Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?

Description

This book offers a new insight into when and why paramilitary groups in Afghanistan engage in protective or predatory behavior against the civilians they purportedly defend. In Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency environment, America leaned on militias to provide order and stabilize communities cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection challenged militia loyalty, as many engaged in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book examines the varying militia experiments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 and their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan involved inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place, and state patrons relied upon those structures as a restraint against militia behavior. Complementary management ensured patrons leaned on communities for strong accountability systems. But such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias preyed on civilians as they monopolized the market of protection. This book adds to the rich literature on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, but differs by focusing on the interplay between states, communities, and militias. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations. Cover Endorsements Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents Acknowledgments Foreword Acronyms 1. Introduction Predators or protectors? Militia as statebuilder Case studies and methods Conclusion Notes Bibliography 2. Embedded militias in Afghanistan Great games and competitive patronage Soviet counterinsurgency Soldiers of the revolution American counterinsurgency Paramilitary policing and village stability Conclusion Notes Bibliography 3. Gangland in northern Afghanistan State building and the new market of protection Material incentives Organizational controls Militias run Amok Patronage, politicking, and community erosion Ideational narratives Conclusion Notes Bibliography 4. Vigilante uprisings in Ghazni Rise of the state and resistance in Ghazni Anti-Taliban uprising Organizational controls Material incentives Ideational narratives Conclusion Notes Bibliography 5. Guardians of Paktika Turning the soil in Marzak Material incentives Organizational controls: entry points and spoilers Ideational narratives—heroes and scripts Transition Notes Bibliography 6. From guardians to territorial force Afghan national army—territorial force Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index