plans before 1991......Page 345 IV. The Iraqi enrichment programme......Page 349 V. Projected indigenously produced weapon-grade uranium inventory for Iraq......Page 373 VI. The Iraqi plutonium programme......Page 374 VII. The crash programme......Page 376 VIII. Post-war activities......Page 381 I. Introduction......Page 383 II. Iran......Page 384 III. Algeria......Page 395 IV. South Korea......Page 397 V. Taiwan......Page 398 II. Argentina and Brazil......Page 401 III. South Africa......Page 409 Part V. Conclusions......Page 425 II. Inventories at the end of 1994......Page 427 III. Types of inventory......Page 429 IV. Military inventories in nuclear weapon states......Page 430 V. Weapon-related inventories and capabilities in countries other than the acknowledged nuclear weapon states......Page 433 VI. Civil inventories of plutonium and HEU......Page 436 VII. Material under international safeguards......Page 438 VIII. Possible future trends in plutonium and HEU inventories......Page 443 I. Introduction......Page 448 II. Two industrial and regulatory systems......Page 450 III. Contemporary pressures to achieve universality and transparency......Page 453 IV. Measures against undeclared activities in NNWS parties to the NPT......Page 456 V. Bilateral initiatives to strengthen controls in the FSU......Page 459 VI. Extending the multilateral framework for material controls......Page 462 VII. The disposition of excess plutonium and HEU......Page 469 IX. Plutonium disposition......Page 478 X. Obstacles to an international disposition strategy......Page 485 XI. Conclusions: moving towards the framework of control required for complete nuclear disarmament......Page 486 Appendices......Page 491 I. Weapon-grade plutonium production......Page 493 II. Highly enriched uranium production......Page 496 Appendix B. Calculation of plutonium production in power reactors......Page 504 Appendix C. Separation of plutonium from power reactor fuel at reprocessing plants......Page 511 Appendix D. Research reactors (>l MWth) using HEU fuel......Page 518 Index......Page 523