Cosmological Fine-Tuning Arguments: What (if Anything) Should We Infer from the Fine-Tuning of Our Universe for Life? (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)

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If the physical constants, initial conditions, or laws of nature in our universe had been even slightly different, then the evolution of life would have been impossible. This observation has led many philosophers and scientists to ask the natural next question: why is our universe so "fine-tuned" for life? The debates around this question are wide-ranging, multi-disciplinary, complicated, technical, and (at times) heated. This study is a comprehensive investigation of these debates and the many metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by cosmological fine-tuning. Waller’s study reaches two significant and controversial conclusions. First, he concludes that the criticisms directed at the "multiverse hypothesis" by theists and at the "theistic hypothesis" by naturalists are largely unsuccessful. Neither of these options can plausibly be excluded. Choosing between them seems to turn on primitive (and so hard to justify) metaphysical intuitions. Second, in order to break the philosophical deadlock, Waller moves the debate from the level of universes to the level of possible worlds. Arguing that possible worlds are also "fine-tuned" in an important and interesting sense, Waller concludes that the only plausible explanation for the fine-tuning of the actual world is to posit the existence of some kind of "God-like-thing." Cover Half Title Series Title Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: “What Can We Make of These Strange Coincidences?” The Argument 1 Four Preliminary Investigations Introduction 1.1. Do Arguments Really Change Minds? 1.2. A Recent History: Paley to Present 1.3. Possibility and Probability 1.3.1. The Conceptual Landscape of Possibility 1.3.2. Conceivability and Modal Fallibilism 1.3.3. Skeptical Challenges to Modal Fallibilism 1.3.4. The Conceptual Landscape of Probability 1.3.5. Brute Facts, Chance, and the Two Modal Objections 1.4. Inductive Strategies 1.4.1. The Likelihood Principle and Bayesian Probability 1.4.2. Inference to the Best Explanation (Abductive Reasoning) 1.4.3. Dembski’s “Design Inference” 1.5. Science and Metaphysics 1.5.1. Why Metaphysics Won’t Just Go Away 1.5.2. Scientific Realism in Physics and Cosmology 1.5.3. Metaphysical Methodology 2 Our Fine-Tuned Universe? Introduction 2.1. “Fine-Tuning” and Contingency 2.1.1. Fine-Tuned for What? 2.2. The Problem of the Infinite Lottery 2.2.1. Three Mathematical Solutions: Pruss, Vallentyne, and Jaynes 2.2.2. Two Pragmatic Solutions: Barnes and Collins 2.2.3. The Infinite Lottery and the Partition Problem 2.3. The Science of Fine-Tuning 2.3.1. Fine-Tuning in Particle Physics 2.3.2. Fine-Tuning in Quantum Mechanics 2.3.3. Fine-Tuning in Cosmology 2.3.4. Fine-Tuning and Metaphysics 2.3.5. Three Objections 2.4. Our “Fine-Tuned” Universe? 3 Learning From the Critics Introduction I. Objections to All Fine-Tuning Inferences 3.1. OSEs Make Fine-Tuning Inferences Problematic 3.2. FTAs Suffer From the “Problem of Old Evidence” 3.3. Fine-Tuning Does Not Require an Explanation 3.4. Inferences From Effects to Causes Are Problematic 3.5. Rearranging the Parameter Space Can Change the Quantity of the Apparent Fine-Tuning for a Given Constant 3.6. FTAs Involve Cherry-Picked Data 3.7. Theories Are Fine-Tuned, Not the World 3.8. There Are Absurd Analogous Arguments 3.9. None of the Available Hypotheses Are Falsifiable or Make Testable Predictions 3.10. Fine-Tuning Arguments Make Controversial Presuppositions About What Constitutes the Essence of a Universe II. Objections to the Theistic Inference 3.11. Theism Is a “God-of-the-Gaps” Explanation 3.12. Theism Is Not an Explanation at All (Or, at Least, Not a Very Good One) 3.13. Assuming That God Would Prefer Life Is Question Begging 3.14. Fine-Tuning Actually Lowers the Probability of God’s Existence 3.15. The Initial State of the Universe Could Not Have Been Designed 3.16. The Universe Contains Significant Design Flaws 3.17. Assuming One Designer Rather Than Many Is Unmotivated III. Objections to the Multiverse Inference 3.18. The Multiverse Inference Commits an “Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy” or Violates the “Requirement of Total Evidence” 3.19. The Multiverse Hypothesis Offers the Wrong Kind of Explanation 3.20. The Multiverse Hypothesis Is Ontologically Extravagant 3.21. The Multiverse Would Have to Be “Fine-Tuned” for the Inclusion of Life-Evolving Universes 3.22. Summary of Results 4 Mapping the Logical Space Introduction 4.1. The Conservative Logical Space and Unconceived Alternatives 4.2. Quantum Mechanics to the Rescue? 4.2.1. Copenhagen Metaphysics 4.2.2. The Metaphysics of “Many-Worlds” 4.2.3. Relational Metaphysics 4.2.4. Summary of Results 4.3. First Option: Brute Fact Hypothesis 4.4. Second Option: Multiverse Hypothesis 4.5. Third Option: Minimal Theistic Hypothesis 4.5.1. Weaker and Stronger Theisms 4.5.2. Objections to the Coherence of Minimal Theism 4.6. Fourth and Fifth Options: Unconceived Alternatives 4.7. Summary and Evaluation 5 Our Fine-Tuned Actual World? Introduction 5.1. Possible Worlds and LEGO Worlds 5.2. Metric Spaces and Alpha-Similar Possible Worlds 5.3. A “Sherlock Holmes Argument” for Minimal Theism 5.4. Objections New and Old 5.4.1. The Modal Realism Assumption 5.4.2. The Unknown Truths Assumption 5.4.3. The Brute Fact Probability Assumption 5.4.4. The Minimal Theism Probability Assumption 5.4.5. The Truth Assumption 5.5. Conclusions: Can I Believe It? Must I Believe It? Bibliography Index