ENGLISH

Master Airline Pilot: Applying Human Factors to Reach Peak Performance and Operational Resilience

Book information

Publisher
CRC Press
Year
2023
ISBN
2022046915, 2022046916, 9781032383446, 9781032383453, 9781003344575
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
8 MB (8908912 bytes)
Pages
604\605
Time added
2023-03-31 00:25:29

Description

Master Airline Pilot offers a process for improving pilots’ skills in risk management, situational awareness building, decision making, communications, and crew management. It links aviation human factors with practical airline operations to promote the development of master-level aviation skills across the full range of pilot experience. Serving as a practical guide for operational aviation challenges, the book discusses exceptional events such as operations under marginal condition, intervening to interdict an unsafe operation, and resolving crew conflicts. It also provides techniques for handling more common airline flying challenges like delays, holding, diverting, and continuing versus aborting a deteriorating game plan. The book is intended for airline pilots, training captains, simulator instructors, and aviation students taking courses in flight safety and crew management to improve their skillset, proficiency, and expertise toward peak performance. Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Acknowledgments About the Author Introduction Chapter 1 The Master Class of Pilots 1.1 How We Learn 1.1.1 How Novice Pilots Learn 1.1.2 How Proficient Pilots Learn 1.1.3 How Master Class Pilots Learn 1.2 How We Learn to Manage Aviation Tasks 1.2.1 Heuristic Development – Learning the Tricks of the Trade 1.2.2 Novice Pilot Heuristics 1.2.3 Proficient Pilot Heuristics 1.2.4 Master Class Pilot Heuristics Bibliography Section I: Introduction to Core Concepts I.1 The Limitations of Commonly Used Terms and Concepts I.2 Hindsight Bias in Mishap Investigations I.3 Evaluating Mishaps Using an in-the-Moment Perspective I.4 Understanding Concepts on a Master Class Level Chapter 2 Risk Management 2.1 There Is Always Some Risk 2.2 Operations and Risk Management 2.3 Pilots as the Last Defensive Barrier 2.4 Pilots as Separate Barriers 2.4.1 The Flight Crew Team as a Third Barrier 2.4.2 Additional Considerations to Safety Barriers 2.5 Assessing Risk 2.5.1 Risk Management Model 2.5.2 Classification of Pilots by Risk Tolerance 2.5.3 The Gray Zone of Increasing Risk 2.5.4 Changing Conditions within the Gray Zone 2.5.5 The Proficient Pilot’s Path to Failure While in the Gray Zone 2.6 The Recognition Trap 2.6.1 Recognition Primed Decision Making 2.6.2 Recognition Trap and Rationalization 2.6.3 Questioning Our Judgment Replaces Situational Assessment 2.6.4 Pilot Recollection of Risk during Mishap Investigations 2.7 Handling Aviation Threats 2.7.1 Levels of Knowing 2.7.2 Threat Detection, Game Plans, and Confidence Level 2.7.3 Warning Signs 2.7.4 The Difference between Normal Path Deviations and Warning Signs Notes Bibliography Chapter 3 Complexity 3.1 Complexity Theory 3.1.1 Six Features of Complex Systems 3.1.2 The Marble Analogy 3.2 Sources of Complexity 3.2.1 External Sources of Complexity 3.2.2 Internal Sources of Complexity 3.3 How Complexity Affects Our Game Plan 3.3.1 Complexity Limits Familiar Game Plans 3.3.2 Unique Situations 3.3.3 Monitoring the Trend of Complexity 3.4 Rising Complexity Model 3.5 The Pushes and Pulls of the System 3.5.1 Factors That Push Us Forward 3.5.2 Factors That Pull Us In Note Bibliography Chapter 4 Decision Making 4.1 Aviation Decision Making 4.2 Three Categories of Aviation Decision Making 4.3 Spontaneous and Standardized Decision Making within Familiar Situations 4.3.1 Spontaneous, Unconscious Decisions 4.3.2 Standard Procedures 4.3.3 Familiarity Breeds Contempt 4.3.4 Latent Vulnerabilities Surface When Something Rare Happens 4.3.5 When Procedures Are Disrupted 4.3.6 The Comfort Zone Trap in Decision Making 4.3.7 Blended Innovation 4.4 Decision Making with Unfamiliar or Nuanced Situations 4.4.1 Conscious Consideration 4.4.2 The Drift Towards “Strong but Wrong” 4.4.3 Equal Choices 4.4.4 Similar Choices with Conflicting Benefits/Penalties 4.4.5 Moving Toward One Choice as the Availability of the Other Decreases 4.5 The Lens of Bias and Experience 4.5.1 How Our Experience Affects Familiar, Spontaneous, and Standardized Decisions 4.5.2 How Our Bias Affects Unfamiliar and Nuanced Decisions 4.5.3 How the Bias Affects Unknown or Rare Situations 4.6 Lens Distortion and Recognition Trap Errors 4.6.1 When Effort Replaces Reassessment – The Frozen Bolt 4.6.2 Feeling That the Plan Is Right Replaces Getting It Right 4.6.3 Exceptional, Novel, and Uncertain Situations 4.7 The Five Stages of a Failing Decision in Recognition Trap Errors Notes Bibliography Chapter 5 Situational Awareness 5.1 Understanding and Improving Our SA 5.1.1 Studying How We Form Our SA 5.1.2 Using Stories to Improve Our SA-Building Skills 5.1.3 Understanding Failed SA Transitions in Aviation 5.1.4 The SA Balloon Metaphor 5.2 The Time Frames of SA 5.2.1 SA from Past Planning and Events 5.2.2 SA in the Present Moment 5.2.3 SA that Predicts the Future 5.3 Expanding Our SA at Each Level 5.3.1 Expanding Our Past SA 5.3.2 Expanding Our Present SA 5.3.3 Expanding Our Future SA 5.4 Factors that Degrade SA 5.4.1 Excessive Workload 5.4.2 Complexity and Novelty 5.4.3 Unskillful Monitoring 5.4.4 Rationalization and Goal Shifting 5.4.5 Distractions and Disruptions 5.4.6 Disrupted SA and Crew Resource Management (CRM) 5.4.7 Inadequate Preparation for Future Contingencies 5.4.8 Alpha and Omega Analysis Notes Bibliography Chapter 6 Error 6.1 Society’s Perception of Error 6.2 Flaws with the Logical Analysis of Error 6.2.1 Flaw of the Bad Apple Theory 6.2.2 Flaw of Deconstruction Logic 6.2.3 Flaws of Hindsight and Foresight 6.2.4 Flaw of Failure to Follow Rules 6.2.5 Flaw of Deficient Rulemaking 6.3 How Complex Systems Hide the Sources of Errors 6.4 Pilot Contributions to Error 6.4.1 Reliance on Single Pilot Actions within the Crew Environment 6.4.2 The Rush Mentality 6.4.3 Task Management at Inappropriate Times 6.4.4 Lack of Knowledge, Failure to Recall Knowledge, and Poorly Applied Knowledge 6.4.5 Flawed Risk Assessment 6.4.6 Misapplied Personal Priorities 6.4.7 Tolerance of Error 6.4.8 Ineffective Communications Environment 6.4.9 Intentional and Selective Noncompliance 6.5 A Better Way to Evaluate Error – Telling the Second Story 6.6 Studying Errors to Prevent the Next Accident Notes Bibliography Chapter 7 Distraction 7.1 Distraction and Workflow 7.2 How We Respond to a Distraction 7.2.1 Handling a Distraction 7.2.2 Recovering from a Distraction 7.3 The Distraction Environment 7.4 How Distraction Affects Us 7.4.1 Startle Reaction 7.4.2 Analyzing the Source of the Distraction 7.4.3 Plan Recovery 7.4.4 Flightpath Management 7.4.5 Time Distortion 7.4.6 PF/PM Role Integrity 7.4.7 Choice or Habit 7.5 External Contributors to Distraction 7.5.1 ATC Radio Calls 7.5.2 Other Distractors from Outside of the Flightdeck 7.6 Internal Contributors to Distraction 7.6.1 Aircraft System Distractors 7.6.2 Automation Distractions 7.6.3 Screen Distractions 7.6.4 Reliance on Automation to Alert Us 7.6.5 Inappropriate Discretionary Choices 7.7 Other Factors that Complicate Distractions 7.7.1 Team Distraction 7.7.2 Distracting Distractions 7.7.3 The Lingering Effects of Earlier Distractions 7.8 Evolving Trends in Distraction Vulnerability 7.8.1 Distraction Vulnerability and Screen-Induced Loss of Mental Rest 7.8.2 Distraction Vulnerability and Multitasking 7.8.3 Pushing Safety Limits 7.8.4 Attention Level and Dynamic Flight 7.9 Self-Inflicted Distractions 7.9.1 Normalization of Deviance and Rationalization 7.9.2 Experience Leads to Relaxing Our Standards for Completing Discretionary Tasks 7.9.3 Sterile Flightdeck Protocols Compared with Discretionary Choices 7.9.4 Prospective Memory Challenges Lead to Discretionary Choice Vulnerabilities 7.9.5 Ill-Timed Diversions of Our Attention 7.9.6 Just One More Thing Notes Bibliography Chapter 8 Safety 8.1 What Safety Is Not 8.1.1 Safety Is Not Completely Present or Absent 8.1.2 Safety Is Not a Number or Value 8.1.3 Safety Is Not a Feeling 8.1.4 Safety Is Not Defined by Outcomes 8.1.5 Safety Is Not a Reason (or Excuse) for Unwise Choices 8.2 What Safety Is 8.2.1 Safety Is Probabilistic 8.2.2 Safety Emerges 8.3 Creating Safety Notes Bibliography Chapter 9 Time 9.1 How We See Time 9.1.1 The Flight Schedule 9.1.2 Efficiency 9.1.3 Distance 9.1.4 Fuel 9.1.5 Sense of Pacing 9.2 The Side Effects of Feeling Behind 9.2.1 Impatience 9.2.2 Combining Tasks 9.2.3 Shortcutting 9.2.4 Rushing 9.2.5 The Adverse Effects of Time Pressure 9.3 Master Class Perspective of Time 9.3.1 Time Pacing as a Tool 9.3.2 Acknowledging the Existing Conditions Notes Bibliography Section II: Introduction to Techniques II.1 Procedures II.1.1 Types of Procedures II.1.2 Policy/Procedure Intent II.1.3 Standardization II.1.4 Procedure Sequences II.1.5 Initiate – Flow – Verify II.2 Techniques II.2.1 Techniques Provide Depth to Procedures II.2.2 Techniques Fill Engineering Gaps II.2.3 Techniques Make Sequences Flow Better II.2.4 Techniques Compensate for Personal Error Vulnerabilities II.2.5 Techniques Keep Us Grounded within Our Comfort Zone II.2.6 How Techniques Make Procedures Work Better II.2.7 The Hidden Vulnerabilities of Techniques II.3 The Techniques Development Lab II.3.1 Understand the History Behind the Procedure II.3.2 Preserve the Protective Features Built into the Procedure II.3.3 Investigate the Underlying Conditions II.3.4 Improve the Overall Quality of the Procedure II.3.5 Build Personal Techniques to Improve Personal Performance II.3.6 If Unsure, Ask the Experts in Standards or Training Departments Notes Bibliography Chapter 10 Risk Management Techniques 10.1 The Risk Management Skillset 10.1.1 Considering the Consequences 10.1.2 Modulating Our Vigilance 10.1.3 Searching for Counterfactuals 10.1.4 Preserving an Escape Option 10.1.5 Communicating a Backup Plan Using “if-then” Language 10.1.6 Rehearsing Contingencies 10.1.7 Evaluating Options Using a Premortem Exercise 10.1.8 Treating Anything Unique as a Warning Sign 10.2 Proactive Risk Management 10.2.1 Avoiding the Deteriorating Spiral 10.2.2 Modulating Vigilance to Match Risk 10.2.3 Managing Priorities and Assumptions 10.2.4 Instilling a Healthy Dose of Caution 10.2.5 Making Continuous Corrections 10.3 The Risk and Resource Management (RRM) Model 10.3.1 The Target and Colors 10.3.2 The Five Resource Blocks 10.3.3 Assess, Balance, Communicate, Do and Debrief (ABCD) 10.3.4 Putting the RRM Process Together Notes Bibliography Chapter 11 Decision-Making Techniques 11.1 The Types of Aviation Decisions 11.1.1 Familiar Situations Following Familiar Decisions 11.1.2 Simple Deviations that We Resolve with Quick Decisions 11.1.3 Novel and Unexpected Events 11.2 How We Determine Importance 11.2.1 Severity 11.2.2 Time Available 11.2.3 Deviation from What We Expect to Happen 11.3 Using Our Intuition for Decision Making 11.3.1 Intuition and Problem Solving 11.3.2 Pattern Recognition – The Puzzle Metaphor 11.3.3 Pattern Recognition – Aviation Problems 11.3.4 Maintaining a Cautious Perspective 11.3.5 Assume that There Are Gaps and Counterfactuals 11.3.6 The Risk of Ignoring Counterfactuals 11.4 The Difference between Quick/Common Decisions and Reasoned/Uncommon Decisions 11.4.1 Problems with Making Inappropriately Quick Decisions 11.4.2 The Precedent Set by False Success 11.4.3 Through Experience, the Complex Becomes Easy 11.5 Identifying Complex Problems 11.5.1 Recognizing Wrongness 11.5.2 Recognizing Familiarity 11.5.3 The Uncertain Middle Ground 11.5.4 Practicing Scenarios in the Uncertain Middle Ground 11.6 Making Well-Reasoned Decisions across the Range of Situations 11.6.1 Situations to the Left Side of the Game Plan Decision Graph 11.6.2 Situations in the Middle of Our Game Plan Continuum 11.6.3 Situations to the Far Right of Our Game Plan Continuum 11.7 Master Class Decision-Making Practices 11.7.1 Choosing Instead of Reacting 11.7.2 The Dos and Don’ts of Using Our Intuition 11.8 Useful Decision-Making Techniques 11.8.1 Basic Steps for Deliberative Decision Making 11.8.2 The In All Situations Checklist 11.8.3 Examining Our Mindset 11.8.4 Add a Qualifierto the Game Plan Notes Bibliography Chapter 12 Techniques for Building Situational Awareness 12.1 Building the SA Goal of Knowing 12.1.1 Planning As If We Know What Is Going to Happen Ahead of Time 12.1.2 Planning for What Is Likely to Happen 12.1.3 Reaching a Sufficient Level of Confidence with Our Level of Knowing 12.2 Building the SA Goal of Monitoring 12.2.1 Active and Subconscious Monitoring 12.2.2 Expectation, Comfort, and Drift 12.2.3 Task Overload and Single-Parameter Fixation 12.2.4 Developing High-Quality Monitoring 12.3 Building the SA Goal of Anticipating Future Challenges 12.3.1 Detecting Task Saturation, Stress, Bias, or Rising Complexity 12.3.2 When We Recognize Task Saturation/Stress/Bias/Complexity, Search for Counterfactuals 12.3.3 How Perspective Affects Our Detection of Counterfactuals 12.4 Building the SA Goal of Resilience 12.4.1 The Range of Expected Events 12.4.2 SA and Safety Margins 12.4.3 Increasing Our Resilience for Novel or Surprising Events 12.4.4 Building Resilience during Unique Events 12.5 Building the SA Goal of Recovering from Deviations in Our Game Plan 12.5.1 Deciding Whether to Recover or Change Our Game Plan 12.5.2 Power over Force 12.6 Building Team SA 12.6.1 Factors that Degrade Team SA 12.6.2 Factors that Improve Team SA 12.7 Master Class SA-Building Techniques 12.7.1 Building Better SA 12.7.2 The Briefing Better Process 12.7.3 Improving Present Moment SA 12.7.4 Keeping Workload Manageable 12.7.5 Building Future SA Notes Bibliography Chapter 13 Time Management Techniques 13.1 When Delays Affect Our Sense of Pacing 13.1.1 Understanding How Timelines Interact 13.1.2 Unavoidable Delays 13.2 Making Up Time Following a Ground Delay 13.2.1 Succumbing to Frustration 13.2.2 Feeling Like We Need to Hurry 13.2.3 Start-Up Lag 13.2.4 Priorities Following Delays 13.3 Making Up Time Inflight 13.4 Making Up Time during Arrival and Taxi-in 13.5 Techniques for Handling Delayed Operations 13.5.1 Use Warning Flags to Slow Down and Investigate Further 13.5.2 Search for Lesser-Included Consequences 13.5.3 There Is Always Time to Do the Right Thing 13.6 Fast-Paced and Emergency Operations 13.6.1 Managing Time during Emergency Situations 13.6.2 Managing Pattern Distance and Location 13.6.3 Refining Our Emergency Mindset 13.6.4 Responding to Quickening 13.6.5 Respecting Limits Notes Bibliography Chapter 14 Workload Management Techniques 14.1 Workload Distribution 14.1.1 Workload in-the-Moment – The Micro Perspective 14.1.2 Workload across the Flight Phases – The Macro Perspective 14.2 Managing Workload Using Planning and Briefing 14.2.1 Preflight Planning and Briefing 14.2.2 Handling Distractions during Preflight Preparation 14.2.3 The Planning and Briefing Process 14.2.4 Preflight Planning from the Gate through Departure 14.2.5 Before Top of Descent Planning and Briefing 14.3 Challenges of Workload Management 14.3.1 Effects of Stress on Workload Management 14.3.2 How We Allocate Time 14.3.3 Task Management and Appropriate Behaviors 14.3.4 Managing Tasks and Our Attention Level 14.3.5 Balancing the Scales between Efficiency, Workload, and Risk 14.3.6 Quickening and Rejection Triggers 14.4 Active Flightpath Monitoring, Dynamic Movement, and Sample Rate 14.4.1 Dynamic Movement – Low 14.4.2 Dynamic Movement – Medium 14.4.3 Dynamic Movement – High 14.5 Areas of Vulnerability (AOVs) 14.5.1 AOVs during Taxi Operations 14.5.2 Workload during Taxi 14.5.3 AOVs during Flight 14.5.4 Workload during Flight 14.5.5 Summary of AOV Guidelines 14.6 Master Class Workload Management 14.6.1 Task Management at the Gate 14.6.2 Workload Management in Low AOVs 14.6.3 Workload Management in Medium AOVs 14.6.4 Workload Management in High AOVs Notes Bibliography Chapter 15 Distraction Management Techniques 15.1 Isolating the Sources of Distraction 15.1.1 Creating Distraction-Free Bubbles around FOs during Preflight Planning 15.1.2 Creating Distraction-Free Bubbles around Captains during Diversion Planning 15.1.3 Creating Low Distraction Time Windows 15.2 Mitigating the Effects of Distractions 15.2.1 Anticipating Probable Distractions 15.2.2 Recognizing that a Distraction Has Occurred 15.2.3 Understanding the Effects of Distraction on Our Operational Flow 15.2.4 Following AOV (Area of Vulnerability) Protocols to Appropriately Manage Distractions 15.2.5 Avoiding Internal Distractions 15.2.6 Avoiding Habits that Intensify the Adverse Effects of Distraction 15.2.7 Mindfully Managing Distractions 15.2.8 Avoiding Mutual Distractions 15.2.9 Developing Distraction-Resistant Habit Patterns 15.2.10 Studying Our Distraction Encounters 15.3 Recovering from Distractions 15.3.1 Perform Any Immediate Action Steps 15.3.2 Evaluate the Time Available to Resolve the Disruption 15.3.3 Mentally Note What Was Happening as the Distraction Occurred 15.3.4 As a Crew, Determine the Cause and Signicfiance of the Distraction 15.3.5 Determine Tasks Required to Resolve the Distraction 15.3.6 Assign or Maintain Roles 15.3.7 Resolve the Distraction 15.3.8 Restore the Operational Flow 15.3.9 Assess the Residual Effects Notes Bibliography Chapter 16 Automation Management Techniques 16.1 Automation Concepts 16.1.1 Direct Control and Supervisory Control 16.1.2 Operating and Managing 16.1.3 The Levels of Monitoring 16.2 Automation Policy 16.2.1 Maintain Automation Proficiency 16.2.2 When Task Saturated, Shift to a Less Demanding Level of Automation 16.2.3 Reengaging Automation When Appropriate 16.2.4 Automation Policy Summary 16.3 Aircraft Automation – Benefit sand Limitations 16.3.1 The Junior Pilot on the Flightdeck 16.3.2 Areas of Strength and Weakness 16.4 Automation-Based Errors 16.4.1 Insufficient Knowledge and Practice 16.4.2 Mismanaging Practice Opportunities 16.4.3 Mismanaged Automation Engagement and Changes 16.4.4 Mismanaged Raising or Lowering the Level of Automation 16.4.5 CRM Breakdown While Making Automation Changes 16.4.6 Automation Application Exceeds Practiced Conditions 16.4.7 Automation Glitches 16.4.8 Changes Made during Mode Transitions 16.4.9 Mis-programmed Values 16.4.10 Misdirected Attention between Automation and the Outside Environment 16.4.11 Selected, but Not Activated 16.4.12 Unexpected Mode Transitions 16.5 Automation Techniques 16.5.1 Selecting and Verifying 16.5.2 The Verified or Verifiable Standard 16.5.3 Verifying Dynamic Changes in the Path 16.5.4 Monitoring Automation Displays Notes Bibliography Chapter 17 Communications Techniques 17.1 Communications Environment 17.1.1 Understanding Roles and Communications Protocols 17.1.2 Reducing Unpredictability within the Communications Environment 17.1.3 Opening the Communications Environment 17.2 Communications – Sending 17.2.1 Environmental Conditions 17.2.2 The Tone of Voice Used 17.2.3 Non-Verbal Communication 17.2.4 Clarity of the Message 17.3 Communications – Receiving 17.3.1 Understanding Rapid or Abbreviated Speech 17.3.2 Focusing Our Attention 17.4 Feedback 17.4.1 Feedback between Pilots on the Flightdeck 17.4.2 Feedback to Team Members Notes Bibliography Chapter 18 CRM Techniques 18.1 CRM Levels 18.1.1 Essential CRM 18.1.2 Supportive CRM 18.1.3 Enhanced CRM 18.2 Achieving an Effective CRM Environment 18.3 Conflict Resolution 18.3.1 Difference of Opinion 18.3.2 Personality Conflicts 18.3.3 Resolvable Personality Conflicts 18.3.4 Unresolvable Conflicts 18.3.5 Irreconcilable Differences and the Need to Separate 18.4 CRM Case Study – The Irreconcilable Conflict 18.4.1 Call for Outside Expertise 18.4.2 Team Meeting 18.4.3 Guide the Discussion 18.4.4 Clearly State the Facts and Intended Actions Note Bibliography Chapter 19 PM Role Breakdowns, Callouts, and Interventions 19.1 The PM Role 19.2 Causes of PM Role Breakdowns 19.2.1 Quickening Pace 19.2.2 Short-Circuiting the PM Role 19.2.3 Assertively Suppressing Intervention 19.2.4 Reluctance to Intervene 19.2.5 Being Overly Helpful 19.2.6 Rationalization 19.2.7 Informing, but Not Acting 19.2.8 Mismanaging Discretionary Space 19.2.9 Different Mindsets and Perspectives 19.3 Preset Intervention Triggers and Applying Judgment 19.3.1 Preset Triggers 19.3.2 Personal Safety Limits 19.3.3 Applying Judgment 19.4 Scripted Callouts, Deviation Callouts, and Risky Decisions 19.4.1 Scripted Deviation Callouts 19.4.2 Unscripted Deviation Callouts 19.4.3 Risky Decisions 19.5 Interventions 19.6 Intervention Strategies 19.6.1 Due Diligence 19.6.2 Barriers to Making Interventions 19.7 Intervention Trigger Points 19.7.1 Escalation Following Standard and Deviation Callouts 19.7.2 Intervention Trigger Levels 19.7.3 Pilot Incapacitation 19.7.4 Non-Flight Related Interventions Notes Bibliography Chapter 20 First Officer Roles and Responsibilities 20.1 The First Officer Perspective 20.1.1 The Cultural Legacy of the First Officer 20.1.2 FO’s Official Roles and Responsibilities 20.1.3 How the FO Role Has Evolved in CRM 20.2 Finding Our Voice 20.2.1 Silence Means Consent 20.2.2 Separate Directive Callouts from Maintaining Team Rapport 20.2.3 Use Humor 20.2.4 Be Sincere 20.3 Staying Out of Synch 20.3.1 Becoming Enmeshed with the Problem 20.3.2 Maintaining a Detached Perspective 20.3.3 Assuming the Flight Instructor Perspective 20.3.4 Looking at the PF 20.3.5 Beware of a PF’s Automatic Responses 20.4 Techniques for Scripted Callouts, Deviation Callouts, Risky Decisions, and Interventions 20.4.1 Making Scripted Callouts 20.4.2 Making Unscripted Deviation Callouts 20.4.3 Making Callouts about Risky Decisions 20.4.4 Making Interventions 20.4.5 Getting an Overly Focused Pilot to Comply 20.5 Case Study – Meeting Resistance from the Captain Notes Bibliography Section III: Introduction to Challenging and Non-Normal Operations III.1 Challenging and Non-Normal Events III.1.1 Mishap Rate III.1.2 Safety Margins III.1.3 Our Felt-Sense of Safety Margin III.1.4 How Our Strategies and Mindsets Change III.1.5 Types of Operations Note Chapter 21 Marginal and Deteriorating Conditions 21.1 Operations under Marginal Conditions 21.1.1 Emergence and Extreme Events 21.1.2 Unknown Actions Disguise Trends 21.2 How Deteriorating Conditions Affect Safety Margins 21.2.1 The Gap between Skills and Capability 21.2.2 Ego, Experience, and Expectations 21.2.3 Learning the Wrong Lessons from Simulator Training 21.3 Latent Vulnerabilities and Mishaps 21.3.1 Plan Continuation Bias 21.3.2 Locating the Failure Zone 21.3.3 Optimistic Assessments of Marginal Conditions 21.3.4 The View from Inside the Tunnel 21.4 Managing Risk in Marginal Conditions 21.4.1 Operational and Regulatory Boundaries 21.4.2 Written Guidance 21.4.3 Personal Boundaries 21.4.4 Continuing Operations – The “Go” Mode 21.4.5 Communicating Information Back to Central Operations 21.4.6 Reaching the Stopping Point 21.4.7 Practicing Failure in the Simulator 21.5 Planning and Selecting Game Plans under Marginal Conditions 21.5.1 Select Options that Reverse Rising Stress 21.5.2 Always Preserve an Escape Option 21.5.3 Plan an Approach for the Next Lower Available Minimums 21.5.4 Trust Experience and Intuition 21.5.5 Run Mental Simulations 21.5.6 Look for Leverage Points 21.5.7 Rank Reasonable Goals and Discard Unreasonable Goals 21.5.8 Select the Best Plan for the Current Conditions, Not for Future Consequences 21.6 Monitoring Game Plans under Marginal Conditions 21.6.1 Expand Situational Awareness 21.6.2 Accept Conditions As They Are, Not How We Wish They Would Be 21.6.3 Apply Aircraft Knowledge 21.6.4 Understand the Subtle Details Embedded Within Procedures 21.6.5 Plan Continuation Bias and Gray-Maybe 21.6.6 If We Need to Fly Our “Best Plus”, Then We Shouldn’t Continue 21.6.7 Guard against Reverting Back to Normal Habit Patterns While Still in Marginal Conditions 21.6.8 Search for Counterfactuals 21.6.9 Monitor Abort Triggers 21.6.10 Avoid Bumping against the Limits 21.6.11 Don’t Debrief during the Event 21.7 Marginal Conditions in Winter Operations 21.7.1 Make Braking Action Reports 21.7.2 Monitor Temperatures and Snowfall Rates 21.7.3 Anticipate Uneven Snow Accumulation 21.7.4 The Deformable Runway Surface Problem 21.7.5 The Tire Tread Problem 21.7.6 The Different Aircraft Problem 21.7.7 The Deceleration Problem 21.7.8 What GOOD Braking Action Means to Us 21.7.9 Effective Braking Techniques and Tire Alignment 21.7.10 Pavement Temperature near Freezing 21.7.11 Conga-Lines into High-Volume Airports 21.7.12 Infrequent Flights into Low-Volume Airports 21.8 Marginal Conditions in Summer Operations 21.8.1 Reduced Visibility from Rain 21.8.2 Windshear 21.8.3 Hydroplaning 21.8.4 Heat and Tires 21.9 Balancing Appropriate Operations in Marginal Conditions 21.9.1 Manage Stress and Keep the Pace Deliberate 21.9.2 Actively Manage Risk 21.9.3 Manage Rest for a Potentially Long Day 21.9.4 Follow Procedures to Control Complexity 21.9.5 Detect and Communicate Warning Signs 21.9.6 When Things Go Wrong, Start with the MATM Steps 21.9.7 Ask for Outside Help 21.9.8 Don’t Be Misled by the Success of Others 21.9.9 Ask Questions to Gauge the Appropriateness of Continuing Notes Bibliography Chapter 22 Non-Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Events 22.1 How Simulator Training and Line-Flying Emergencies Differ 22.1.1 Non-Normal Events Interrupt Our Operational Flow 22.1.2 Differences between Simulator Events and Line Events 22.1.3 Using Debriefing to Reframe Our Mindset 22.1.4 Advantages of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) Training 22.1.5 Recreating Unexpectedness and Context 22.1.6 How Consequence and Responsibility Affect Our Mindset 22.1.7 The Effects of Noise and Distraction 22.1.8 Recreating Complexity 22.2 Understanding How Exceptional Events Become Mishaps 22.2.1 The View from Inside the Tunnel 22.2.2 Our Subjective Perceptions 22.2.3 Understanding Accident Event Timelines 22.2.4 Calibrating Our Personal Awareness and Abort Triggers 22.2.5 Operational and Personal Priorities 22.2.6 Fatigue 22.2.7 Difficulty Processing Relevant Information While Overloaded 22.3 Emergency Procedure Strategies 22.3.1 Initial Reaction and Maintaining Aircraft Control 22.3.2 Analyze/Assess the Problem 22.3.3 Develop a Game Plan to Resolve the Problem 22.3.4 Take Appropriate Action 22.3.5 Maintain Situational Awareness 22.3.6 Adding Time to Manage an Emergency Event 22.3.7 Unknown Causes 22.3.8 Extreme Complexity 22.3.9 Sharing Our Stress Level with Other Crewmembers 22.3.10 Using QRH Checklists 22.3.11 Temporarily Dividing Workload and Duties 22.3.12 Studying Our Personal Biases Notes Bibliography Chapter 23 Time-Critical Emergencies 23.1 Emergencies with Little Time to React 23.2 The Effects of Startle and Surprise 23.2.1 Startle 23.2.2 Surprise 23.2.3 Startle and Surprise Comparison 23.2.4 How Startle and Surprise Affect Our Attention Focus 23.2.5 How Startle and Surprise Adversely Affect Our Decision Making 23.2.6 How Startle and Surprise Increase Our Vulnerability to Distraction 23.3 Recovering from the Effects of Startle and Surprise 23.3.1 Rehearsal 23.3.2 Body Positioning 23.3.3 First Look 23.3.4 First Step 23.4 Time-Critical Emergencies – Example Scenarios 23.4.1 Rejected Takeoff (Immediately Before the V[sub(1)] Callout) 23.4.2 Engine Loss/Fire Immediately Following Liftoff, But Prior to Gear Retraction 23.4.3 Directional Control Problems on the Runway at High Speed 23.4.4 Loud Bang near V[sub(1)] Notes Bibliography Section IV: Introduction to Professionalism IV.1 Career Progression and Professional Wisdom IV.1.1 Average Proficient Pilots IV.1.2 Comfortable Pilots IV.1.3 Master Class Pilots IV.1.4 The Professional Aviation Wisdom Gap IV.1.5 The Pursuit of Resilience Chapter 24 The Master Class Path 24.1 Establishing Our Master Class Intention 24.1.1 Career Advancement by Time versus Merit 24.1.2 Our Personal Commitment to Sustain Our Master Class Intention 24.2 Engaging in Deliberate or Purposeful Practice 24.2.1 Purposeful Preparation 24.2.2 Purposeful Briefing 24.2.3 Purposeful Execution 24.2.4 Purposeful Feedback and Debriefing 24.3 Committing to Life-Long Learning 24.3.1 Growth Mindset 24.3.2 Pursuing Depth of Knowledge 24.3.3 Integration of Knowledge and Experience 24.4 Embracing a Standard of Excellence 24.4.1 Everyday Excellence 24.5 Pursuing Perfection 24.6 Building Conscious Awareness 24.6.1 Meta-Awareness 24.6.2 Attention Drift 24.6.3 Level of Caring 24.7 Understanding and Overcoming Our Biases 24.7.1 Plan Continuation Bias 24.7.2 Representativeness Bias 24.7.3 Expectation Bias 24.7.4 Confirmation Bias 24.7.5 Specialty Bias 24.7.6 Framing Error Bias 24.7.7 Salience Bias 24.7.8 Fundamental Attribution Error 24.7.9 Distancing through Differencing 24.7.10 Automation Bias 24.7.11 My Biases 24.8 Countering the Forces that Drag Us Back 24.8.1 Countering Cynicism with Proactive Discussion 24.8.2 Reframing the Irritants 24.8.3 Embracing Change 24.8.4 Affirming Ownership 24.9 Continuing Our Aviation Wisdom Trajectory 24.9.1 Keeping Our Eyes on the Prize 24.9.2 Balancing Over and Under-Response 24.9.3 Keeping It Steady 24.9.4 Keeping It Smooth 24.9.5 Keeping Our Professional Aviation Wisdom Moving Upward 24.9.6 Keeping It Interesting Notes Bibliography Chapter 25 The Master Class Skillset 25.1 Countering Stagnation and Drift 25.1.1 Countering Declining Interest 25.1.2 Becoming Aware of Our Subconscious Actions 25.1.3 Guarding Against Shortcutting Procedures 25.1.4 Using Drift to Improve Resilience 25.2 Improving Skills by Studying Challenging Events 25.2.1 Managing Operations in the Gray Zone of Increased Risk 25.3 Proactive Debriefing 25.3.1 Characteristics of Effective Debriefs 25.3.2 The Meandering Course of Debriefs 25.3.3 Scheduling a Debrief Opportunity 25.3.4 Creating a Debriefing Habit Pattern 25.3.5 Questions That Encourage Proactive Debriefing 25.3.6 Debriefing a Significant Event 25.3.7 Debriefing Surprising Events 25.3.8 The Master Class Debriefing Perspective 25.4 Improving Our Judgment 25.4.1 Training versus Line Flying 25.4.2 Practicing Judgment during Everyday Line Flying 25.4.3 Imagining Scenarios 25.5 Improving Our Intuition 25.5.1 Our Intuitive Recognition of Risk 25.5.2 Our Intuitive Sense of Time Available 25.5.3 Limits of Intuition 25.5.4 Learning from Stories 25.5.5 Sources of Stories 25.5.6 Making the Story Our Own 25.5.7 Watching, Learning, and Sharing 25.6 Managing Uncertainty 25.6.1 Managing Uncertainty with Awareness 25.6.2 Gauging Trends 25.6.3 Imposing Tighter Criteria on Acceptability Notes Bibliography Chapter 26 Professional Attributes 26.1 How FOs Identified the Best Captains 26.1.1 Professional Competence 26.1.2 Personality 26.1.3 Team Building 26.1.4 Instructing/Teaching 26.1.5 Testimonial 26.1.6 Attributes as Ranked by FO Seniority 26.1.7 Relative Importance of Attributes 26.2 Surveying the Best Captains 26.2.1 Creating a Favorable First Impression 26.2.2 Open Communications 26.2.3 Team Building 26.2.4 Instructing/Mentoring 26.2.5 Personality 26.2.6 Professionalism and Standardization 26.2.7 Deliberate and Predictable 26.2.8 CRM/Customer Service 26.2.9 Best Captains Survey Summary 26.3 Master Class Professionalism 26.3.1 Moral Character 26.3.2 Pilots as System Monitors 26.3.3 Captain’s Authority 26.4 Professional Attributes across the Phases of the FO Career 26.4.1 Phase 1 – New-Hire/Probationary FO 26.4.2 Phase 2 – Experienced, Line-Holding FO 26.4.3 Phase 3 – Nearing Upgrade Notes Bibliography Glossary of Commonly Used Airline Terms Bibliography Index

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