ENGLISH

Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

By Demet Çetiner (auth.)

Book information

Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2013
ISBN
978-3-642-35821-0, 978-3-642-35822-7
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
2 MB (2436525 bytes)
Series
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 668
Edition
1
Pages
168\180
Orientation
yes
Scanned
yes
Time added
2013-08-01 04:00:00
Management Science; Game Theory/Mathematical MethoOperation Research/Decision Theory; Operations Res

Description

​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

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