Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics

Description

A growing body of evidence from the sciences suggests that our moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis. To explain how human morality evolved, some philosophers have called for the study of morality to be naturalized, i.e., to explain it in terms of natural causes by looking at its historical and biological origins. The present literature has focused on the link between evolution and moral realism: if our moral beliefs enhance fitness, does this mean they track moral truths? In spite of the growing empirical evidence, these discussions tend to remain high-level: the mere fact that morality has evolved is often deemed enough to decide questions in normative and meta-ethics. This volume starts from the assumption that the details about the evolution of morality do make a difference, and asks how. It presents original essays by authors from various disciplines, including philosophy, anthropology, developmental psychology, and primatology, who write in conversation with neuroscience, sociology, and cognitive psychology. Acknowledgments Contents About the Editors Contributors Chapter 1: Situating Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics 1.1 What Does It Mean to Naturalize Ethics? 1.2 Empirically Engaged Ethics Before Darwin 1.3 Evolutionary Ethics: Some Historical Notes 1.4 Evolutionary Ethics Today 1.5 The Present Volume References Part I: The Nuts and Bolts of Evolutionary Ethics Chapter 2: Dual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Outcome-to-Intent Shift 2.3 Using Dual-Process Models to Explain the Outcome-to-Intent Shift 2.4 Cognitive Decoupling and the Articulation of Divergent Intuitions 2.5 Cultural Variation in the Weight Placed on Intentions 2.6 Discussion 2.7 Conclusion References Chapter 3: Not So Hypocritical After All: Belief Revision Is Adaptive and Often Unnoticed 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Hypocrisy in Social Psychology 3.3 Evolutionary Considerations 3.4 Cultural Mechanisms for Belief Acquisition 3.5 The Sparseness of Belief 3.6 Belief Revision in Response to Social Cues 3.7 Conclusion: Hypocrisy Unmasked References Chapter 4: The Chimpanzee Stone Accumulation Ritual and the Evolution of Moral Behavior 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 The Question 4.1.2 Definition of Morality and Its Components 4.1.3 Background – Chimpanzee Cognitive, Affective, Moral and Communicative Capacities 4.2 Summary of Kühl et al. (2016) 4.2.1 Hurl, Bang, Toss (Cache, Heap) and Stone Accumulations 4.2.2 Flowchart 4.2.3 Problematic Explanatory Hypotheses 4.3 Method 4.3.1 Explanation 4.3.2 Stone Accumulation Behaviors as Ethological Ritualization and Ritual 4.3.3 Semiotic Interpretation 4.4 Results 4.4.1 Relevant Chimpanzee Aggression Display Variables 4.4.2 Relevant Chimpanzee Vocal Communication Variables 4.4.3 Moral Context for the Chimpanzee Stone Throwing/Caching Ritual 4.4.4 Contextualizing the Stages of the Ritual 4.5 Discussion 4.6 Conclusion References Part II: The Evolution of Moral Cognition Chapter 5: Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation 5.1 How to Do Evolutionary Ethics: Four Sequential Questions 5.2 Morality as Prudential Risk-Aversion 5.3 The Elements of Moral Cognition 5.4 The Diverse Evolutionary Advantages of Our Moral Capacities 5.5 Conclusion References Chapter 6: Social Animals and the Potential for Morality: On the Cultural Exaptation of Behavioral Capacities Required for Normativity 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Morality and Biology: Evolution, Natural Selection, and Adaptation 6.3 An Inclusive Understanding of Social Behaviors 6.3.1 Normativity, Culture, and Conformity (Among Others) 6.3.2 The Relationship Between Various Types of Norms 6.3.3 Complexity of Animal Social Behaviors: Prerequisites of Morality Fulfilled 6.4 From Normativity to Morality 6.4.1 Morality as Secondary Adaptation (Exaptation) 6.4.2 Cultural Evolution in Animals 6.4.3 Implications for Moral Universality and Diversity 6.4.4 Animals and Moral Behavior 6.5 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Against the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality: Deconstructing a Philosophical Myth 7.1 Mechanistic Explanation vs. Cognitive Capture of Objective Values 7.2 Moral Objectivity and Its Sequels in the Philosophical Tradition 7.2.1 Hume and the Projection Mechanism 7.2.2 Mackie and the Claim to Objectivity in Moral Language 7.3 Evolutionary Debunking: Selection for Illusory Objectivity 7.4 An Alternative Mechanistic Explanation References Part III: The Cultural Evolution of Morality Chapter 8: The Cultural Evolution of Extended Benevolence 8.1 Extended Benevolence in Darwin’s Descent of Man 8.2 Darwin on the “Moral Sense” 8.3 Extended Benevolence: Behaviors, Institutions, and Attitudes 8.4 Extended Benevolence Evolving 8.4.1 Transmission Biases and Human Rights 8.4.2 Transmission Biases and Animal Welfare 8.5 The Moral Sense as an Assemblage of Adapted Transmission Biases 8.6 How Extended Benevolence Emerged 8.7 The Proliferation of Extended Benevolence 8.8 Conclusion: An Evolutionary Foundation for Extended Benevolence References Chapter 9: The Contingency of the Cultural Evolution of Morality, Debunking, and Theism vs. Naturalism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Contingency Question 9.3 The Contingency Thesis: The Contingency of Cultural Evolution 9.4 The Philosophical Implications: Debunking Arguments and Theism vs. Naturalism 9.5 Empirical Support for the Contingency of Cultural Evolution 9.6 Conclusion: Contingency and Its Philosophical Implications References Chapter 10: Morality as Cognitive Scaffolding in the Nucleus of the Mesoamerican Cosmovision 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Cosmovision, a Cognitive and Social Phenomenon 10.3 Cosmovision and Scaffolding in Niche Construction 10.4 The Epistemological Challenge 10.5 Conclusions References Index