The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Regime after the Covid-19 Pandemic: Dealing with the Scientific Revolution in the Life Sciences

Description

This book offers an analysis of how the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) regime has responded in the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus has highlighted the need to better protect modern societies from natural, accidental and deliberate disease affecting humans, animals and plants. Within that context preventing the deliberate hostile use of biological and chemical agents will be of increasing importance. Dando asks to what extent there has been a significant strengthening to the CBW non-proliferation regime in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic using an analysis focused on two proposals to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which aim to constrain advances in science and technology developments that could be misused. On this basis he concludes that it would be hard to argue that to date there has been a significant strengthening of the CBW regime. Preface Contents Acronyms List of Figures List of Tables 1 Introduction 1.1 The Problem 1.2 Assessing the CBW Nonproliferation and Disarmament Regime After COVID-19 Notes 2 Novel Neuroweapons 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Neuroweapons Not Covered by the CBW Nonproliferation Regime 2.3 Neuroweapons Covered by the CBW Nonproliferation Regime 2.3.1 Introduction 2.3.2 Some History 2.3.3 Future CB Neuroweapons 2.3.3.1 CBNW Type 1: Neuropharmacological Agents 2.3.3.2 CBNW Type 2: Neuromicrobiological Agents 2.3.3.3 CBNW Type 3: Organic Toxins 2.3.3.4 CBNW Type 4: Novel Devices 2.4 Conclusions Notes 3 Neuroscience Developments of Concern 3.1 Targets in the CNS 3.2 Botulinum and Tetanus Toxins 3.3 Noradrenaline and Fear Processing 3.4 Neuropeptides 3.4.1 Orexin 3.5 Conclusions Notes 4 The Chemical Weapons Convention 4.1 Threats and Responses 4.2 The Chemical Weapons Convention 4.3 Meetings of States Parties in 2019 4.4 Meetings of States Parties in 2020 4.5 Meetings of States Parties in 2021 4.6 The Conference of States Parties, 2021 Notes 5 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 5.1 The BTWC Intersessional Process After 2017 5.2 Meeting of States Parties in 2019 5.2.1 MX1: Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance Under Article X 5.2.2 MX2: Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention 5.2.3 MX3: Strengthening National Implementation 5.2.4 MX4: Assistance, Response and Preparedness 5.3 The Meetings of States Parties 2021 5.3.1 The Aspirational Code Proposed by China and Pakistan Under the BTWC 5.3.2 The Hague Ethical Guidelines Under the CWC 5.3.3 The OIE Guidelines on Responsible Conduct 5.3.4 Further Development of the Model Code 5.3.5 The Meeting of Experts in August/September 2021 5.3.6 The Meeting of States Parties in November and December 2021 Notes 6 Conclusion 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Towards the 2022 and 2023 Review Conferences 6.3 Beyond the 2022 and 2023 Review Conferences Notes Index