Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method

Description

First published in 1931, this volume represents the culmination of twenty years’ of the study on the principles of science. Noticing a widespread craving for philosophical light at a time of scant such offerings, Morris R. Cohen aimed to demonstrate here the fundamental and ancient connection between nature and science - between hearts and minds – in an attempt to salve the developing mutual hostility between the two in the 1920s. The volume bears particular relation to George Santayana’s Life of Reason and Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Mathematics and explores areas including the character of the insurgence against reason and reason in the contexts of the natural and social sciences. Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Original Title Page Original Copyright Page Dedication Preface Table of Contents BOOK I: REASON AND THE NATURE OF THINGS CHAPTER ONE: The Insurgence Against Reason SECTION I. THE ARGUMENT OF PSYCHOLOGISM SECTION II. THE ARGUMENT OF HISTORICISM SECTION III. THE ARGUMENT OF EMPIRICISM SECTION IV. THE ARGUMENT OF KINETICISM SECTION V. CAN FAITH BE BASED ON SCEPTICISM AS TO REASON? CHAPTER TWO: The Rivals and Substitutes for Reason SECTION I. AUTHORITY (A) THE CHURCH (B) TRADITION (C) EXPERT OPINION SECTION II. PURE EXPERIENCE (A) AVENARIUS (B) MACH (C) JAMES SECTION III. INTUITION (A) INTUITION AND COMMON SENSE (B) THE ILLATIVE SENSE AND INTUITIVE ASSENT (C) INTUITIONISM AND ONTOLOGISM (D) INTUITION, LIFE, AND INSTINCT (E) INTUITIVE OR ROMANTIC REASON SECTION IV. CREATIVE IMAGINATION (A) IMAGINATION AS CONSTRUCTIVE (B) THE FREEDOM OF THE IMAGINATION AND THE DESIRE FOR ILLUSION (C) IMAGES AND MEANINGS CHAPTER THREE: Reason and Scientific Method SECTION I. REASON AND THE GATHERING OF FACTS SECTION II. THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE (A) CERTAINTY—EVIDENCE AND PROOF (B) ACCURACY AND MEASUREMENT (1) ENUMERATION (2) MEASUREMENT (i) INTENSIVE MAGNITUDES (ii) EXTENSIVE MAGNITUDES (C) ABSTRACT UNIVERSALITY AND NECESSITY (D) SYSTEM SECTION III. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION SECTION IV. PROBABILITY SECTION V. THE IRRATIONAL AND THE A PRIORI (A) THE IRRATIONAL (B) THE A PRIORI (1) DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND THE LOGICALLY PRIOR (2) THE UNPROVABLE AND THE IRREFUTABLE (i) SELF-EVIDENCE (ii) THE INCONCEIVABILITY OF THE OPPOSITE (iii) THE FORMS OF INTUITION (3) THE A PRIORI AS METHODOLOGIC POSTULATE (4) RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE A PRIORI CHAPTER FOUR: The Metaphysics of Reason and Scientific Method SECTION I. THE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE (A) PHILOSOPHY AS A SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENCES (B) PHILOSOPHY AS A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE (C) PHILOSOPHY AS AN EXTENSION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD SECTION II. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON (A) REASON AND CONTINGENCY (1) CONTINGENCY OF SCIENTIFIC DATA (2) CONTINGENCY OF IRRELEVANT FACTS (3) CONTINGENCY OF SCIENTIFIC LAWS (B) REASON AND THE ABSOLUTE (C) REASON AND THE REALITY OF UNIVERSALS (D) REASON AND DISCONTINUITY (E) REASON AND PROBABILITY SECTION III. THE NATURE OF THINGS SECTION IV. RATIONALISM, NATURALISM, AND SUPERNATURALISM (A) FICTIONALISM (B) CONCEPTUALISM (C) IRRATIONALISM SECTION V. THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY BOOK II: REASON IN NATURAL SCIENCE CHAPTER ONE: The Nature of Mathematics SECTION I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURE AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS SECTION II. HOW CAN A PURELY FORMAL SCIENCE EXIST? (A) THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF PURE MATHEMATICS (1) IS MATHEMATICS THE ART OF MANIPULATING SYMBOLS? (2) IS MATHEMATICS BASED ON INTUITION? (i) KANT (ii) POINCARÉ (iii) RECENT INTUITIONISM (B) THE NATURE OF LOGICAL NOVELTY SECTION III. HOW IS APPLIED MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? (1) EMPIRICISM (2) TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM (3) PRAGMATISM (4) CONCLUSION CHAPTER TWO: Mechanism and Causality in physics SECTION I. MONISTIC MECHANISM (A) ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (B) HISTORICAL ARGUMENT (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT SECTION II. PHYSICAL PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION SECTION III. CONTINGENCY AND MATHEMATICS IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE APPENDIX. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PHYSICAL RELATIVITY (A) METHODOLOGIC BEARINGS (B) COSMOLOGICAL BEARINGS (1) TIME (i) TEMPORAL LOCATION (ii) DURATION (iii) TEMPORAL ORDER (2) SPACE (C) ULTIMATE PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES CHAPTER THREE: Law and Purpose in Biology SECTION I. MECHANISM AND VITALISM A. THE CASE FOR MECHANISM (A) THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTINUITY (B) THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE (C) THE ARGUMENT FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF VERIFICATION B. THE CASE FOR VITALISM (A) THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF LIFE (B) THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF BIOLOGIC LAWS (1) VITAL PHENOMENA AND THE LAW OF ENTROPY (2) DEPENDENCE OF VITAL PHENOMENA UPON HISTORY (3) THE PURPOSIVE CHARACTER OF LIFE (i) ORGANIC MOVEMENTS (ii) GROWTH, REPRODUCTION, AND HEREDITY (iii) REGENERATION (C) THE INDEPENDENCE OF BIOLOGIC METHOD (1) THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE ORGANISM (2) THE INFLUENCE OF THE ORGANISM AS A WHOLE (3) THE BIOLOGIC LEVEL OF ANALYSIS (4) THE SPONTANEITY OF LIFE (5) CONCLUSION SECTION II. IN WHAT SENSE IS EVOLUTION A BIOLOGIC LAW? (A) EVOLUTION AND THE UNFOLDING OF THE PREFORMED (B) EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMISM (C) EVOLUTION AND ORTHOGENESIS OR PROGRESS (D) EVOLUTION AND COMMON DESCENT (E) EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION AND GENETICS (F) EVOLUTION AND NATURAL SELECTION SECTION III. BIOLOGY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN CHAPTER FOUR: Psychology as a Natural Science SECTION I. FROM COMMON SENSE TO SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY SECTION II. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PSYCHOLOGY (A) CONCEPTIONS OF PSYCHIC SUBSTANCE (1) THE SOUL (2) THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO OR SELF (3) THE SUBCONSCIOUS (i) UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTIONS (ii) PANPSYCHISM (iii) UNCONSCIOUS THOUGHTS (B) THE MENTAL AND THE PHYSICAL (1) MENTALISM (2) BEHAVIOURISM (i) MATERIALISTIC MONISM (ii) THE INSULATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS (iii) THE ATTACK ON INTROSPECTION SECTION III. LAW AND CAUSALITY IN PSYCHOLOGY (A) PURE PSYCHOLOGY (B) CAN THE MENTAL BE THE CAUSE OF THE PHYSICAL? (C) CAN THE PHYSICAL CAUSE THE MENTAL? (D) FREEDOM OF THE WILL (1) EMPIRICAL FREEDOM (2) RADICAL INDETERMINISM (3) SELF-DETERMINATION (4) SUMMARY BOOK III: REASON IN SOCIAL SCIENCE CHAPTER ONE: The Social and the Natural Sciences SECTION I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (A) ARE SOCIAL FACTS SIMPLY PHYSICAL? (B) ARE SOCIAL FACTS SIMPLY BIOLOGIC? (C) ARE SOCIAL FACTS SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGIC? (D) THE DISTINCTIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1) THE VOLITIONAL OR TELEOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF SOCIAL FACTS (i) INDIVIDUAL VOLITION (ii) SOCIAL TELEOLOGY (2) THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF SOCIAL FACTS (3) THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF SOCIAL FACTS SECTION II. THE IDEAL GOAL (τέλος) OF THE SOCIAL AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES SECTION III. THE FORM OR METHOD OF RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES (A) THE COMPLEXITY AND VARIABILITY OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA (B) ARE THERE ANY SOCIAL LAWS? (C) SOCIAL AND NATURAL CAUSATION (D) TENDENCIES AS LAWS (E) TYPE ANALYSIS SECTION IV. THE FACULTY OR TYPE OF MENTALITY INVOLVED CHAPTER TWO: History Versus Value SECTION I. THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO SOCIAL VALUES (A) ECONOMICS (B) JURISPRUDENCE (C) POLITICS (D) ETHICS (E) RELIGION (F) PHILOSOPHY SECTION II. HISTORICAL METHOD (A) PEDAGOGIC VALUE (B) HISTORY AND ETHICAL ABSOLUTISM CHAPTER THREE: Communal Ghosts in Political Theory SECTION I. THE REALITY OF GROUPS SECTION II. GROUP RESPONSIBILITY SECTION III. POLITICAL PLURALISM SECTION IV. CONCLUSION CHAPTER FOUR: Natural Rights and Positive Law SECTION I. A PRIORI OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAW (A) HISTORICAL ARGUMENT (B) PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (C) LEGALISTIC ARGUMENT (D) METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT SECTION II. DIFFICULTIES IN THE PATH OF NATURAL LAW (A) THE INDETERMINATENESS OF OUR JURAL IDEALS (B) THE INTRACTABILITY OF HUMAN MATERIALS (1) INHERENT LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER (2) INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN FORCING OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW (3) THE LIMITS OF LEGAL MACHINERY (C) THE ABSTRACTNESS OF LEGAL RULES CHAPTER FIVE: The Possibility of Ethical Science SECTION I. THE ILLUSIONS OF MORALITY (A) THE ILLUSIONS OF ABSOLUTISM (B) THE ILLUSIONS OF ANTINOMIANISM (1) MORAL ANARCHISM (2) AMORALISM (3) ANTI-RATIONAL EMPIRICISM SECTION II. THE APORIAS OF THE ETHICAL IDEAL (A) MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE MORAL WILL (B) ETHICS AND DETERMINISM (C) THE PLURALITY OF MORAL ASSUMPTIONS (D) THE COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUES (E) PRUDENCE AND THE PURSUIT OF THE UNATTAINABLE SECTION III. RATIONAL METHOD IN ETHICS EPILOGUE: In Dispraise of Life, Experience, and Reality INDEX OF SUBJECTS INDEX OF PROPER NAMES