The History of Skepticism. In Search of Consistency

Description

This book reconstructs the history of skepticism ranging from ancient to contemporary times, from Pyrrho to Kripke. The main skeptical stances and the historical reconstruction of the concept of skepticism are connected with an analysis of their recurrent inconsistency. The author reveals that this inconsistency is not a logical contradiction but a pragmatic one. She shows that it is a contradiction between the content of the skeptical position and the implicit presumption of the act of its assertion. The thesis of global skepticism cannot be accepted as true without falling into the pragmatic inconsistency. The author explains, how skepticism was important for exposing the limits of human knowledge and inspired its development. Cover......Page 1 Table of Contents......Page 6 Introduction......Page 10 1. Genealogy of the Term Skepticism......Page 14 2.1. Ancient Skepticism: the Suspension of Judgements Aspiring to Be the Truth......Page 17 2.2. Medieval Skepticism: the Weakness of Human Judgements Contrasted with God’s Omnipotence......Page 18 2.3. Modern Skepticism: Doubting the Value of Judgements Aspiring to be Knowledge......Page 19 2.4. Contemporary Skepticism: Paradoxical Thesis on the Non-existence of Knowledge and Meaning......Page 20 3. Types of Skepticism and Related Terminology......Page 22 1. Elements of Skepticism in the Pre-Pyrrhonian Philosophy......Page 28 2. Pyrrho of Elis and Ethical Skepticism......Page 32 3. Academic Skepticism (Arcesilaus and Carneades)......Page 44 4. Later Pyrrhonism (Aenesidemus and Agrippa)......Page 57 5. Sextus Empiricus – Summa of Ancient Skepticism......Page 67 5.1. The Concept and the Criterion of Truth......Page 69 5.2. Signs and Demonstrations......Page 74 5.3. Physics, Ethics and the Specialized Sciences......Page 82 5.4. The Defense of Consistency......Page 90 5.5. Recent Consistency Interpretations......Page 92 5.6. “Throwing away the Ladder” – Does Sextus Accept Self-Refutation?......Page 101 5.7. Pragmatic Inconsistency of Sextan Skepticism......Page 104 Conclusions for Ancient Skepticism......Page 109 1. The Early Christian Thinkers about Skepticism......Page 112 2. St. Augustine and the Critique of Academic Skepticism......Page 115 3. Medieval Skeptics before William Ockham (John of Salisbury, Henry of Ghent, Peter Aureoli)......Page 120 4. William Ockham – Skepticism and Fideism......Page 127 5.1. Nicholas of Autrecourt......Page 131 5.2. John of Mirecourt......Page 134 Conclusions for Medieval Skepticism......Page 136 1. The Beginning of Modern Skepticism (Erasmus, Pico, Sanchez)......Page 138 2. Montaigne’s Skepticism......Page 143 2.1. Ancient Themes......Page 144 2.2. Christian Themes......Page 149 2.3. Renaissance Themes......Page 152 2.4. An Attempt to Avoid the Inconsistency Charge......Page 154 2.5. Montaigne’s Followers (Charron, de la Mothe le Vayer)......Page 156 3. Descartes’ Hypotheses and the Radicalization of Skepticism......Page 158 3.1. The Dream Hypothesis and the Evil Demon Hypothesis......Page 159 3.2. Idealism and Making Skepticism Deeper......Page 162 3.3. Methodic Skepticism......Page 164 3.4. An Attempt to Rebut Skeptical Hypotheses......Page 166 3.5. Skepticism between Descartes and Hume (Huet, Pascal, Bayle)......Page 172 4.1. References to Ancient Tradition......Page 178 4.2. Acceptance of the Cartesian Hypotheses......Page 181 4.3. Broadening the Skeptical Arguments......Page 183 4.4. Instinct as a Rescue from Skepticism......Page 187 4.5. The Critique of Total Skepticism......Page 188 4.6. Searching for a Consistent Moderate Skepticism......Page 190 4.7. Dialectics of Skepticism and Naturalism......Page 191 5.1. Kant and the Skeptical Tradition......Page 194 5.2. Futility of Skepticism and the Value of the Skeptical Method......Page 196 5.3. Transcendental Skepticism......Page 197 5.4. Hegel about Skepticism......Page 200 5.5. Nietzsche’s Skepticism......Page 202 Conclusions for Modern Skepticism......Page 206 1.1. Pragmatism......Page 208 1.2. Analytical Philosophy......Page 214 1.3. Phenomenology and Existentialism......Page 222 2.1. Knowledge as an Absolute Limit Term......Page 225 2.2. Hypothesis of the Evil Scientist and Brain-in-a-Vat......Page 229 2.3. Other Protagonists of Skepticism......Page 231 3.1. Knowledge Does Not Require Certainty (Fallibilism)......Page 234 3.2. Knowledge is Not Governed by Deductive Rules (Nozick)......Page 236 3.3. Knowledge Does not Require Knowledge about Knowledge (Externalism)......Page 238 3.4. Standards for Knowledge are Changeable (Contextualism)......Page 239 3.5. Justification Does Not Require the Procedure of Justification (Williams)......Page 245 3.6. Inconsistency of Brain-in-a-Vat Hypothesis (Putnam)......Page 250 4.1. Thought Experiment with quus......Page 253 4.2. Practice as a Rescue from Skepticism......Page 256 4.3. Meaning Skepticism about Other Minds......Page 259 4.4. Skepticism about Self-Consciousness......Page 261 Conclusions for Contemporary Skepticism......Page 264 Conclusion: Pragmatic Inconsistency of Skepticism......Page 268 Bibliography......Page 274 Chronology and Geography of Skepticism......Page 296 Index......Page 298