Art and IR Theory: Visual Semiotic Games

Description

This book examines the correspondence between international relations (IR) theories of structural realism and constructivism and paintings, notably the artwork of Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, in a game theory setting. This interdisciplinary approach, through the lens of game theory and semiotics, permits different, enriched interpretations of structural realism and constructivism. These theories constitute an axis of debate between social and systemic approaches to international politics, as well as an axis of differentiation between scientific realism and positivism as philosophies of science. As such, the interpretations explored in this book contribute to what we know about international relations, how semiotics intersect with strategic uncertainty, and explains these interactions in the proposed games model. The book’s use of game theory and semiotics generate ‘visual semiotic games’ (VSGs) that shed light on the debate axes through strategic uncertainty, interactions, and players’ interactive belief systems. VSGs will contribute to literature on experimental semiotics in the sense of players’ coordination behavior, beliefs, and artistic evaluations. The equilibria, interpreted through branches of philosophy of mind and theories of explanation, will reveal possibilities of agreement among players about which artwork representing the theory at hand is the best, opening innovative research perspectives for the discipline of IR theory. Preface Contents Chapter 1: Scope and Method 1.1 Hybrid Method 1.1.1 Visual Semiotics 1.1.2 Visual Semiotic Games Chapter 2: Structural Constraınts and Nonunıque Dynamıc Anarchıes 2.1 The Discipline Is a Ghetto of War 2.2 Game Theory in Visual Turn 2.3 Structural Constraints 2.4 Scientific Realism, Phlogiston 2.5 Criticisms of Structural Realism 2.6 Dynamic Nonunique Anarchies 2.6.1 Categorization of Anarchies 2.6.2 Changing Anarchies 2.6.3 Evolutionary Games and the Continuum of Anarchies 2.7 Criticisms of Constructivism Chapter 3: Art Versus IR Theory 3.1 Abstraction in Art and IR Theory 3.2 Rothko-Waltz 3.3 Pollock-Wendt 3.4 Why Pollock and Rothko? Chapter 4: Preferences and Equılıbrıa 4.1 Preferences Over Outcomes 4.1.1 Preferences and Minds 4.2 Preferences Over Actions: Nash Equilibrium 4.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma 4.2.2 Dress-Color Game 4.2.2.1 Nash Equilibrium in Dress-Color Game 4.2.2.2 Dress-Color Game Solution by Backward Induction 4.3 Coordination 4.3.1 Pure Coordination 4.3.2 Stag Hunt 4.3.3 Battle of Sexes Chapter 5: Saussurean Games 5.1 Nash Equilibrium 5.2 Saussurean Stag Hunt Game 5.2.1 Saussurean Battle of Sexes Game 5.2.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 5.2.3 Correlated Equilibrium 5.2.4 Commitments 5.2.5 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: One-Sided Incomplete Information in Saussurean Games 5.3 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: Two-Sided Incomplete Information in Saussurean Games 5.4 Repeated Interactions 5.5 Evolutionary Equilibrium in Saussurean Games Chapter 6: Peırcıan Games 6.1 Peircian Games in Strategic Form 6.2 Icon 6.3 Index 6.4 Symbol 6.5 Equilibrium 6.6 Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 6.7 Peircian Game in Extensive Form 6.8 One-Sided Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 6.9 Evolutionary Equilibrium Chapter 7: Hybrıd Games 7.1 Hybrid Game Under Imperfect Information 7.2 Hybrid Game in Two-Stage Form 7.3 Hybrid Game of One-Sided Incomplete Information 7.3.1 (A, AA) 7.3.2 (A, AR) 7.3.3 (A, RA) 7.3.4 (A, RR) 7.3.5 (R, AA) 7.3.6 (R, AR) 7.3.7 (R, RA) 7.3.8 (R, RR) 7.4 Hybrid Game in Extensive Form Chapter 8: Interpretations 8.1 The Place of Mind in IR 8.1.1 Dualism and Materialism 8.1.2 IR Theories as Mental Pictures 8.2 Dualism 8.3 Monism 8.3.1 Behaviorism 8.3.2 Identity Theory 8.3.3 Functionalism 8.4 Explanations Versus Nash Equilibria 8.4.1 Explanations Why 8.4.2 Explanations How Possible Summing Up References