Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan

Description

Despite vast efforts to build the state, profound political order in rural Afghanistan is maintained by self-governing, customary organizations. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan explores the rules governing these organizations to explain why they can provide public goods. Instead of withering during decades of conflict, customary authority adapted to become more responsive and deliberative. Drawing on hundreds of interviews and observations from dozens of villages across Afghanistan, and statistical analysis of nationally representative surveys, Jennifer Murtazashvili demonstrates that such authority enhances citizen support for democracy, enabling the rule of law by providing citizens with a bulwark of defence against predatory state officials. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it shows that 'traditional' order does not impede the development of the state because even the most independent minded communities see a need for a central government - but question its effectiveness when it attempts to rule them directly and without substantive consultation. Tags: Comparative Politics, History, Political, Political Science, Social History, Philosophy, Military, Demography, Social Science Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Dedication Frontispiece Table of contents List of Tables Glossary List of Acronyms Acknowledgments Preface 1 Introduction From area studies to political economy Central questions State building and self-governance Custom, tribe, and counterinsurgency Organization Part I The politics of customary governance 2 The Afghan state in historical perspective Indirect rule: Ahmad Shah Durrani and the early monarchy Direct rule: Abdur Rahman Khan and state consolidation Direct rule redux: Amanullah The long peace: Musahiban rule Communist rule and the Soviet invasion Anarchy and Civil war The Taliban era Conclusion 3 The architecture of village governance The informal constitution Shura: Village Council Mullah: Religious leader Malik: Primus Inter Pares Back to the future: Subnational governance after 2001 Who controls the villages? Conclusion Appendix to Chapter 3 Part II Customary governance and public goods provision 4 The political economy of village governance The political economy of local public goods provision: A theory of local self-governing organizations Case studies of public goods provision Hazrati Imam Sahib District, Kunduz Province Sayghan District, Bamiyan Province Behsod District, Nangarhar Province A quantitative study of public goods provision Safety and security Dispute resolution Land disputes and resolution Other research Conclusion 5 Cooperation among communities Regional governance and public goods provision Irrigation management Bamiyan Center, Bamiyan Province Khanabad District, Kunduz Province Paghman District, Kabul Province Local order and security Dawlatabad District, Balkh Province Bamiyan Center, Bamiyan Province Panjab District, Bamiyan Province Public infrastructure Panjab District, Bamiyan Province Qarabagh District, Kabul Province Sorkhrod District, Nangarhar Province Sorkhrod District, Nangarhar Province Khanabad District, Kunduz Province Conclusion Part III Customary governance and the state 6 Customary organizations and support for the state Competing loyalties, competing values, and state building State building in Afghanistan Customary governance, foreign aid, and the state: Hypotheses Customary governance and state building Assessing the ungovernability hypothesis Assessing the democratic deficit hypothesis Explaining the findings Public goods, foreign aid, and state building Public goods, foreign aid, and the state Explaining the findings Conclusion Statistical appendix to Chapter 6 7 Federalism, Afghan style The formal structure of government in post-Taliban Afghanistan The federal dilemma in Afghanistan A note on methods De facto federalism in rural Afghanistan Governing together: Federal norms in Guldara District, Kabul Unconstrained Woluswals: Karokh District, Herat Province Weak Woluswals: Guzara District, Herat Province Breakdown and reassertion of Weak Maliks: Shibar District, Bamiyan Province The significance of De Facto federalism Conclusion 8 Conclusion Rethinking ‘‘traditional authority’’ Going local: Self-governance as an instrument of state building Power in restraint Implications for state building in Afghanistan Appendix A Research design and fieldwork appendix Appendix B Statistical Appendix Appendix C List of Interviews and Focus Groups Works cited Index