Transcendental Arguments and Science: Essays in Epistemology

Description

The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi­ cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi­ cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result­ ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep­ tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously. Front Matter....Pages i-viii Front Matter....Pages 1-1 Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason ....Pages 3-26 Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic....Pages 27-35 A Note on Transcendental Propositions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason ....Pages 37-43 Analytic Transcendental Arguments....Pages 45-64 On Bennett’s ‘Analytic Transcendental Arguments’....Pages 65-69 Comment on Bennett....Pages 71-75 Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism....Pages 77-103 Comment on Rorty....Pages 105-112 Challenger or Competitor?....Pages 113-120 Front Matter....Pages 121-121 The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics....Pages 123-158 Comment on Von Weizsäcker....Pages 159-170 Comment on Von Weizsäcker....Pages 171-176 The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ Versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science....Pages 177-190 Transcendentalism and Protoscience....Pages 191-195 Sellarsian Realism and Conceptual Change in Science....Pages 197-225 Some Remarks on Realism and Scientific Revolutions....Pages 227-233 Realism and Underdetermination....Pages 235-242 Front Matter....Pages 243-243 Transcendental Arguments and Pragmatic Epistemology....Pages 245-262 Conceptual Schemes, Justification and Consistency....Pages 263-269 Comment on Rosenberg....Pages 271-275 Front Matter....Pages 243-243 The Significance of Scepticism....Pages 277-297 Scepticism and How to Take It....Pages 299-307 Back Matter....Pages 309-325