Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume LXI

Description

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. "'Have you seen the latest OSAP?' is what scholars of ancient philosophy say to each other when they meet in corridors or on coffee breaks. Whether you work on Plato or Aristotle, on Presocratics or sophists, on Stoics, Epicureans, or Sceptics, on Roman philosophers or Greek Neoplatonists, you are liable to find OSAP articles now dominant in the bibliography of much serious published work in your particular subject: not safe to miss." - Malcolm Schofield, Cambridge University "OSAP was founded to provide a place for long pieces on major issues in ancient philosophy. In the years since, it has fulfilled this role with great success, over and over again publishing groundbreaking papers on what seemed to be familiar topics and others surveying new ground to break. It represents brilliantly the vigour-and the increasingly broad scope-of scholarship in ancient philosophy, and shows us all how the subject should flourish." - M.M. McCabe, King's College London Cover Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Copyright Advisory Board Contents Plato’s Knowledge Vocabulary and John Lyons’s Structural Semantics 1. The structural semantic method 2. The interchangeability of epistēmē and technē 3. Does epistasthai imply tēn technēn echein? 4. Can epistēmē substitute for technē with no change in meaning? 5. Linguistic meaning and philosophical meaning 6. A suggested interpretation 7. Conclusion Bibliography The Phaedo’s Final Argument and the Soul’s Kinship with the Divine 1. The kinship argument (78 B–80B) 2. Cebes’ objection (87 A–88B) 3. The final argument’s response to Cebes’ objection 4. The forms in us: 102 B–103C 5. The bringers (103 C–105C) 6. The soul as bringer of life and the final argument proper (105 C–107A) 7. The soul and the divine as immortal 8. Conclusion Bibliography Timaeus on Colour Mixture 1. Colour, fire, and flame 2. Chromatic affections 3. Primary colours 4. Brilliant 5. Red 6. Proportion, divine bonds, and the chromatic unknown 7. Colour mixture 8. Interpreting Timaean colour mixture 9. The minimalist interpretation 10. Against Democritus Bibliography Aristotle on Comparison 1. Aristotle’s (apparent) claim that comparison requires synonymy 1.1. The Topics on homonymy and comparability 1.2. Physics 7. 4 on synonymy and comparability 1.3. Dichotomous and non-dichotomousdivisions of homonymy and synonymy 1.4. Homonymy and non-synonymyare not the same 1.5. Developmental and other approaches 2. Comparison across ambiguity 2.1. Introducing the pros hen legomena 2.2. Comparison using the pros hen legomena 2.3. Analogical comparisons? 3. Broader implications: Aristotle’s cosmological hierarchy 3.1. Species specificity and non-synonymyof goodness 3.2. Cosmic comparison without cosmic synonymy Bibliography Aristotle’s Philosophy of Geometry: A Philosophical Defence 1. Introduction 2. Inadequacy, Inherence, and the properties interpretation 3. How geometrical objects inhere in sensibles 3.1. An apparent conflict 3.2. Kooky objects 3.3. Geometrical objects as kooky objects 3.4. How sensible objects have geometrical properties (and how they do not) 4. How geometrical objects are limits and divisions of sensibles 4.1. How geometrical objects are limits 4.2. How geometrical objects are divisions 5. An incompatible alternative: The parts interpretation 6. Problems for the parts interpretation 6.1. Weakness of motivations 6.2. Irreconcilability with other Aristotelian commitments 6.2.1. The actual parts problem 6.2.2. A category error 6.2.3. The material parts confusion 7. The kooky objects solution 8. Conclusion Bibliography Aristotelian Continence Reconsidered 1. Preface 2. Continence and incontinence as behavioural tendencies 3. Reason and motivation 4. Ethical education 5. Epilogue: The continent character Appendix 1: Virtue and vice Appendix 2: Two recent treatments Appendix 3: Jennifer Whiting’s Locomotive Soul Appendix 4: David Charles’s ‘Third Way’ Bibliography Proof against Proof: A Reading of Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Logicians 8. 463–81 1. Introduction 2. The Dogmatist’s anti-scepticalargument (M 8. 463–5) 2.1. The Dogmatist’s aim 2.2. The Dogmatist’s dilemmatic argument 3. The sceptic’s response to the first horn of the dogmatist’s dilemma (M 8. 470–1) 3.1. The sceptic’s strategy 3.2. The unamended text 3.3. Deleting both the third and the fourth οὐκ 3.4. Retaining the third and deleting the fourth οὐκ 3.5. Deleting the third and retaining the fourth οὐκ 3.6. One-Sidedversus Two-Sidedsuspension of judgement 4. The sceptic’s response to the second horn of the dogmatist’s dilemma (M 8. 472) 4.1. The sceptic’s argument 4.2. Opposing an argument versus superseding an argument 5. The dogmatist’s objection and the sceptic’s counterargument (M 8. 479–81) 5.1. The content of the dogmatist’s objection: Self-refutation or self-elimination? 5.2. The sceptic’s first response to the dogmatist’s objection 5.3. The sceptic’s second response to the dogmatist’s objection 5.4. The target of the dogmatist’s objection: AAP or S2? 5.5. Two interpretations of the sceptic’s counterargument 5.6. The seriousness of the dogmatist’s challenge 5.7. The completeness of the sceptic’s response 6. Conclusion Bibliography Index Locorum Notes for Contributors