How We Cooperate: A Theory of Kantian Optimization

Description

A new theory of how and why we cooperate, drawing from economics, political theory, and philosophy to challenge the conventional wisdom of game theory Game theory explains competitive behavior by working from the premise that people are self-interested. People don’t just compete, however; they also cooperate. John Roemer argues that attempts by orthodox game theorists to account for cooperation leave much to be desired. Unlike competing players, cooperating players take those actions that they would like others to take—which Roemer calls “Kantian optimization.” Through rigorous reasoning and modeling, Roemer demonstrates a simpler theory of cooperative behavior than the standard model provides. Contents Preface One. Introduction: Cooperation, Altruism, and Economic Theory Part One. Kantian Optimization in Games Two. Simple Kantian Equilibrium Three. Heterogeneous Preferences: Multiplicative and Additive Kantian Optimization Four. Other Forms of Kantian Optimization Five. Altruism Six. Is Kantian Optimization Really Nash Optimization under Another Guise? Seven. Existence and Dynamics of Kantian Equilibrium Eight. Evolutionary Considerations: Can Kantians Resist Invasion by Nashers? Nine. Alternative Approaches to Cooperation Ten. A Generalization to More Complex Production Economies Part Two. Kantian Optimization in Market Economies Eleven. International Cooperation to Reduce Global Carbon Emissions Twelve. Efficient Provision of a Public and Private Good: A Semimarket Economy Thirteen. Two Designs for Market Socialism Fourteen. An Economy of Worker-Owned Firms Fifteen. Conclusion: Positive or Normative? Notes References Index