Smart Grid Security: Innovative Solutions for a Modernized Grid

Description

The Smart Grid security ecosystem is complex and multi-disciplinary, and relatively under-researched compared to the traditional information and network security disciplines. While the Smart Grid has provided increased efficiencies in monitoring power usage, directing power supplies to serve peak power needs and improving efficiency of power delivery, the Smart Grid has also opened the way for information security breaches and other types of security breaches. Potential threats range from meter manipulation to directed, high-impact attacks on critical infrastructure that could bring down regional or national power grids. It is essential that security measures are put in place to ensure that the Smart Grid does not succumb to these threats and to safeguard this critical infrastructure at all times. Dr. Florian Skopik is one of the leading researchers in Smart Grid security, having organized and led research consortia and panel discussions in this field. Smart Grid Security will provide the first truly holistic view of leading edge Smart Grid security research. This book does not focus on vendor-specific solutions, instead providing a complete presentation of forward-looking research in all areas of Smart Grid security. The book will enable practitioners to learn about upcoming trends, scientists to share new directions in research, and government and industry decision-makers to prepare for major strategic decisions regarding implementation of Smart Grid technology. Cover Title Page Copyright Page Contents List of Contributors Foreword Chapter 1 - Introduction 1.1 - What is a Smart Grid? 1.2 - The Structure of a Smart Grid System 1.3 - The Two Key Challenges to be solved by Smart Grids 1.4 - Smart Grid Applications and their Critical Nature 1.5 - Challenges in Smart Grid Security 1.6 - The Storyline of this Book References Chapter 2 - Assessing the European Approach to Privacy and Data Protection in Smart Grids. Lessons for Emerging Technologiesa 2.1 - Introduction 2.2 - The Dutch Case Study: a smart grid roll-out that neglected individual interests 2.3 - The Smart Grid: a socially complex phenomenon with a surveillance dimension 2.4 - Privacy and Personal Data Protection in the European Legal Order 2.5 - Privacy Testing and Data Protection Testing of Smart Grids 2.6 - Regulating Smart Grids in Europe: a “light” approach to personal data protection 2.6.1 - Supplementing the legally binding data protection framework 2.6.2 - A data protection impact assessment framework is the core element 2.6.2.1 - The First Regulatory Experiment: The RFID PIA Framework 2.6.2.2 - The Second Regulatory Experiment: The DPIA Framework for Smart Grids and Smart Metering Systems 2.7 - The EU “light” regulatory approach to Personal Data Protection in Smart Grids: an evaluation 2.8 - Conclusion: DPIA Testing is a First Good Step but a more inclusive, easy to apply and flexible solution is necessary 2.8.1 - A missed opportunity? 2.8.2 - Recommendation 1: the governance of emerging technologies should carefully combine regulatory strategies 2.8.3 - Recommendation 2: Impact assessments of emerging technologies should be inclusive, easy to use and flexible Acronyms References Chapter 3 - The Evolution of the Smart Grid Threat Landscape and Cross-Domain Risk Assessment 3.1 - Introduction 3.2 - Smart Grid Architectures: The Basics 3.2.1 - GridWise Interoperability Context-Setting Framework 3.2.2 - NIST Smart Grid Framework 3.2.3 - Smart Grid Architecture Model and EU Mandate M490 3.3 - Smart Grid Threat Landscape 3.3.1 - Threat Types 3.3.2 - Threat Agents 3.3.3 - Attack Vectors 3.3.4 - Case Studies 3.3.4.1 - Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 3.3.4.2 - Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMPAC) 3.3.4.3 - Distribution Grid Management (DGM) 3.4 - Smart Grid Risk Assessment 3.4.1 - Basic Concepts 3.4.2 - Main Challenges 3.4.2.1 - Managing Safety and Security Risks 3.4.2.2 - Analysing Cyber-physical Risks 3.4.2.3 - Understanding the Risks to Legacy Systems 3.4.2.4 - Complex Organisational Dependencies 3.4.2.5 - Understanding Cascading Effects 3.4.3 - Existing Risk Assessment Frameworks 3.5 - Conclusion Acronyms References Chapter 4 - Resilience Against Physical Attacks 4.1 - Introduction 4.2 - Physical Attacks 4.2.1 - Goals of physical attacks in the context of smart grid devices 4.2.1.1 - Information Gathering 4.2.1.2 - Manipulating the Device Under Attack 4.2.2 - Overview of physical attacks 4.2.3 - Access to local storage (non-invasive) 4.2.4 - Accessing open interfaces (non-invasive) 4.2.5 - Bus probing (non-invasive) 4.2.6 - Fault/signal injection (non-invasive) 4.2.7 - Glitching attacks 4.2.7.1 - Clock Glitching 4.2.7.2 - Voltage Glitching 4.2.8 - Side-channel attacks 4.2.8.1 - Timing Attacks 4.2.8.2 - Power Analysis Attacks Simple Power Analysis (SPA) Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Template and Other Profiling Attacks 4.2.8.3 - EM Attacks 4.2.9 - IC Decapsulation 4.2.10 - Limited optical access to internal storage 4.2.11 - (Optical) fault injection (semi-invasive) 4.2.12 - IC reverse engineering 4.3 - Basic Protection Mechanisms 4.4 - Hardware security modules 4.5 - Integrity protection and attestation 4.6 - Physical Uncloneable Functions 4.6.1 - Motivation 4.6.2 - Classification of PUFs and related concepts 4.6.2.1 - Unique Objects 4.6.2.2 - Physical Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) 4.6.3 - Properties of PUFs 4.6.4 - Example implementations of PUFs 4.6.4.1 - SRAM PUF 4.6.4.2 - Ring Oscillator PUF 4.6.4.3 - Arbiter PUF 4.6.4.4 - Bistable Ring 4.7 - Conclusion Acronyms References Chapter 5 - Secure Communications in Smart Grid: Networking and Protocols 5.1 - Introduction 5.1.1 - An Overview of the Communication Network 5.1.2 - The Communications Network as an Attack Surface 5.2 - Smart Grid Communication Standards 5.2.1 - Functional Groups of Smart Grid Communications 5.2.1.1 - Advanced Metering Infrastructure 5.2.1.2 - Field Devices and Substation Communication 5.2.1.3 - Control Centre Communication 5.2.2 - Communication Standards 5.2.2.1 - IEC 61850 5.2.2.2 - IEC 60870-5 5.2.2.3 - IEEE C37.118 5.2.2.4 - DNP3 5.2.2.5 - Modbus 5.2.3 - IEC 62351: Security 5.3 - Attacking Smart Grid Network Communications Reconnaissance Scan Enumeration Disruption Penetration 5.3.1 - Basic Attacks on Communications 5.3.1.1 - Denial of Service (DoS) 5.3.1.2 - DoS on Communication Mediums 5.3.1.3 - ARP Spoofing and MAC Flooding 5.3.1.4 - Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attacks 5.3.1.5 - Replay 5.3.1.6 - Session Hijacking 5.3.1.7 - Injection 5.3.1.8 - Miscellaneous Attacks 5.3.2 - Attacks on Smart Grid Communication Protocols 5.4 - Approaches to Smart Grid Network Communication Security 5.4.1 - Minimal Vulnerabilities 5.4.2 - Visibility of Attacker Activities 5.4.3 - Protection 5.4.4 - Detection 5.4.5 - Current Research 5.5 - Conclusion Acronyms References Chapter 6 - Cyber-Secure and Resilient Architectures for Industrial Control Systems 6.1 - Introduction 6.1.1 - Cyber Security Challenges in Industrial Control Systems 6.1.2 - Threats against Industrial Control Systems 6.1.3 - Illustrative Attack Case: Stuxnet 6.2 - Design of Cyber-secure and Resilient Industrial Control Systems 6.2.1 - IT Security Reference Architecture 6.2.2 - Control-Centric Approaches 6.2.2.1 - Anomaly Detection in Control Systems Model-Based Fault Detection and Isolation Data-Driven Fault Detection and Isolation 6.2.2.2 - Resilient Control Framework Robust Control Active Fault-Tolerant Control 6.2.3 - Risk Assessment for Control Systems 6.2.3.1 - Adversary Model Disclosure Resources Disruption Resources Model Knowledge Adversary Goals and Constraints 6.3 - Cyber Security Challenges in Electric Power Systems 6.3.1 - New Control Loops in Smart Grids CL1. Energy Balancing with Load Flexibility CL2. Local Control with Substation Equipment CL3. Local Control at Generator CL4. Coordinated Control with Substation Equipment and Field Units CL5. Medium Voltage Network Optimisation on Management System Level CL6. Local Voltage Control with Substation Equipment CL7. Coordinated Voltage Control with Substation Equipment and Field Units CL8. Distribution Optimisation across Voltage Levels 6.3.2 - Vulnerabilities in feedback-controlled Smart Grids F1. Local Active and Reactive Power Control F2. Supply and Demand Balance F3. Voltage Control F4. Frequency Control 6.3.3 - Existing Control Loops in Modern Power Transmission Networks 6.3.3.1 - Vulnerabilities in Power Transmission Networks 6.4 - Case Studies: Risk Assessment for False-Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems 6.4.1 - Minimum-Resource Adversary Policies 6.4.1.1 - Case Study: The IEEE 14-bus Benchmark 6.4.1.2 - Incremental Improvements in Security: The Use of Security Metrics 6.4.2 - Maximum-Impact Resource-Constrained Adversary Policies 6.4.2.1 - Case Study: The IEEE 14-bus Benchmark 6.5 - Conclusion acronyms References Chapter 7 - Establishing a Smart Grid Security Architecture 7.1 - Introduction 7.2 - Adopting a Smart Grid Security Architecture Methodology 7.3 - Defining your Smart Grid Security Architecture 7.3.1 - NISTIR 7628 7.3.1.1 - Summary of NISTIR 7628 Approach 7.3.1.2 - NISTIR 7628 Gaps and Limitations with Respect to Smart Grid Security 7.3.1.3 - Applying NISTIR 7628 to Smart Grid Security Architecture 7.3.2 - Response to EU Mandate M/490 7.3.2.1 - Summary of M/490 Approach 7.3.2.2 - M/490 Gaps and Limitations with Respect to Smart Grid Security 7.3.2.3 - Applying M/490 in EU Smart Grid Security Projects 7.3.3 - Microgrid Security Reference Architecture (MSRA) 7.3.3.1 - Summary of MSRA Security Reference Architecture Approach 7.3.3.2 - MSRA Gaps and Limitations with Respect to Security Architecture 7.3.3.3 - Applying MSRA in Smart Grid Security Projects 7.3.4 - Addressing Gaps in the Smart Grid Reference Architectures 7.4 - Moving from Architecture to Design 7.5 - Validating your Smart Grid Security Architecture 7.6 - Conclusion Acronyms References Further Readings Chapter 8 - Secure Development Life Cycle 8.1 - Introduction 8.1.1 - The Development of Software for the Smart Grid 8.2 - The Secure System Development Lifecycle 8.2.1 - NIST 800-64 8.2.2 - Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle 8.2.3 - Other Industry Best Practices 8.3 - Security Assurance Standards 8.4 - Safety-critical System Development and Best Practices 8.4.1 - The DO-178B Document 8.4.2 - The IEC 61508 Standard 8.4.3 - The PHASE principles 8.5 - Secure Development Activities 8.5.1 - Secure Programming 8.5.1.1 - The MISRA C Standard 8.5.1.2 - The ISO/IEC 25010 Standard Series 8.5.2 - Secure Code Review 8.5.3 - Static Code Analysis 8.5.4 - Dynamic Code Analysis 8.5.5 - Code Coverage Analysis 8.5.6 - Penetration Testing 8.6 - Conclusion Acronyms References Chapter 9 - Operational Smart Grid Security 9.1 - Introduction to the Operational Smart Grid Security Model 9.2 - Visibility: Cyber Intelligence and Information Sharing 9.2.1 - Visibility into Risk 9.2.2 - Visibility into Infrastructure 9.2.3 - Visibility into Identities 9.2.4 - Visibility into Information 9.2.5 - Visibility into Applications 9.3 - Analytics: Deriving Patterns and Understanding Anomalies 9.3.1 - Analytics: Establishing Patterns of What is Normal 9.3.2 - Analytics: Detecting Anomalies within the Operational Environment 9.3.3 - Analytics: Detecting Anomalies within the Administrator Environment 9.3.4 - Analytics: Investigation and Prioritization 9.4 - Action: Mitigation, Remediation and Recovery 9.4.1 - Action: Recovering from and Managing Incidents 9.4.2 - Action: Remediating Vulnerabilities and Anomalies 9.4.3 - Action: Mitigating Risk 9.5 - The Human Factor as Asset 9.5.1 - Engaging the Employee Community 9.5.2 - Engaging the User Community 9.6 - Conclusion: Security Shared is Security Strengthened Acronyms References Further readings Chapter 10 - Implementation Experiences from Smart Grid Security Applications and Outlook on Future Research 10.1 - Smart Grid Evolution 10.1.1 - Documented Incidents 10.1.2 - Evolving Security Standards 10.2 - Sustainable Building Integrated Energy Test-Beds 10.2.1 - Tertiary (supervisory) control layer 10.2.2 - Secondary (coordination) control layer 10.2.3 - Primary (local) control layer 10.3 - Security Measures and Protection Mechanisms 10.3.1 - Intrusion Detection Systems 10.3.2 - Physical unclonable functions- PUFs 10.3.3 - Advanced Security Analytics 10.3.4 - Resilient Control Algorithms 10.4 - Anticipated Results: Smart Grid Test-Bed Use-Cases 10.4.1 - Network Vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 Smart Substations 10.4.2 - IEC 61850 based Smart Substation 10.4.3 - Security analytics in SCADA systems 10.5 - Conclusion and Look Ahead Acronyms References Further Readings Subject Index