In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons

Description

How does the idea that perception must provide reasons for our empirical judgements constrain our conception of our perceptual experiences? This volume presents ten new essays on perception which in different ways address this fundamental question. Charles Travis and John McDowell debate whether we need to ascribe content to experience in order to understand how it can provide the subject with reasons. Other essays address issues such as the following: What exactly is the Myth of the Given and why should it be worthwhile to try to avoid it? What constitutes our experiential reasons? Is it experiences themselves, the objects of experiences, or facts about our experiences? Should we conceive of experiential reasons as conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the fallibility of our perceptual capacities if we think of experiences as capable of providing conclusive reasons? How should we conceive of the objects of experience? The contributors offer a variety of views on the reason-giving potential of experience, engaging explicitly and critically with each other's work. Cover In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons Copyright Contents Acknowledgements Contributors Introduction The Papers of the Anthology 1. The Myth of the Given 2. The Epistemology of Empirical Knowledge 3. The Nature of Experience 4. The Object of Experience A Brief Overview References The Travis–McDowell Debate References PART I: The Myth of the Given 1: Travis on Frege, Kant,and the GivenComments on ‘Unlocking the Outer World’ I The Given II Kant III Frege References 2: The Move, the Divide, the Myth, and its Dogma References 3: What is the Myth of the Given? 1. The Elusive Myth of the Given 2. The Substance of the Myth 3. Minimal Empiricism and McDowell’s Notion of Reasons 4. Conceptualism and McDowell’s Notion of Conceptuality 5. The Myth, Its Constraint, and the Argument for Conceptualism 6. The—Somewhat—Incontestable Argument for Non-Myth 7. How to Treat an Experiential Reason As Such 8. The First Form of Evaluation and the Particularist’s Obstacle 9. Conclusion References 4: Empiricism and Normative Constraint I II III IV V References PART II: The Epistemology of Empirical Knowledge 5: Do Perceptions Justify Beliefs?: The Argument from “Looks” Talk 1. Introduction 2. Reasons to Doubt that Perceptions Justify Beliefs 3. The Meta-Argument from “Looks” Talk 4. The Pertinent Sense of “Looks” 5. Critique of the “Looks” Argument 6. An Alternative Account of “Looks” References 6: Fallibility for Infallibilists 1. McDowell on Perceptual Fallibility 2. Capacities Perfect and Imperfect 3. Missing Austin’s Insight 4. The Lesson 5. Two Forms of Infallibilism References PART III: The Nature of Experience 7: Perception and the Vagaries of Experience 1. Direct Realisms 2. On Experience 3. Interposition? 4. Particularity 5. Making Sense of Empiricism Appendix: Martin on Visualization References 8: World in Mind: Extending Phenomenal Character and Resisting Skepticism 1. Extended Phenomenal Character 1.1 Veridical Experience 1.2 Hallucinations 1.3 Illusion 2. A Novel Version of Epistemological Disjunctivism 2.1 Veridical Experience 2.2 Hallucination 2.3 Illusion 2.4 The Epistemological Order of Explanation 3. Conclusion: A Brief Comparison References PART IV: The Object of Experience 9: Objects and the Explanation of Perception 1. The Natural Continuants View 2. The Explanation of Perception 3. The Importance of Exclusivity 4. Objections and Replies 4.1 Mind-Independence and Explanation 4.2 Explanation and Exclusivity 4.2.1 Sortalism 4.2.2 Reference Magnetism 4.3 Spatial Parts 4.4 Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind References 10: Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception? 1 The Puzzle 2 Two Ways of Solving the Puzzle 2.1 Perceptual Reasons: Content vs. Objects 2.2 The Truth-Maker View Elaborated 3 The Explanatory Exclusion Argument 3.1 In Defence of (P1) 3.2 First Argument in Defence of (P2) 3.3 Second Argument in Defence of (P2) 4 Two Objections 4.1 Reasons ≠ Explanantia 4.2 A Role for Recognitional Capacities References Index