New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving

Description

New philosophical essays on love by a diverse group of international scholars. Topics include contributions to the ongoing debate on whether love is arational or if there are reasons for love, and if so what kind; the kinds of love there may be (between humans and artificial intelligences, between non-human animals and humans); whether love can explain the difference between nationalism and patriotism; whether love is an necessary component of truly seeing others and the world; whether love, like free will, is “fragile,” and may not survive in a deterministic world; and whether or not love is actually a good thing or may instead be a force opposed to morality.  Key philosophers discussed include Immanuel Kant, Iris Murdoch, Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, Thomas Hurka, Bennett Helm, Alfred Mele and Derk Pereboom.  Essays also touch on the treatment of love in literature and popular culture, from Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair to Spike Jonze’s movie her. Contents Notes on Contributors Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 I Want to Know What Love Is 1.2 (If Loving You Is Wrong) I Don’t Want to Be Right 1.3 The Look of Love 1.4 Love Me Do 1.5 Will You Still Love Me Tomorrow 1.6 Love Is a Battlefield 1.7 Is This Love? 1.8 Can’t Help Falling in Love 1.9 Love Me for a Reason 1.10 Drowning in the Sea of Love 1.11 The Love Cats 1.12 Computer Love 1.13 Thin Line Between Love and Hate 1.14 References Chapter 2: Making Room for Love in Kantian Ethics 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Kant’s Views About Love and Friendship 2.3 Some Contemporary Kantian Approaches to Love and Friendship 2.4 Conclusion: Assessing Kantian Moral Love 2.5 References Chapter 3: Iris Murdoch and the Epistemic Significance of Love 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Murdoch’s Moral Framework 3.3 Alternative Interpretations of Murdochian Love 3.4 Love and Realism 3.5 Love as a Virtue and a Perceptual Sensitivity The Unity of the Virtues The Unique Significance of Love 3.6 The Everyday Concept of Love: A Defense of Murdoch 3.7 Conclusion References Chapter 4: ‘Love’ as a Practice: Looking at Real People 4.1 An Ameliorative Project 4.2 Love, Value, and Looking 4.3 Love as Passivity: Unrealistic Images and Fantasies 4.4 Love as an Ongoing Practice: Steering Away from the Ego 4.5 Real People Versus Fantasies 4.6 The Ongoing Practice: Getting to Know Versus Knowledge References Chapter 5: Love, Choice, and Taking Responsibility 5.1 The Little Prince 5.2 Responsibility 5.3 Taking Responsibility 5.4 The Marital Vow 5.5 Responsibility or Duty? 5.6 Conclusion References Chapter 6: Not All’s Fair in Love and War: Toward Just Love Theory 6.1 Love and War: Getting Started 6.2 Just War Theory 6.3 Toward Just Love Theory Realism Jus ad Amantes Necessitudo Just Target Evaluative Deontic Just Goals Internal Goals External Goals Jus in Amantes Necessitudo 6.4 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Doubting Love 7.1 Introduction 7.2 On Believing That I Love You: Two Potential Sources of Bias 7.3 On Believing That I Am Experiencing Love’s Emotions Toward You 7.4 On Believing That I Am Making Love’s Commitments to You 7.5 Concluding Remarks References Chapter 8: Love and Free Agency 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Responsibility and History 8.3 Love and History 8.4 Love’s Requirements and Acting from Love 8.5 More on Love’s Fragility: Love and Moral Sentiments or Attitudes 8.6 A Worthy Objection: Love’s Resilience 8.7 Final Thoughts References Chapter 9: Sentimental Reasons 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Reasons for Love 9.3 Disentangling ‘Reasons’: Explanation, Understanding, Justification 9.4 A Confluence of Interests: ‘Responding’ to Reasons 9.5 Love as a Sentiment 9.6 Divergent Interests References Chapter 10: Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love 10.1 Introduction 10.2 What’s So Good About the Reasons View? 10.3 The Requiring Reasons View 10.4 The Warranting Reasons View 10.5 The Enticing Reasons View 10.6 The Threat of Overgeneralization 10.7 The Abundance and Inconstancy of Enticing Reasons 10.8 The Unloving 10.9 Conclusion References Chapter 11: Love, Motivation, and Reasons: The Case of the Drowning Wife 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Case of the Drowning Wife 11.3 The Husband with One Thought Too Many 11.4 Frankfurt’s Response 11.5 Velleman’s Response 11.6 The Possibility of a Moral Account of Love 11.7 A Too Moralistic Account of Love? 11.8 Special Relationships 11.9 Special Reasons 11.10 Conclusion References Chapter 12: Can Our Beloved Pets Love Us Back? 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Attempts from Scientists to Prove That Dogs Can Love Us Back 12.3 First Potentially Vindicating Theory: Hurka’s Theory 12.4 Second Potentially Vindicating Theory: Franklin-Hall and Jaworska’s Theory 12.5 Theory Troubles 12.6 The Last Potentially Vindicating Theory: Shpall’s Tripartite Theory 12.7 Conclusion References Chapter 13: Romantic Love Between Humans and AIs: A Feminist Ethical Critique 13.1 Introduction 13.2 A Feminist Reading of Her 13.3 Implications for Loving Relationships Loving Voluntarily Individualist Caring Interpersonal Sharing Love as Union 13.4 Responses to Some Objections Just Give the AI a Personality of Its Own, Then! Unequal Relationships Are Not Ethically Bad Per Se AIs Are Not Persons, So Why Care About Our Relationships with Them? What About Male AIs? 13.5 Conclusion References Chapter 14: Patriotism and Nationalism as Two Distinct Ways of Loving One’s Country 14.1 Are Patriotism and Nationalism Distinct Constructs? 14.2 Analogies Between Patriotism and Filial Love and Nationalism and Intense Passionate Love Patriotism and Filial Love Analogy Between Patriotism and Filial Love Patriotism and Impartiality Nationalism and Intense Passionate Love Analogy Between Nationalism and Intense Passionate Love (i) Clinging on to the Object of Love (ii) Bad Faith (iii) Love “Highs” 14.3 Conclusion References Index