Hume's Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction (The MIT Press)

Description

A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem. Schurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress. Cover Contents Preface 1: The Problem of Induction 2: On Failed Attempts to Solve the Problem of Induction 3: The Significance of Hume’s Problem for Contemporary Epistemology 4: Are Probabilistic Justifications of Induction Possible? 5: A New Start: Meta-Induction, Optimality Justifications, and Prediction Games 6: Kinds of Meta-Inductive Strategies and Their Performance 7: Generalizations and Extensions 8: Philosophical Conclusions and Refinements 9: Defense against Objections 10: Interdisciplinary Applications 11: Conclusion and Outlook: Optimality Justifications as a Philosophical Program 12: Appendix: Proof of Formal Results Formal Symbols and Abbreviations Memos, Definitions, Propositions, Theorems, Figures, and Tables References Subject Index Author Index