Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

Description

Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection. Cover Front Matter Half Title Series page Title page Copyright information Dedication Dedication Contents List of figures Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Chapter Int-4 Introduction Chapter 1 Historical and Philosophical Background 1.1 Neo-Hegelian Origins 1.2 Russellian Propositions 1.3 Why Did Russell Abandon Russellian Propositions? 1.4 The Multiple Relation Theory 1.5 Wittgenstein at Cambridge 1.6 The Theory of Knowledge Manuscript Chapter 2 The Scholarly Controversy 2.1 The Direction Problems 2.2 The Standard Reading 2.3 Stevens’s First Critique of EI: Direct Inspection and the MRTJ 2.4 Stevens’s Second Critique of EI: The Logical Status of the Subordinate Relation 2.5 The Ontological Interpretation 2.6 Hanks’s Critique of the Standard Reading 2.7 Hanks on How Wittgenstein ‘Defeated’ the MRTJ 2.8 Pincock on the Standard Reading 2.9 Pincock on Hanks and the Unity of Judgement 2.10 The Correspondence Problem 2.11 Landini and Giaretta on Type* Distinctions 2.12 Landini on Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 2.13 Lebens on the ‘Representation Concern’ and the Stoutian Evolution of the MRTJ 2.14 Lebens on the Demise of the MRTJ Chapter 3 Russell’s Paralysis 3.1 The Logical Interpretation 3.2 Revising the Standard Reading 3.3 Re-examining Stevens on EI and OI 3.4 Hanks on the Judging Relation and Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 3.5 Pincock on the Proposition Problem 3.6 Pincock on the Correspondence Problem 3.7 Russell’s Diagram of Understanding 3.8 ‘Props’ 3.9 Type* Distinctions Reappraised 3.10 Revisiting Landini on Wittgenstein’s Critique of the MRTJ 3.11 Reconsidering the Representation Concern 3.12 The Demise of TK and of the MRTJ Chapter 4 Wittgenstein on Truth, Logic and Representation 4.1 The Picture Theory of Propositions 4.2 Wittgenstein and Type-Theory 4.3 Logical Form 4.4 Bipolarity and Extensionalism 4.5 Saying and Showing 4.6 Inference 4.7 Sense-Truth Regress 4.8 The Fundamental Thought (Grundgedanke) 4.9 The General Propositional Form 4.10 Transition 4.11 The Later View: Continuities amidst Contrasts 4.12 Conclusion End Matter References Works by Russell Works by Wittgenstein Works by Other Authors Index