Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology

Description

Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume’s sympathetic sentimentalism. Cover Title Copyright Dedication Contents List of Abbreviations Preface Acknowledgments Introduction: Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology: An Overview 1 Beyond the “Disease of the Learned”: Hume on Passional Disorders 2 Hume on the Rarity of Virtue 3 Spontaneity, Intuition, and Humean Virtue 4 Character, Culture, and Humean Virtue Ethics: Insights From Situationism and Confucianism 5 Empathy, Autism, and Hume 6 Cultivating Empathic Concern and Altruistic Motivation: Insights From Hume and Batson 7 Preserving Practicality: In Defense of Hume’s Sympathy- Based Ethics 8 Hume, Bloom, and Moral Inclusion 9 Empathy, Interdependency, and Morality: Building From Hume’s Account 10 The Philosophical Power of Hume’s Notion of Love 11 Hume on the Methods and Limits of the Science of Human Nature 12 Hume on Moral Motivation 13 Passionate Regulation and the Practicality of Reason 14 Hume on Affective Leadership Conclusion: Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology: Future Directions Contributors’ Information Bibliography Index