Climate change and individual responsibility: agency, moral disengagement and the motivational gap

Description

If climate change represents a severe threat to humankind, why then is response to it characterized by inaction at all levels? The authors argue there are two complementary explanations for the lack of motivation. First, our moral judgment system appears to be unable to identify climate change as an important moral problem and there are pervasive doubts about the agency of individuals. This explanation, however, is incomplete: Individual emitters can effectively be held morally responsible for their luxury emissions. Second, doubts about individual agency have become overly emphasized and fail to convincingly exonerate individuals from responsibility. This book extends the second explanation for the motivational gap, namely that the arguments for the lack of individual agency do in fact correspond to mechanisms of moral disengagement. The use of these mechanisms enables consumption elites to maintain their consumptive lifestyles without having to accept moral responsibility for their luxury emissions.;1. Introduction -- 1.1. Is Someone Responsible? -- 1.2. Overview -- 2. Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility -- 2.1. Human Rights Threatened by Climate Change -- 2.2. Assigning Remedial Responsibility for Tackling Climate Change -- 2.3. Individual Responsibility and Moral Agency -- 3. The Phenomenology of Agency in Climate Change -- 3.1. First Feature: the Primacy of Acts Over Omissions -- 3.2. Second Feature: the Primacy of Near Effects Over Remote Effects -- 3.3. Third Feature: the Primacy of Individual Effects Over Group Effects -- 4. Understanding the Motivational Gap -- 4.1. The Origins of Common-sense Morality and the Theoretical Storm -- 4.2. Competing Motives Influenced by the Dominant Social Paradigm -- 4.3. The Role of the Restrictive Conception of Individual Responsibility and Moral Disengagement -- 5. Addressing the Motivational Gap and Tackling Moral Disengagement -- 5.1. Increasing Moral Motivation -- 5.2. Addressing the Underlying Reasons for Moral Disengagement -- 5.3. Tackling the Propensity for Moral Disengagement -- 6. Conclusion.;Climate change, human rights, and moral responsibility -- The phenomenology of agency in climate change -- Understanding the motivational gap -- Addressing the motivational gap and tackling moral disengagement. Climate change, human rights, and moral responsibility -- The phenomenology of agency in climate change -- Understanding the motivational gap -- Addressing the motivational gap and tackling moral disengagement. 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Is Someone Responsible? -- 1.2. Overview -- 2. Climate Change, Human Rights and Moral Responsibility -- 2.1. Human Rights Threatened by Climate Change -- 2.2. Assigning Remedial Responsibility for Tackling Climate Change -- 2.3. Individual Responsibility and Moral Agency -- 3. The Phenomenology of Agency in Climate Change -- 3.1. First Feature: the Primacy of Acts Over Omissions -- 3.2. Second Feature: the Primacy of Near Effects Over Remote Effects -- 3.3. Third Feature: the Primacy of Individual Effects Over Group Effects -- 4. Understanding the Motivational Gap -- 4.1. The Origins of Common-sense Morality and the Theoretical Storm -- 4.2. Competing Motives Influenced by the Dominant Social Paradigm -- 4.3. The Role of the Restrictive Conception of Individual Responsibility and Moral Disengagement -- 5. Addressing the Motivational Gap and Tackling Moral Disengagement -- 5.1. Increasing Moral Motivation -- 5.2. Addressing the Underlying Reasons for Moral Disengagement -- 5.3. Tackling the Propensity for Moral Disengagement -- 6. Conclusion.