The Contents of Visual Experience

Description

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision. Title......Page p0001.djvu Acknowledgments......Page p0005.djvu Table of Contents......Page p0007.djvu Introduction......Page p0011.djvu THE CONTENT VIEW......Page p0012.djvu THE RICH CONTENT VIEW......Page p0014.djvu WHY DOES IT MATTER?......Page p0015.djvu HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?......Page p0021.djvu I. CONTENTS......Page p0025.djvu 1. Experiences......Page p0027.djvu 1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES......Page p0030.djvu 1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES......Page p0032.djvu 2. The Content View......Page p0035.djvu 2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS......Page p0038.djvu 2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY......Page p0041.djvu 2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY......Page p0050.djvu 2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING......Page p0052.djvu WHAT ABOUT OBJECTS?......Page p0062.djvu WHY PROPERTIES? FREGEAN CONTENTS, CENTERED WORLDS AND TROPES......Page p0063.djvu 2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM LOOKS, APPEARS, AND THEIR COGNATES......Page p0067.djvu 2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW......Page p0078.djvu 3. How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?......Page p0085.djvu 3.1 INTROSPECTION......Page p0087.djvu 3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT......Page p0091.djvu 3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST......Page p0095.djvu II. PROPERTIES......Page p0105.djvu 4.1 THE EXAMPLES......Page p0107.djvu 4.2 THE PREMISES......Page p0110.djvu 4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM......Page p0121.djvu 5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS......Page p0125.djvu 5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS......Page p0127.djvu 5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE......Page p0129.djvu 5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS......Page p0133.djvu 5.5 RAW FEELS......Page p0140.djvu 5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES......Page p0145.djvu III. OBJECTS......Page p0149.djvu 6. The Role of Objects in Visual Experience......Page p0153.djvu 6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY......Page p0156.djvu 6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING......Page p0161.djvu 6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES......Page p0170.djvu 6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM vs.PURE DISJUNCTIVISM......Page p0172.djvu 6.5 WHY INTERNALlSM?......Page p0177.djvu 7. Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience......Page p0183.djvu 7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS......Page p0185.djvu 7.2 COMPLEX CONTENTS......Page p0190.djvu 7.3 THE GOOD AND THE ODD......Page p0191.djvu 7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES......Page p0207.djvu 8. The Strong Content View Revisited......Page p0215.djvu References......Page p0219.djvu Index......Page p0228.djvu