Perception

Description

Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naïve realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication CONTENTS Preface and acknowledgments Introduction: What is the puzzle of perception? 1. The character question 2. Why the character question is hard: the external-internal puzzle 3. Why the character question is important: the significance of experience 4. The organization of this book 1. The sense datum view: Experiencing virtual reality 1.1. Naïve realism: the window shade model 1.2. The sense datum view: the brain as a virtual reality device 1.3. The act-object assumption 1.4. The argument from hallucination for the sense datum view over naïve realism 1.5. The argument from illusionism about sensible properties for the sense datum view over naïve realism 1.6. The sense datum view neatly solves the external-internal puzzle 1.7. The percipi problem about pain 1.8. Can the sense datum view explain our access to the external world? 1.9. Do simplicity considerations undermine the sense datum view? 1.10. Where are sense data? 1.11. Hard cases: perceptual imprecision and incompleteness Summary Further Reading 2. The internal physical state view: Experiences as inner modifications 2.1. What is the internal physical state view? 2.2. From experiential internalism to the internal physical state view 2.3. Can the internal physical state view accommodate the transparency observation? 2.4. The externally directed nature of some experiences 2.5. The argument from essential external directedness against the internal physical state view 2.6. Could a brain-in-the-void have a favorite shape? 2.7. Papineau’s reply: rejecting essential external directedness Summary Further Reading 3. The representational view: Experiencing as representing 3.1. What is the representational view? 3.2. The argument for the representational view: an inference to the best explanation 3.3. Can the representational view explain all sensory-perceptual experiences? 3.4. How rich is the content of experience? 3.5. The question of skepticism and the dogmatist answer 3.6. Does the representational view explain perceptual presence? 3.7. Is the representational view intrinsically implausible? 3.8. Can the representational view explain the laws of appearance? Summary Further Reading 4. How does experience represent the world? 4.1. Two questions for representationalists 4.2. Response-independent representationalism 4.3. Armchair arguments against response-independent representationalism? 4.4. The problem of internal dependence about sensible properties 4.5. Other problems about sensible properties 4.6. Response-dependent representationalism 4.7. Two problems with response-dependent representationalism 4.8. Internalist-nonreductive representationalism: the basic idea 4.9. Must internalist representationalists treat color as illusory? 4.10. Is internalist representationalism plausible for spatial experience? 4.11. Is internalist representationalism mysterious? Summary Further Reading 5. The return to naïve realism: Experience as openness to the world 5.1. A basic form of contemporary naïve realism 5.2. How naïve realism differs from representationalism 5.3. Naïve realism v representationalism: intrinsic plausibility 5.4. Naïve realism v representationalism: explanatory role 5.5. Representationalism v naïve realism: hallucination and illusion 5.6. Representationalism v naïve realism: two arguments from science 5.7. Can internalist-selectionist naïve realism answer the arguments from science? 5.8. Can ways-based naïve realism answer the arguments from science? Summary Further Reading 6. Conclusion 6.1. Explaining essential external directedness at the cost of denying internal dependence 6.2. Explaining internal dependence at the cost of denying essential external directedness 6.3. Accepting both essential external directedness and internal dependence Further Reading Glossary References Index