The Indexical Point of View: On Cognitive Significance and Cognitive Dynamics

Description

This book argues that there is a common cognitive mechanism underlying all indexical thoughts, in spite of their seeming diversity. Indexical thoughts are mental representations, such as beliefs and desires. They represent items from a thinker's point of view or her cognitive perspective. We typically express them by means of sentences containing linguistic expressions such as 'this (F)' or 'that (F)', adverbs like 'here', 'now', and 'today', and the personal pronoun ‘I’. While generally agreeing that representing the world from a thinker's cognitive perspective is a key feature of indexical thoughts, philosophers disagree as to whether a thinker's cognitive perspective can be captured and rationalized by semantic content and, if so, what kind of content this is. This book surveys competing views and then advances its own positive account. Ultimately, it argues that a thinker's cognitive perspective - or her indexical point of view - is to be explained in terms of the content that is believed and asserted as the only kind of content that there is which thereby serves as the bearer of cognitive significance. The Indexical Point of View will be of interest to philosophers of mind and language, linguists, and cognitive scientists. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Preface Introduction Overview Preliminaries An Outline of the Book 1 Character, Content, and Cognitive Significance 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Character and Cognitive Significance 1.3 A Problem with Characters: Demonstratives 1.4 A Problem with Characters: Pure Indexicals 2 Other Kinds of Content and Cognitive Significance 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Official and Reflexive Content 2.3 Utterances, Beliefs, and Cognitive Significance 2.4 Notion-Networks 2.5 Conclusion 3 Anti-individualism and Cognitive Perspective 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Sameness and Difference of Thought-Contents 3.3 Opacity of Thought-Contents 3.4 Transparency of Thought-Contents 3.4.1 Transparency of Difference 3.4.2 Transparency of Sameness 3.4.3 The Enterprise Case 3.4.4 Internal Facts 3.4.5 Concepts 3.4.6 Concluding Remarks 3.5 The Neo-Fregean View 3.6 Transparency Again 3.7 Senses 3.8 Conclusion 4 Cognitive Dynamics, Belief Retention, and Cognitive Significance 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics 4.3 The Fregean View 4.4 Kaplan’s View 4.5 Linguistic Meaning and Thinking about Days 4.6 Thoughts and Transparency 4.7 Sourceless Beliefs 4.8 The Content of Thought 5 Beliefs and Characters 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Doxastic Characters 5.3 The Mismatch between Characters and Belief States 5.3.1 The Existence of Character Is Not Tied to the Existence of Belief State 5.3.2 The Existence of Belief State Is Not Tied to the Existence of Character 5.3.3 Identity of Character Is Not Tied to Identity of Belief State 5.4 The Retention of Thought 5.5 Modes of Presentation and Meaning 6 Slicing Thoughts 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Individuating Thoughts 6.3 Blocking the Intrapersonal Proliferation of Thoughts 6.4 Stretching Thoughts 6.5 The Sameness of Thoughts 6.6 Blocking the Interpersonal Proliferation of Thoughts 6.7 Conclusion 7 How Many Modes of Presentation Do We Need? 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Re-Identification of Objects 7.3 The Modal and the Non-modal Criteria of Difference 7.4 Against the Modal Criterion of Difference 7.5 A Case for the Modal Criterion of Difference 7.6 Name-Like Modes of Presentation 7.7 Demonstrative Modes of Presentation 7.8 Temporal Modes of Presentation 7.9 Nominal Terms and Indexicals 8 Tracking and Reporting 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Tracking Indexicals 8.3 Personal Pronouns 8.4 ‘You’, ‘I’, and Cognitive Significance 8.5 Token Meanings 8.6 Roles Strike Back: The Interpersonal Case 8.7 Roles Strike Back: The Intrapersonal Case 8.8 Correspondence Relations 8.9 Correct Speech Reports 9 Conclusion 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Singular Thoughts and Acquaintance 9.3 The Distinctness of Indexical Beliefs 9.4 Mental Files Notes References Index