The Aftermath of Defeats in War: Between Revenge and Recovery

Description

This book sets out to explain the variation in nations’ reactions to their defeats in war. Typically, we observe two broad reactions to defeat: an inward-oriented response that accepts defeat as a reality and utilizes it as an opportunity for a new beginning, and an outward-oriented one that rejects defeat and invests national energies in restoring what was lost—most likely by force. This volume argues that although defeats in wars are humiliating experiences, those sentiments do not necessarily trigger aggressive nationalism, empower radical parties, and create revisionist foreign policy. Post-defeat, radicalization will be actualized only if it is filtered through three variables: national self-images (inflated or realistic), political parties (strong or weak), and international opportunities and constraints. The author tests this theory on four detailed case studies, Egypt (1967), Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Hungary and Bulgaria (WWI), and Islamic fundamentalism. Front Matter ....Pages i-xi Introduction and Theoretical Framework (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 1-45 Egypt: Defeat and the Transformation of State and Society (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 47-107 Bulgaria: Defeat and Nationalist Demobilization During the Peasant Era (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 109-152 Hungary: The Cult of Defeat (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 153-225 The Ottoman Empire/Turkey: Defeat and the Birth of a Nation (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 227-277 Defeats, Humiliation, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Political Violence (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 279-296 Conclusion (Ibrahim M. Zabad)....Pages 297-311 Back Matter ....Pages 313-318