Duty to Self: Moral, Political, and Legal Self-Relation

Description

Duty to self has not been taken seriously by contemporary moral and political philosophers, with many even denying the coherence of the notion. Morality and politics concern treatment of others, according to common understanding, and so the very idea of a duty to oneself is thought to be mistaken. Against this, this book aims to vindicate the idea of duties owed by a person to herself, within both the moral and the political domains. Temporal divisions within a life, as well as between practical identities, enable an individual to relate to herself second-personally as she would to another, and thus to owe herself obligations. This book argues that such duties have implications for ethics, practical reasoning, and moral psychology. It also advances a new justification for paternalistic laws, which appeals to the notion of political self-duty. Title_Pages Dedication Acknowledgments Introduction On_the_Significance_of_Duties_to_the_Self Troubles_for_Duties_to_the_Self Defending_Duties_to_the_Self_Part_1Duties_Across_Time Defending_Duties_to_the_Self_Part_2Duties_at_a_Moment Might_There_Be_SelfDirected_Political_DutiesTroubles_for_State_Paternalism Defending_Political_Duties_to_the_SelfThe_Possibility_of_Liberal_Paternalism Practical_Philosophy_After_Duties_to_Self Works_Cited Index