Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 2: Just Playing (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

Description

In Volume 1 of Game Theory and the Social Contract, Ken Binmore restated the problems of moral and political philosophy in the language of game theory. In Volume 2, Just Playing, he unveils his own controversial theory, which abandons the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant for the naturalistic approach to morality of David Hume. According to this viewpoint, a fairness norm is a convention that evolved to coordinate behavior on an equilibrium of a society's Game of Life. This approach allows Binmore to mount an evolutionary defense of Rawls's original position that escapes the utilitarian conclusions that follow when orthodox reasoning is applied with the traditional assumptions. Using ideas borrowed from the theory of bargaining and repeated games, Binmore is led instead to a form of egalitarianism that vindicates the intuitions that led Rawls to write his Theory of Justice.Written for an interdisciplinary audience, Just Playing offers a panoramic tour through a range of new and disturbing insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, and psychology. It is essential reading for anyone who thinks it likely that ethics evolved along with the human species. Apology Series Foreword Reading Guide Whither Away? The Art of Compromise Nonsense upon Stilts Social Contracts Reform The Original Position Bargaining Moral Philosophy Traditional Philosophical Categories Fin de Siècle Noncooperative Game Theory The Ultimatum Game Anomalies? Cooperative Game Theory Games in Coalitional Form. Nash Program Implementation Nuances of Negotiation Realistic Bargaining Models Bargaining Problems Payoff Regions Nash Bargaining Problems The Bargaining Set Dividing the Dollar Edgeworth Box Bargaining Solutions Nash Bargaining Solution Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution Bargaining with Interpersonal Comparison Characterizing Bargaining Solutions The Kalai-Smorodinsky Axioms The Nash Axioms Renegotiation Axioms Bargaining with Commitment Nash Demand Game Fixed and Variable Threats Trustless Transactions Repeated Games Transitional Arrangements Bargaining without Commitment The Alternating Offers Game How Realistic is Rubinstein's Model? Other Approaches to Bargaining The Coase Theorem Gauthier on Bargaining over a Social Contract Evolution in Eden The Good, the Right, and the Seemly Utilitarianism Summum Bonum Ipsedixists Ideal Observers Philosopher-King The Social Contract Approach Rule-Utilitarianism or Act-Utilitarianism? The Big Picture Fictitious Postulatum? Interpersonal Comparison of Utility Evolutionary Ethics Evolution and Justice Reciprocity Kinship Equilibrium Selection Empathy and Fairness The Long and the Short and the Medium Nonteleological Utilitarianism Commitment in Eden Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run Retelling the Rawlsian Story Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon The Princess and the Pea How Justice Works Why Not Utilitarianism? Rationalizing Reciprocity Back-scratching Rights in a Theory of the Seemly Rights as Strategies? Rules for Sustaining an Equilibrium Moral Responsibility Free Will Nil Desperandum! Folk Theorem Memes Finite Automata Computing Payoffs Reciprocal Sharing Crime and Punishment Guardians Who Guard Each Other Tit for Tat? How Does Cooperation Evolve? Social Contracts in Big Societies Social Transfers Friendship and Coalitions Police Forces Punishing the Innocent Leadership and Authority The Role of the Emotions Sore Thumbs Tunnel Vision Due Process Anarchy to Statehood Natural Equilibrium Renegotiation Getting from Here to There Renegotiation in the Original Position Making the Punishment Fit the Crime Renegotiation-Proofness What about Moral Values? Confusing Tastes and Values Das Adam Smith Problem Postwelfarism What Moral Relativism Is Not Yearning for Utopia Introduction Envy Equity in Economics Envy-Freeness Welfarism Equity in Psychology Equity in Anthropology Sharing and Caring Enforcement in Foraging Societies Anarchy in Prehistory? Kinship in Small Groups The Game of Morals Fair Social Contracts Paradise Lost Modeling the Original Position When is Justice Dispensed? Rawls Vindicated! Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run Consensus and Context Morality in the Short Run Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism Paradise Regained? Worthiness and Power Will to Power? Comparative Statics To Each According to His Need? Arbeit Macht Frei? From Each According to His Ability? The High and the Lowly Socialism versus Capitalism The Market and the Long Run The Walrasian Bargaining Solution Misrepresenting Personal Preferences The Concept of a Fair Price Time Corrupts All Unfinished Business Large Societies and Coalitions Incomplete Information and Mechanism Design A Changing Game of Life A Perfect Commonwealth? What is Whiggery? Where is Whiggery? Humean and Humane Really Meaning It! Naturalism Causal Reversals Modeling Man Strength of Body Reason Passions Experience Harsanyi Scholarship Introduction Teleological Utilitarianism Nonteleological Utilitarianism Bargaining Theory Introduction Alternating Offers Game Preferences Stationary Subgame-Perfect Equilibria Nonstationary Equilibria Generalized Nash Bargaining Solutions Nash Program