Chapters in Game Theory: In honor of Stef Tijs

Description

Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen. Stochastic Cooperative Games: Theory and Applications....Pages 1-26 Sequencing Games: a Survey....Pages 27-50 Game Theory and the Market....Pages 51-81 On the Number of Extreme Points of the Core of a Transferable Utility Game....Pages 83-97 Consistency and Potentials in Cooperative TU-Games: Sobolev’s Reduced Game Revived....Pages 99-120 On the Set of Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game: a Survey....Pages 121-142 Concave and Convex Serial Cost Sharing....Pages 143-155 Centrality Orderings in Social Networks....Pages 157-181 The Shapley Transfer Procedure for NTU-Games....Pages 183-203 The Nucleolus as Equilibrium Price....Pages 205-222 Network Formation, Costs, and Potential Games....Pages 223-246 Contributions to the Theory of Stochastic Games....Pages 247-265 Linear (Semi-) Infinite Programs and Cooperative Games....Pages 267-285 Population Uncertainty and Equilibrium Selection: a Maximum Likelihood Approach....Pages 287-314