Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis

Description

Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: From Scientia sermocinalis to Scientia intentionum .......................................... 19 1.1 Logic as Scientia sermocinalis ..................................................................................................... 19 1.2 Aristotelian Sources .............................................................................................................................. 22 1.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 22 1.2.2 Metaphysics Γ: The σοφισταί, διαλεκτικοί, and φιλοσόφoι ........................................................... 24 1.2.3 Metaphysics Δ and Ε: Being as the True and the False ...................................................................... 28 1.3 An “Avicennian Moment” in Intentionality and the Subject of Logic ................................... 38 1.4 Two Transitional Figures: Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas ................................... 46 1.4.1 Logic, Reality and Discourse in the De ortu scientiarum of Robert Kilwardby ....................... 46 1.4.1.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 46 1.4.1.2 Situating the Scientiae Sermocinales in the De ortu scientiarum.............................................................. 48 1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the De ortu scientiarum ............................................................................ 54 1.4.2 Thomas Aquinas – Intentions, Ens rationis, and Logic ..................................................................... 73 1.4.2.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 73 1.4.2.2 Aquinas and Second Intentions .............................................................................................................................. 75 1.4.2.3 Aquinas as Logical Commentator .......................................................................................................................... 88 1.4.2.4 Aquinas, the Metaphysics, and “Being as the True and False” ................................................................ 108 1.5 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 122 Chapter 2: Scotus as a Source for the De secundis intentionibus ..................................... 127 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 127 2.2 Duns Scotus—A Critical Figure in the Proximate Background ............................................ 137 2.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 137 2.2.2 Scotus’ Logical Works and the Subject of Logic ................................................................................ 142 2.2.3 Scotus, Second Intentions, and Acts of the Intellect ....................................................................... 160 2.2.4 Second Intentions, Mind-Dependent Relations, and Esse Obiectivum ..................................... 176 2.2.5 Ens Verum and Logical Being................................................................................................................... 196 2.3 Concluding Remarks Concerning Interpretational Trajectory ............................................ 208 Chapter 3: Hervaeus’s Treatise Qq. 1-4 — Intentions and Reality.................................. 215 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 215 3.2 Hervaeus on Logic and “Being as the True and False” ............................................................. 219 3.2.1 In What Domain of Being? ......................................................................................................................... 219 3.2.2 Explicit Remarks on Being as True and False ................................................................................... 237 3.3 Beyond the Categories: The Ontology of Second Intentions ................................................. 248 3.3.1 Important Distinctions ............................................................................................................................... 248 3.3.2 Relationes rationis: Their Non-Categoriality...................................................................................... 263 3.4 A Brief Hervaean Catalogue of Second Intentions .................................................................... 282 3.4.1 Many Other Things Than the Predicables ........................................................................................... 282 3.4.2 Founding one Intention on Another ...................................................................................................... 294 3.4.3 An Aside: The Ultimate Foundation of Second Intentions ........................................................... 304 3.4.4 Returning to the Main Thread: Founding More Complex Second Intentions ...................... 322 Chapter 4: Hervaeus’s Treatise Q. 5 — The Subject of Logic ............................................. 330 4.1 Is Logic Possible? .................................................................................................................................. 330 4.1.1 Logical Reflection .......................................................................................................................................... 330 4.1.2 First Principles in a Secondary Way of Knowing ............................................................................. 336 4.2 What is Logic About and Not About? The Broad Domain of Ens Rationis ........................ 350 4.3 The Treatise: Logical, Metaphysical, or Supertranscendental? ........................................... 382 v 4.4 Final Thoughts ....................................................................................................................................... 407 5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 413 Appendix One: Intentional Reception of Forms and “Supervenience” ......................... 426 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 433