Animal Suffering, Human Rights, and the Virtue of Justice

Description

In this book, Per Bauhn does three things. First, he outlines some aspects of contemporary philosophical views on animals and morality, including the criticism of speciesism and the animal rights argument. Second, he criticizes these views, arguing that we cannot escape a speciesist perspective on morality, and that there are no good reasons why we should believe that non-human animals have moral rights. Third, he argues that cruelty against non-human animals is morally wrong, but not because animal rights are being violated but because human agents who inflict cruelty on non-human animals are failing their duty to develop in themselves the virtue of justice. This latter argument is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s idea that we have only indirect duties towards animals, but unlike that idea, Bauhn's argument does not depend on any causal hypothesis that humans who are cruel to animals are likely to be cruel also to their fellow humans. Instead, Bauhn's argument relies on the fact that being cruel to non-human animals and other innocent beings is conceptually and logically inconsistent with the virtue of justice – a virtue which agents are rationally required to develop in themselves. Preface Contents About the Author Chapter 1: Introduction References Chapter 2: The Suffering Inflicted on Non-Human Animals by Human Agents References Chapter 3: Speciesism References Chapter 4: Sentientist Equality 4.1 Singer and Animal Rights 4.2 Regan and Animal Rights References Chapter 5: Kant on Duties to Animals References Chapter 6: Gewirthian Human Rights and Non-Human Animals References Chapter 7: Why Non-Human Animals Do Not Have Moral Rights References Chapter 8: In Defence of a Speciesist View of the Moral Community 8.1 The Amoral Order of Nature 8.2 The Case for Eating Meat References Chapter 9: Duties Regarding Animals and the Virtue of Justice References Index