Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment: Acts of Assent

Description

This book focuses on practice, and applies them to intellectual, humanist and religious commitments specifically. Beginning with intellectual commitment, Peter Forrest argues that innocence is an epistemological state. He considers the intellectual consequences of this by demonstrating why, for example, we should not believe in angels. He then explores why humans are attached to reason and to humanism, recognising the different commitments made by theist and non-theist humanists. Finally, he analyzes religious faith, specifically fideism, defining it by way of contrast to Descartes, Pascal and William James, as well as contemporary philosophers including John Shellenberg and Lara Buchak. The case for and against committing to God is made, recognising that God’s divine character sets up an emotional rather than an intellectual barrier to commitment to worship. Of particular interest to scholars working on the philosophy of religion, Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment offers a rigorous analysis of why commitment matters and the challenges it presents to a range of believers. Title Page Copyright Page Contents Preface Acknowledgements Chapter 1: Introduction The context: Loss of innocence Aims The scandal of epistemology Distinguishing the Universe from universes, Time from time, and God from god Chapter 2: Between Innocence and Commitment: Speculation and Experience Innocent reactions to loss of innocence: Speculation Innocent reactions to loss of innocence: Experience Innocent reactions to loss of innocence: Reformed Epistemology and Presuppositionalism Innocent epistemology as synthesis Suspense of judgement, epistemological anarchy or commitment? Chapter 3: Reasonable Commitment Is commitment ever reasonable? Intellectual dilemmas The conditions for reasonable commitment Replies to objections Not committing to angels Conclusion Chapter 4: Some Comparisons Fideism Descartes Pascal’s Wager The ‘heart’ versus the ‘head’ Clifford and James Schellenberg’s conditions Lara Buchak on faith Religious pluralism Commitments and disagreement A final point of comparison: Axiarchism again Summary Chapter 5: Commitment to Reason and to Scientific Realism Commitment to reason Qualified scientific realism Rejecting unqualified scientific realism, physicalism and naturalism Reason, scientific realism and non-scientific commitments Chapter 6: Humanist Commitment On humanism Humanism and secular humanism Against committing to secular humanism Humanism, environmentalism, naturalism and theism Complaints against secular humanism Commitment to absolute values Moral Dignity The remaining humanist theses Agency and the Multiverse speculation Digression A theory of consciousness Should we commit to absolute ethics? Summary Chapter 7: Humanism and the Cosmic Agent Speculating about cosmic agency Alternative conceptions of god The case for a cosmic agent The case against a cosmic agent On the classical argument from Evil: Omni-god and God On agnosticism and atheism Chapter 8: Commitment to God The case for God Incommensurable values theodicy Responding to rejoinders Commitment to the worship of God Chapter 9: Corollaries Optimism and pessimism Worship, trust and praise; faith, hope and love In defence of religion Conclusion Notes Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 References Index