(Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis

Description

What is racism? is a timely question that is hotly contested in the philosophy of race. Yet disagreement about racism’s nature does not begin in philosophy, but in the sociopolitical domain. Alberto G. Urquidez argues that philosophers of race have failed to pay sufficient attention to the practical considerations that prompt the question “What is racism?” Most theorists assume that “racism” signifies a language-independent phenomenon that needs to be “discovered” by the relevant science or “uncovered” by close scrutiny of everyday usage of this term. (Re-)Defining Racism challenges this metaphysical paradigm. Urquidez develops a Wittgenstein-inspired framework that illuminates the use of terms like “definition,” “meaning,” “explanation of meaning,” and “disagreement,” for the analysis of contested normative concepts. These elucidations reveal that providing a definition of “racism” amounts to recommending a form of moral representation—a rule for the correct use of “racism.” As definitional recommendations must be justified on pragmatic grounds, Urquidez takes as a starting point for justification the interests of racism's historical victims. Acknowledgments......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 1.1.1 Racism and the Concept of Racism......Page 14 1.1.2 Competing Conceptions of Racism......Page 17 1.1.3 A Methodological Intervention......Page 20 1.2 Racism’s Janus-Faced Character: The Necessity/Contingency Divide......Page 22 1.2.1 Three Theoretical Problems......Page 23 1.2.2 Necessity and Contingency......Page 24 1.2.3 Accidental and Essential Features......Page 26 1.2.4 “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game Contestation......Page 28 1.2.5 Racism as a Sociocultural Concept......Page 29 1.3.1 The Primacy of A Priori Analysis......Page 31 1.3.2 Valuing the Victim’s Perspective......Page 32 1.4 A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism......Page 37 1.4.1 Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism......Page 38 1.4.2 Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism......Page 41 1.4.3 Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive to Prescriptive Grammar......Page 42 1.5 Chapter Summaries......Page 45 References......Page 49 Part I: Racism Without Ontology......Page 51 2.1.1 The Philosophical Question......Page 52 2.1.2 Metaphysical Analysis......Page 58 2.2 Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist Approach......Page 66 2.2.1 Meaning, Use, Understanding......Page 67 2.2.2.1 Grammatical Rule and Grammatical Proposition......Page 72 2.2.2.2 What Grammatical Knowledge Is and How It Is Acquired......Page 76 2.2.2.3 Explanation of Meaning and Explanation of Racism......Page 80 2.2.2.4 The Significance of Explanation of Meaning for Philosophy?......Page 82 2.2.3 Wittgenstein’s Normativism......Page 86 2.2.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Normativism......Page 87 2.2.3.2 Demarcating Semantic Rules......Page 92 2.3 Conclusion: The Aim of This Book......Page 96 References......Page 97 3.1.1 Scope of the Chapter......Page 101 3.1.2 Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,” “Rule-Formulation”......Page 102 3.2 The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting Metaphysical Predicates as Facets of Convention......Page 104 3.2.1.1 Contingency as the Mark of Culture......Page 105 3.2.1.2 What We Affirm and What We Do with What We Affirm......Page 110 3.2.1.3 The Arbitrariness of Grammar......Page 111 3.2.2.1 Necessity and Universality......Page 117 3.2.2.2 Logical Priority......Page 122 Grammatical Propositions as Reasons......Page 130 Epistemic Justification......Page 131 Pragmatic Justification......Page 135 3.3.1 Normative Descriptions of Grammar......Page 139 3.3.2 Criticisms of Grammar......Page 143 3.3.3 Grammatical Approaches......Page 146 3.4.1 In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism......Page 147 3.4.2 Beyond Realism and Constructivism......Page 152 3.4.3 Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible......Page 156 3.5 Conclusion......Page 162 References......Page 163 4.1 Introduction......Page 166 4.2 The Case for Externalism......Page 167 4.2.1 Some Key Concepts......Page 168 4.2.2 Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments......Page 173 4.3.1 Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries as Pragmatic Reasons......Page 178 4.3.2 The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample......Page 184 4.3.3 Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused?......Page 188 4.3.4 The Arbitrariness of Grammar......Page 191 4.4 Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition to Being Normative?......Page 196 4.4.1 Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences......Page 197 4.4.2 A Measure that Measures Itself?......Page 199 4.5 Conclusion......Page 204 References......Page 205 Part II: Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement......Page 206 5.1 Introduction: From Ontology to Linguistic Norms......Page 207 5.2.1 Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement......Page 208 5.2.2 A Mere Difference in Word Use?......Page 210 5.3.1 Non-Descriptive Disagreement......Page 213 5.3.2 Pragmatic Advocacy......Page 217 5.3.3 The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism”......Page 220 5.4.1 Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement......Page 224 5.4.2 Contested Rationality......Page 229 5.4.3 No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With......Page 235 5.5 Conclusion......Page 237 References......Page 238 6.1 Introduction......Page 240 6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Analysis......Page 243 6.2.2 Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism......Page 245 6.2.3 Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations......Page 248 6.3.1 Doxastic Inertia or Instability?......Page 252 6.3.2 Instability and Pragmatic Considerations......Page 255 6.4 Two Arguments for Revisionism......Page 262 6.4.1 Conceptual Inflation Argument......Page 263 6.4.2 Political Morality Argument......Page 271 6.5 Conclusion......Page 275 References......Page 277 Part III: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism......Page 279 7.1 Introduction......Page 280 7.2.1 A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests......Page 283 7.2.1.1 The Mills-Shelby Objection: Theory Should Not Explain Racism’s Wrongness......Page 286 7.2.1.2 Arthur’s Objection: Racism Is Not a Moral Flaw, but an Epistemic Flaw......Page 290 7.2.2 Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial Oppression Approach......Page 296 7.3.1 Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon......Page 303 7.3.2 Criteria and Vagueness......Page 310 7.3.3 Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process......Page 315 7.4 The Resolution Condition......Page 321 7.5 Conclusion......Page 324 References......Page 325 8.1 Introduction......Page 329 8.2 Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism”......Page 334 8.2.1 Garcia’s Core Essentialism......Page 335 8.2.2 Infection and Characteristic Racism......Page 336 8.3.1 Two Pictures of Paternalism......Page 339 8.3.2 Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal......Page 342 8.4 Ideology and the Primary Sense......Page 345 8.4.1 Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure......Page 346 8.4.2 Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition......Page 348 8.4.3 Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue......Page 352 8.4.4 Ideology and Political Morality......Page 355 8.5.1 Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism......Page 359 8.5.2 The Wrong Explanation......Page 360 8.5.3 Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically Wrongful Beliefs......Page 363 8.6 Conclusion......Page 366 References......Page 368 9.1 Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility of Negotiation......Page 370 9.2 Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression......Page 373 9.3 Going Forward from Here: Implications and Future Research......Page 381 References......Page 384 Bibliography......Page 386 Index......Page 397