Qatar: The Practice of Rented Power

Description

This book explains the parameters of Qatar’s political growth by developing an alternative theory of power – ‘rented’ power. The author demonstrates how Qatar’s emergence as a regional power can be solely explained by its capacity as a gas-rich rentier state. By using Qatar as an empirical case study of the ‘rented’ power theory, readers will gain insight into Qatar’s engagement with non-state actors (political Islam, tribes, media, sports, and others) to wield its power, allowing Qatar to ‘rent’ the well-established influence of non-state actors due to their transnational nature. The Qatari case demonstrates a state’s ability to establish a patron-client relationship with non-state actors, overcoming limitations set by size or military strength to gain international influence. This book is accessible to a wide readership: it will be of interest of scholars, postgraduates, journalists, policy experts, and a general audience whose interests include the politics of the Middle East and the GCC states particularly Cover Endorsement Half Title Series Information Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Preface Acknowledgements Note On Transliteration Part I Rented Power: Main Features 1 Introduction to the Concept of Rented Power 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Overview of the Argument 1.3 Why Study Qatar? 1.4 Contribution of the Argument to Existing Literature 1.4.1 Rented Power and Other Types of Power 1.4.2 Studies On Qatar and Non-State Actors 1.5 The Structure of the Book Note 2 Rented Power: Theoretical Foundations 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Typologies of Power in IR Theory 2.2.1 Hard/soft Power and Smart Power 2.2.2 Sticky and Sharp Power 2.2.3 Sharp Power 2.2.4 Civilian Power Europe, Military Power Europe, Normative Power Europe 2.2.5 Subtle Power 2.3 Great, Middle Or Small: Who Can Wield Power? 2.4 Qatar and IR Theory 2.4.1 Qatar: Small Or Big? 2.4.2 Wealthy But With Limited State Capacity: How to Wield Power? 2.4.3 Alliances With Non-State Actors 2.5 Rented Power: Theoretical Foundations 2.5.1 Sectional and Non-Sectional Social Power Concepts 2.5.2 The Community Power Debate 2.5.3 The Three-Dimensional Framework 2.6 Conclusion Note Part II Wielding Rented Power 3 Rented Power in Use: Political Islam 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Scope of Qatar’s Rented Power 3.2.1 Individual Links 3.2.1.1 The Muslim Brotherhood 3.2.1.2 Al-Nahda in Tunisia 3.2.1.3 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group 3.2.1.4 Chechen Separatists 3.2.2 Mediations 3.2.2.1 The Lebanese Hizbullah 3.2.2.2 The Houthi Movement 3.2.2.3 Hamas 3.2.2.4 Taliban 3.3 Qatar’s Rented Power Domain 3.4 The Weight of Qatar’s Rented Power 3.4.1 Renting the Popularity of Islamists 3.4.2 Renting Regional Leadership 3.4.3 Renting Influence in the Muslim World 3.5 The Cost of Qatar’s Rented Power 3.5.1 Criticism of Qatar During the Arab Spring 3.5.2 The Gulf Crisis of 2014 3.5.3 The Gulf Crisis of 2017 3.5.4 Qatar, a Terrorist Safe Haven, Or Ka‘ba Al-Madiyoum? 3.5.5 Paying the Cost of Transnationalism 3.6 Conclusion 4 Rented Power in Use: Tribalism 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Scope of Qatar’s Rented Power 4.2.1 Offering Financial and Social Benefits 4.2.2 Linking Al-Thani Ancestry With Important Figures in Arab History 4.2.2.1 Ancestry Claims With the Legendary Warrior 4.2.2.2 Claims That Mohammad Bin ‘Abdul Wahhab Was the Great-Grandfather of Shaykh Hamad 4.3 Qatar’s Rented Power Domain 4.3.1 GCC: Saudi Arabia 4.3.2 GCC: Bahrain 4.3.3 The Middle East 4.4 The Cost of Qatar’s Rented Power 4.4.1 The Gulf Crises of 2014 and 2017 4.4.2 Risk of Challenges From Tribes Against the Qatari Regime 4.5 Qatar’s Rented Power Weight 4.5.1 Renting Loyalties of Domestic Tribes 4.5.2 Rented Loyalties of Tribes Beyond Qatar 4.6 Conclusion 5 Rented Power in Use: Media 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Scope of Qatar’s Rented Power: Direct Funding 5.3 Qatar’s Rented Power Domain: Via Al-Jazeera 5.4 Qatar’s Rented Power Weight: Via Al-Jazeera 5.4.1 Renting Narratives for Competing With Political Opponents 5.4.2 Renting Popularity of Islamist Narratives 5.4.3 Renting a Recognisable, Worldwide-Known Voice 5.5 The Cost of Qatar’s Rented Power: Via Al-Jazeera 5.5.1 Backing Al-Jazeera: The Sponsor of the ‘Mouthpiece of Al-Qai’da’ 5.5.2 Backing Al-Jazeera: Strained Relations With the Middle Eastern States 5.6 Scope: Indirect Backing of Media Non-State Actors 5.6.1 Arabi Post (Formerly Known as HuffPost Arabi) 5.6.2 The New Arab (al-Araby Al-Jadeed) 5.6.3 Middle East Eye 5.7 Qatar’s Domain: Indirect Backing of Media Non-State Actors 5.8 Qatar’s Rented Power Weight: Indirect Backing of Media Non-State Actors 5.9 The Cost of Qatar’s Rented Power: Indirect Backing of Media Non-State Actors 5.10 Conclusion 6 Rented Power in Use: Sports 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Qatar’s Rented Power Scope 6.2.1 Hosting Sport Mega-Events 6.2.1.1 The World Cup 2022 6.2.2 Famous Clubs: Acquisitions and Shirt Sponsorships 6.2.2.1 Purchase of Paris Saint-Germain F.C. (PSG) 6.2.3 Shirt Sponsorships With Famous Clubs 6.2.3.1 FC Barcelona 6.2.3.2 FC Bayern Munich 6.2.3.3 AS Roma 6.3 Qatar’s Rented Power Domain 6.4 Qatar’s Rented Power Weight 6.4.1 An Important Rented Role in the World of Sports Politics 6.4.2 Rented Influence in the Internal Affairs of a ‘Heavyweight’: France as a Case Study 6.5 The Cost of Qatar’s Rented Power 6.5.1 Price for Backing FIFA 6.5.2 Cost for Backing Paris Saint-Germain F.C. (PSG) 6.5.3 Cost for Backing FC Barcelona 6.6 Conclusion Part III The Future of Rented Power 7 Concluding Notes On Rented Power 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Theoretical Foundations of Rented Power 7.3 Wielding of Rented Power By Qatar: Lessons From Its Past and a Discussion On Its Future 7.3.1 Qatar’s Rented Power: Lessons to Learn 7.3.2 Future of Qatar’s Rented Power 7.4 Wielding Rented Power: Beyond Qatar 7.4.1 Rented Power of Bahrain 7.4.2 Rented Power of Iran 7.4.3 Rented Power of Saudi Arabia 7.4.4 Rented Power of Russia 7.5 Validity of the Concept of Rented Power Bibliography Index