Science Meets Philosophy: What Makes Science Divided but Still Significant

Description

The book is an attempt to bring together what are often seen as incommensurable scientific and philosophical positions. Its core argument is that a main reason for the divisions about what constitutes scientific knowledge relates to disagreements on philosophical issues. The book explores what these disagreements are about, and discusses whether they can be overcome. Taking a historical perspective, the book traces the divides in science back to three main philosophical traditions: realism, idealism, and scepticism. It maps how these have inspired three main current positions in science: logical empiricism, phenomenology, and sociology of scientific knowledge. The book is intended for a general audience concerned with today’s debates on scientific knowledge and society. It will be useful for students and researchers studying philosophy of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, realism, phenomenology, positivism, logical empiricism, analytical philosophy, and sustainable scientific knowledge. Cover Half Title Series Title Copyright Contents Preface 1 A king’s art 1.0 The line of argument in this chapter 1.1 How to study science 1.1.1 An uneasy relationship 1.1.2 What is the disagreement about? 1.2 Science meets philosophy 1.2.1 Four traditions and three positions 1.2.2 The methodological approach in this book 2 Antiquity and the origin of the divides in philosophy of science 2.0 The line of argument in the chapter 2.1 Science before science: the Plato/Aristotle controversy 2.1.1 The nature of knowledge 2.1.2 Plato on knowledge and truth 2.1.3 Aristotle and the order of things 2.2 The emergence of modern logic 2.2.1 Critique of Plato’s and Aristotle’s methodologies 2.2.2 After antiquity: science and religion 2.2.3 The language of science 3 The realist track towards logical empiricism: the problem of conceptualising reality 3.0 The line of argument in this chapter 3.1 Empiricism 3.1.1 Phenomenalism 3.1.2 All science is science of man 3.1.3 Positivism 3.2 Logical empiricism 3.2.1 The non-existent King of France 3.2.2 The Vienna Circle 3.2.3 Discovering truth by observation and logic 3.3 Post-positivism 3.3.1 The logic of scientific discovery 3.3.2 Towards critical rationalism 3.3.3 The practical turn 4 The idealist track towards phenomenology: the problem of objectivity of thinking 4.0 The line of argument in this chapter 4.1 Constructivism: thinking at the centre of everything 4.1.1 A mind-dependent reality 4.1.2 Kant’s Copernican revolution 4.1.3 Synthetic a priori knowledge 4.2 Science in the post-Kantian world 4.2.1 The parting of ways: rationalism versus humanism 4.2.2 Existentialism 4.2.3 Explaining and understanding 4.3 Phenomenology 4.3.1 Striving towards the infinite horizon 4.3.2 Fundamental ontology 4.3.3 Communicative rationality 5 The scepticism track towards the sociology of science: the problem with the concept of knowing 5.0 The line of argument in the chapter 5.1 The practical turn 5.1.1 Beyond realism and idealism 5.1.2 Scepticism, rationalism, and evolution 5.1.3 The knowledge society: who killed the parrot? 5.2 Inside the whale 5.2.1 The historical embeddedness of thought 5.2.2 The critical theory tradition: against epistemology 5.2.3 Post-structuralism: the social construction of thought 5.3 Sociology of science 5.3.1 Pragmatism 5.3.2 A naked emperor: science as a social practice 5.3.3 Incommensurable paradigms? 6 Still a role for philosophy? 6.0 The line of argument in this chapter 6.1 A view from the moon 6.1.1 Scientific pluralism 6.1.2 Science in a post-metaphysical society 6.2 Sustainable scientific knowledge 6.2.1 Pending questions in the philosophy of science 6.2.2 To reach out into the unknown SmP References Index